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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The thesis sets out to critique recent accounts dealing with the notion and role of 
ontology in IR theorising as it can be found, for instance, in Alexander Wendt and more 
recently in the writings of critical realists. The main aim of these treatises on ontology is 
to provide a new perspective for IR theory that is in line with a more general critique of 
epistemological foundationalism and strict empiricism. Thereby these accounts rely 
upon an interpretation of scientific realism as it can be found in the Philosophy of 
Science.  
The thesis shows how these approaches to ontology on the one hand overcome 
epistemological foundationalism but, on the other hand, reaffirm a form of ontological 
foundationalism through the apodictic positing of ‘intransitive objects’ that exist outside 
and independent of the human mind. Such an approach, rather than leading to a new and 
better conception of ontology, reifies the same biases of Cartesian subjectivity, the 
designative nature of language, a correspondence theory of truth and the problem-laden 
concept of freedom as it was conceived in Kant’s third antinomy. In response to these 
approaches whose general aim at reconceptualising ontology must be welcomed, the 
thesis develops a new approach that does not recreate the same problems in a different 
fashion but tries to overcome them through a reconceptualisation of the term ontology 
itself. The basis for the thesis is to be found in post-Husserlian phenomenology, a body 
of literature that has so far been widely ignored in IR theorising. By explicating the 
main tenets in the thought of such eminent philosophers as Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur the thesis reconstructs the notion of ontology on the basis of 
an enquiry into the meaning of being in general and human being in particular. From 
this perspective a new approach to the notions of agency, language, truth and freedom 
becomes possible without recreating the rifts and foundationalisms that characterises 
many approaches to social and political relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“At first philosophy hid in her womb the germs of all sciences; 
 but once she had given birth to them and given them motherly  
care during their infancy, and once they had, under her tutelage,  
become mature and great, she is not averse to watching them go  
out into the big world in order to conquer it. For a while she  
watches them with loving care, perhaps now and again with a soft  
warning word that neither can nor wishes to restrict their  
newly won independence; eventually, however, she quietly  
withdraws to her retirement corner, from where one day, scarcely  
noticed and scarcely missed, she will have vanished from the world.” 
 
Paul Natorp 
 
 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century IR theory seems to be as vibrant and diverse as 
never before in its 90 year old history as an academic field. The traditional theoretical 
outlooks of realism and liberalism in their different varieties have been supplemented 
by a plethora of so called critical accounts that draw on different sociological, 
philosophical and anthropological insights developed through the course of the 19th and 
20th centuries. The most prominent and influential among these are post-/neo- Marxist 
accounts (Cox, 1981; Cox, 1983, Gill, 1993; Rosenberg, 1994; Taylor, 2003), different 
strands of constructivism (Onuf, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989; Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; 
Fierke and Jorgensen, 2001; Fierke, 2005; Guzzini and Leander, 2006) and post-
structuralism (Der Derian, 1987; Campbell, 1998; Edkins, 1999).  
One feature that recently developed in the wake of this ‘reflective turn’ (Keohane, 
1988) is the renewed occupation with ontological stipulations and concerns regarding 
the units and structures and their interrelation that constitute the international system. 
(White, 1997; Wendt, 1999; Wight, 2006; Kurki, 2007) With the rise of constructivist 
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literature in all its various forms we have learned that the wisdoms of old that relied 
upon either ideas or material capabilities to explain political outcomes and (state) 
behaviour are too simplistic and under-socialised in their attempts to grasp the 
developments and events in international politics. Since the 1980s and especially after 
the end of the Cold War new approaches rose out of the ashes into which most IR 
theorising had deteriorated and promised a new take on processes of identity formation 
and the social dimension and its effects in the international system.  
 
What these critical accounts all share is a general suspicion against the modern 
scientific project that promised an application of reason and instrumental rationality to 
face and solve the increasing problems of humankind. Enquiries into the social world, 
they stipulate, cannot follow a strict scientific agenda modelled on the natural sciences 
as it was attempted after the second debate in IR between traditionalism and 
behaviouralism was decided in favour of the latter. Game theory approaches taken over 
from economics as well as strict quantitative or qualitative research designs dominated 
the field (especially in the US) throughout the better part of the 20th century. (see for 
instance Keohane et al., 1994; Jackson, 2008: 130) The hope they exhibited was deeply 
reliant on and influenced by the modern epistemological project started with Cartesian 
scepticism and climaxing in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Based on this seminal 
development of Western thought the natural sciences that prospered since the 16th 
century could finally be reconciled with a philosophical outlook that fit with their 
insights and furthermore they were now bestowed with a task of deciphering and 
dispelling the last remnants of mysticism regarding natural phenomena. (Baumann, 
1978: 10-1) Reason was destined to illuminate the dark corners where irrationalism and 
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superstition had ruled for the last 1000 years. The trial of reason would decide which 
insights yield knowledge and which can be discarded as mere belief and story-telling. 
Scientific explanation and experimentation, many were convinced, will gradually reveal 
the secrets of nature and achieve a total control over its domain.  
 
In the mainstream accounts in IR theory we can clearly identify the ramifications of this 
radical shift in Western thought. Neo-realism and neo-utilitarianism in general are 
committed to a ‘scientific’ approach that should wield universally valid and necessary 
insights into the realm of international politics. The quest for causal explanations and 
the positing of constitutive features such as anarchy, security dilemma and power 
politics served and still serve as the basic points for enquiries into the nature of the 
international system. Surely there were early sceptic voices such as Hans Morgenthau in 
Scientific man versus power politics (1946) but those voices were mainly sidelined by 
the seemingly compelling insights into dynamics of state action and their underlying 
determinants. The Cold War was hereby probably the biggest and most favourable 
playground adherents to a scientific approach to IR will ever get. The dream to 
conceptualise IR according to this modern epistemological outlook entered a process of 
decline, however, with the sudden and surprising end of the Cold War. One of the actors 
within this period of ideological stand-off decided to pursue a way of action that was 
neither fitting nor really explicable in the terminologies of the then predominant 
approaches to international politics. The challenge in the form of what is now subsumed 
under the large umbrella of constructivism was looming at the horizon throughout the 
1980s and found early expressions in publications such as Kratochwil’s Rules, Norms 
and Decisions (1989) or Onuf’s World of our making (1989). At the beginning of the 
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1990s it saw its chance and penetrated the hitherto rather closed discipline. Since then 
the variety of new, critical or reflectivist accounts, as they have been labelled, increased 
tremendously and so did their influence in IR, at least in the European approaches. (on 
the differences between American and European understandings of IR see for example 
Waever, 1998) 
The eventual breakthrough could no longer be ignored when Alexander Wendt with his 
Anarchy is what states make of it  (1992) reached for the first time deep into the 
community of IR and presented a different approach to analyse and indeed understand 
the processes of change in the international system. Since then the field of reflectivist 
accounts has been diversified with many different research agendas and competing 
ontological and epistemological claims. What could be glimpsed here already, however, 
is a slight shift away from the modern preoccupation with devising methods to establish 
valid and true knowledge about the international system towards renewed thought about 
the entities and their conceptualisation that constitute the international system; in other 
words we could see a renewed emphasis on ontological questions in certain corners of 
IR theory. Alexander Wendt, for example, whose work will be looked at more closely in 
chapter I was explicitly concerned with developing a different ontology of IR, stating 
that the “most important move is to reconceptualise what international structure is made 
of.” (Wendt, 1999: 20)  
 
Aim and Scope of the thesis 
 
The challenges alluded to above raised new and substantial questions regarding the 
foundations for research within the study of International Relations. “Recent years have 
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seen a marked resurgence of debates about the philosophical foundations of empirical 
inquiry throughout the social sciences. … the conceptual sophistication of the study of 
politics has certainly been on the increase.” (Jackson, 2008: 129) One of the most 
sustained and prevalent discussions in this new-found sophistication relates to the status 
of the entities we study. As Jackson rightly pointed out the concern with questions 
regarding the nature and status of the entities towards which our research efforts are 
directed is closely tied to the demise of the Enlightenment ideal to achieve a 
presuppositionless and objective science that, relying upon the right epistemological 
tools, will present a true and accurate mirror-image or representation about how the 
world ‘really is’. (ibid.: 130) Such a fundamental challenge, even when originally 
concerning very abstract considerations, must have and already had a profound impact 
on the study of social and political phenomena. If we overturn the Enlightenment ideal 
of science and its concomitant focus on epistemological questions, “then we have to 
fundamentally rethink the ways in which we conduct and evaluate empirical research in 
IR.” (ibid.: 131) 
 
Exactly here do we find the main concern of this thesis. In light of the challenges 
expounded against the ideal of presuppositionless science we encountered many 
different approaches to engage this problem. Fundamental to all of them are the central 
assumptions about the things and entities we are trying to understand and their relation 
to human existence. Such an enquiry will therefore necessarily bring us back to the 
notion of ontology as we have to enquire and conceptualise the beings we are dealing 
with as well as their nature and characteristics. Following this renewed interest in the 
status and nature of beings “we should bring ontological considerations to the forefront 
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of our reflections about the status of the knowledge that we produce in our research.” 
(ibid.: 132) 
The main aim of this thesis is in line with this demand and tries to deliver a reflection 
on the notion of a social ontology, i.e. a conceptualisation of the nature of beings in the 
international system and their relation to one another. It is important to note from the 
beginning that there are basically two different ways to conduct such an enquiry. The 
first is to reiterate differing ontological positions and develop a new or more elaborate 
one which fits better with the criticisms outlined above. Such an endeavour, as 
promising as it may be, would however still posit the existence of beings as given. Of 
course, this is not to suggest that we should question or even abandon the assumptions 
that beings exist. What it does require though, and here we reach the second way in 
which an ontological reconceptualisation can be conducted, is an engagement with the 
fundamental question of what it means to be. Rather than simply acknowledging that 
beings are and then  try to grasp what they are we should first of all clarify what it 
actually means to be – in other words it seems even more fundamental to start with the 
notion of being rather than right away with the various beings we encounter and their 
status and nature. This thesis is therefore not concerned with attempting to 
conceptualise yet another ‘ontology’ and devise a further ‘theory of international 
politics’. Arguably, we have seen too many of those already. Rather the thesis will 
proceed by reflecting on the notion of ontology as such and how it has been 
conceptualised in IR theory so far. In other words, where scholars like Alexander Wendt 
were motivated to critique existing ontologies (for Wendt that predominantly meant 
structural realism) and sought “to explain the latter’s cultural conditions of possibility, 
and in so doing the basis for alternative, ‘non-Realist’ cultures of anarchy” (ibid.: 15) 
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this thesis questions the understanding of ontology as such as we find it in these 
accounts. 
 It will argue that for instance Wendt’s attempt to conceptualise a different ‘culture’ of 
anarchy basically relies upon the same understanding of ontology as does Waltz’s 
structural realism. The only difference consists in an intra-ontology shift towards 
ideational rather than material factors or from a ‘dualist’ to a ‘monist’ conception. 
(ibid.: 132-4) A reconceptualisation of ontology, if it wants to be successful and not just 
reiterate the common dichotomies of ideas vs. matter, mind vs. nature or agency vs. 
structure, needs first and foremost a clear understanding of what ontology is all about in 
the first place, namely the question of the meaning of being. Before one can ask what 
different beings are and how they are such constituted one must ask what would the 
conditions for the possibility of such ‘what-being’ be.  
 
Here we find nothing new in many conceptualisations within IR. The main occupation, 
as can be seen in Wendt’s case for example, lies with a conceptualisation of what 
specific beings are, i.e. a delineation of entities that we suppose exist and are important 
for an understanding of international relations. A treatment of beings in their specificity, 
however, presupposes an at least implicit conception of being. Apparently, what all 
these different entities that occupy the international space have in common is the fact 
that they ‘are’, but what it means ‘to be’ is completely ignored and subsumed under the 
modernist umbrella that seeks to fix the meanings of specific entities and then devise 
methods to establish knowledge of them. In Wendt’s case we learn that the international 
structure is “a social rather than material phenomenon.” (ibid.: 20) Subsequently, “this 
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leads to an idealist view of structure as a ‘distribution of knowledge’ or ‘ideas all the 
way down’ (or almost anyway)”. (ibid.) 
Wendt’s ‘new’ ontology therefore aims at the same outcome as Waltz’s, namely to 
grasp the ‘what-being’ of entities in the international realm in order to establish 
knowledge and explain outcomes in the international realm. For Wendt it is time to 
“rethink the dominant ontology of international structure.” (ibid.: 22) What ontology 
means for Wendt we learn when he says that “we all have ontologies, since we all make 
assumptions about what exists in the world: dogs, cats, and trees.” (ibid.) As we can see 
here again, and we will look at this more closely in chapter I, Wendt stipulates that 
ontology consists in delineating the different modes of ‘what-being’, i.e. of the ways 
things are but does not reflect on what it means to be. As will be argued throughout the 
thesis, the neglect of the question of the meaning of being is a major shortcoming in 
most forms of IR theory and a remnant of the modern outlook that relied in its quest for 
certain knowledge on clearly definable and fixed forms of being.  
Wight in a very similar fashion is concerned with the renewed focus on ontology which 
he perceives to lie at the heart of an enquiry into the social and political realm. “Politics 
is the terrain of competing ontologies. Politics is about competing visions of how the 
world is and how it should be. [...] If there were no ontological differences there would 
be no politics.” (Wight, 2006: 2) Wight posits two main arguments in his treatment of 
ontology as central. First, the real existence of unobservables and secondly the mind-
independence of intransitive objects – observables and unobservables alike.  
“A commitment to depth realism presupposes that there are things, entities, 
structures and / or mechanisms that operate and exist independently of our 
ability to know or manipulate them. […] Science is possible, then, because 
the world consists of ‘intransitive’ objects which form the focus of scientific 
discourses; with the aim of science in particular being the production of 
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knowledge of mechanisms that in certain combinations produce the 
phenomena that are actually manifest in experience / appearance.” (ibid.: 
29)  
 
Wight, in the same way as Wendt follows hereby the modern conception of ontology as 
substance-ontology which stipulates the existences of a clear subject-object distinction 
and the pre-given characteristics of objects that can be observed and represented by the 
human mind. (Frede, 2006: 44-6) It is this notion of ontology that the thesis tries to 
challenge by dealing with the meaning of being as such rather than the different beings 
we can encounter. 
 
The question therefore that will guide this thesis is ‘What is the meaning of being in 
relation to thought about international politics?’ We agree with Alexander Wendt and 
the many scholars who have made this claim since, that the notion of the social is 
crucial in understanding the international system and its many interlocking discourses 
and outcomes. In order, however, to say something profound about the social we would 
have to enquire first into the nature of human existence and the formation and meaning 
of human co-existence. A radically new social ontology for IR as we try to set out here, 
requires therefore a reflection of the notion of being that does not take for granted that 
we are but investigates more clearly into the question of how we are before moving to 
its different manifestations as entities we can study. 
In order to achieve such a reconceptualisation of the notion of being the thesis will draw 
on one of the most influential strands of Continental Philosophy in the 20th century – 
phenomenology. To be fair, although it seems right to claim that so far no 
conceptualisation of this new ontology has been attempted concerning its major 
elements, we can already witness scholars, albeit only a few, that seem to open paths 
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towards such a conceptualisation.1 The scope of the thesis is, however, broader and 
more basic than the attempts to conceptualise specific elements of human existence and 
their relation to international politics. The ontological premises, i.e. the meaning of 
being lie at present only dormant in these new lines of enquiry – they can be said to be 
still shrouded in darkness. 
In the following chapters this thesis sets out to deliver a peak behind this veil and aims 
at enquiring into the nature of being that might bring about a truly new social ontology 
for IR. The focus will hereby lie on the core elements needed to flesh out a basic 
framework of ontology – agency, language, truth and freedom. These elements will also 
be delineated more elaborately in chapter I. 
 
It seems important to point out from the outset that the quest of this thesis is not a 
foundationalist enterprise that seeks to base our understanding of the international 
system on yet another system of a priori metaphysical assumptions be they ideational or 
materialist in nature. The argument that an enterprise as it is proposed here almost by 
necessity will present a foundationalist enterprise seems invalid since, as the following 
chapters will show, this enquiry is not guided by the question for meaning but rather by 
the quest for understanding. It seems necessary at this stage to develop this distinction 
somewhat further.  
A foundationalist enterprise would aim at defining or allocating fixed meanings to a 
given set of core terms such as agency, freedom or truth. If, however, the focus lies with 
understanding it seems possible to enquire more fundamentally into the framework and 
                                                 
1 The work of the more critically oriented constructivists as well as post-structuralists can be seen in this 
light. 
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conceptualisations that lie at the heart of a social ontology and so to say provide the 
sediment of its practical implications and epistemological commitments. It is in this 
sense an exposition of the possibilities of experience in the social realm, not in the sense 
that we try to find what becomes possible to say about the beings in international 
politics but what makes any attempt to approach this what-being possible itself. This 
argument, however, seems rather questionable itself since it posits understanding as 
preceding interpretation. The predominant view on the relationship between 
understanding, interpretation and meaning would suggest that we encounter a situation 
or proposition, then we interpret it and by interpreting it we achieve an understanding of 
it and therefore allocate a meaning to it. This sequence, however, as will become clear 
in the course of the thesis is itself inherent in a specific kind of ontology, namely 
substance-ontology. In fact, we encounter any situation or proposition with an 
understanding (in a practical rather than theoretical way) always already in place. Based 
on this preconceptual understanding which exhibits our direct, practical and constant 
involvement in a context informs our interpretation and subsequently the formation of 
meaning. The sequence therefore would be: understanding a situation or proposition out 
of an always already existing context, formulating an interpretation of it and then 
designating a meaning to it. If we follow this line of reasoning, understanding will 
prove to be the more fundamental condition. (for such a view on the relation between 
understanding and interpretation see Risser, 1997: 131) 
What such an ontological enquiry into the nature of understanding therefore delivers is 
not an abstract consideration of meaning but a practical exposition of understanding and 
therefore a way for renewed reflections on the nature of being, especially human being. 
From this perspective it is clear now that we are not aiming at delineating theoretical 
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facts about core concepts but praxeological features which condition the practical 
possibilities of the social ontology subsequently conceptualised. We do not ask ‘What is 
agency?’ but rather ‘What are agents doing?’, we are not asking ‘What is language?’ but 
rather ‘How is language used?’, we are not asking ‘What is truth?’ but rather ‘How are 
practices verified?’ and we are not asking ‘What is freedom?’ but rather ‘What are the 
praxeological conditions of action?’.  
All this already suggests that apart from these concrete questions dealing with the 
practical understanding of core terms of a different social ontology, the thesis is in its 
entirety also an exposition of a much more fundamental revolution in IR theory. What 
this new social ontology in fact presents is a challenge not just to specific 
methodological, theoretical or epistemological issues that arise within the field of IR but 
a fundamental disagreement about the ontology of human existence and social and 
political interaction that we find in many accounts prevalent today. As was mentioned 
above, we can already see the first signs in which such a new social ontology is implicit 
in accounts of language and its role in understanding processes and outcomes in the 
international sphere. The methodological, theoretical and epistemological disagreements 
that we face in IR today are in this light just reflections or effects of this deeper 
challenge. The problem, however, is that this challenge has never been clearly 
explicated. Instead of spending some energy on clarifying its scope and substance for 
itself, many accounts got bogged down into skirmishes about particular methods or 
assumptions. Certainly, these concrete theoretical and methodological debates are an 
exhibition of a lively field and, likewise, the empirical research agendas connected to it 
should be pursued. Complementary to these, however, it seems high time to finally get 
down to the basic conceptualisation of this new social ontology and investigate what 
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understanding it brings to the study of IR and how it therefore differs on this level from 
its opponents. In this sense, this thesis will provide a philosophical reconceptualisation 
of social ontology that on the one hand will explore key concepts such as agency, 
language, freedom and truth in their practical application as well as provide a broader 
and substantive re-assessment of the challenge that such an enterprise poses to our 
understanding of ontology and the meaning of being as we find it currently in most 
accounts of international relations.  
 
The way to a new social ontology – Post-Husserlian phenomenology 
 
As was already touched upon above, the thesis will in the following lines aim at a 
philosophical exposition of core elements of a new social ontology. As was hinted at 
above the real challenge would lie with a radical reconceptualisation of the notion of 
ontology and therefore the meaning of being that overcomes the impasse of Cartesian 
dualism.  
The ontology developed over the course of this thesis will therefore draw upon the 
insights of one of the most influential philosophical movements since the late 19th 
century – phenomenology. In many phenomenological thinkers we find a different 
approach to the problems connected with Cartesian dualism that does not follow the 
trodden modern path and its quest for an absolute foundation to resolve the dualism in a 
form of immanent or transcendental unity. Rather, when seen from a post-Husserlian 
phenomenological standpoint which will inform the conceptualisation of our new social 
ontology, the problem of the dualism does not arise in the first place and therefore does 
not have to be resolved. This, of course, implies a completely different ontology and 
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therefore a completely different view of the human agent and its relation to his or her 
environment.  
 
When referring to the movement of phenomenology it soon becomes clear that we will 
have to deal with one of the most controversial thinkers of the 20th century, namely 
Martin Heidegger. Given his involvement with the Nazi movement it seems necessary 
to say something about the relation of his thought to the study of political and social 
phenomena right in the beginning. If we look around the literature in IR we encounter 
mostly silence when it comes to Heideggerian or post-Heideggerian thought. Notable 
exceptions such as Louiza Odysseos’ The Subject of Coexistence (2007), Richard 
Shapcott’s Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (2001) 
(although we have to say even here that Shapcott’s Gadamer is more Habermasian than 
Heideggerian) or Michael Dillon’s Politics of Security (1996) are rare. Admittedly, 
Hannah Arendt’s thought finds appreciation among political theorists (see for instance 
Lang and Williams, 2005; Hayden, 2007 and Owens, 2007) but most of these accounts 
present Arendt’s thought in a very much sanitised and decontaminated way in which 
direct links to Heidegger are hardly ever made. Why is this so? 
The simple and obvious answer is certainly linked to Heidegger’s commitment to the 
NSDAP especially and pre-eminently during his 10-month rectorship of the University 
of Freiburg in 1933/34 in which he indeed and undeniably was a driving force in the 
Gleichschaltung of the German universities. (for a detailed account see Ott, 1994: 133-
263) This complicity also signalled a larger break since “[u]ntil Heidegger no member 
of the philosophical clan had ever been linked to such a degree of complicity with the 
history of brutality. This uniqueness underscores all the conundrums of der Fall 
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Heidegger.” (Chytry, 1993: 86) Almost worse than his involvement with the Nazis 
seems his refusal to apologise or regret his allegiance after the end of WWII. He 
remained defiant until his death in 1976 as towards accepting any responsibility for his 
political commitment during Germany’s darkest hour. (Paskow, 1991: 522) Here it 
seems that although “[h]is later retraction has been accepted by many, […] others who 
watched him at that period have found his words and actions hard to forget and 
forgive.” (Bixler, 1963: 121; see also Pavel, 1988: 887) Even to former friends such as 
Karl Jaspers he maintained an attitude of innocence retreating most often into the 
mystical and poetic ruminations that characterised his later thought when it came to the 
topic of the intertwinement of his philosophical thought and Nazi Germany.  
It is indeed both his stubbornness and his actual involvement with the Nazis that cost 
him many sympathies in the academic world and so far made the application of his 
thought in politics or IR departments a minefield. There is hardly any doubt that 
Heidegger did certainly not represent the average and dedicated Nazi, fiercely anti-
Semitic (although there are even voices who utter such a view on Heidegger; see for 
instance Rubenstein, 1989) and all in all very primitive and profane in his outlooks. 
(Lacoue-Labarthe, 1989: 484) Rather, Heidegger saw the possibility for a new 
beginning in Nazi ideology, a beginning that would overcome the Seinsvergessenheit he 
always highlights in his thought. (Chytry, 1993: 94) The Nazi movement for Heidegger 
was not about world domination or the annihilation of the European Jews but about a 
realisation of being that could help overcoming the predicaments of modern humankind 
by drawing attention once more to the fundamental ontological rather than 
epistemological questions. In his view “[a]ll that was merely a ruined revolution and not 
the great renewal based in the spiritual and moral strength of the people, which 
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Heidegger had dreamed of and yearned for as the preparation for a new human 
religion.” (Gadamer, 1989: 429) To be clear, even if we can confirm that these were the 
motives behind Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis, it does in no way and by no 
means exonerate his political commitment to the most ruthless and heinous political 
movement of the 20th century.  
From Heidegger’s perspective, however, his commitment had nothing to do with the 
primitive worldly aims of this movement. As Gadamer pointed out: “But Heidegger was 
also no mere opportunist. If we wish to dignify his political engagement by calling it a 
political ‘standpoint‘, it would be far better to call it a political ‘illusion’, which had 
notably little to do with political reality. If Heidegger later, in the face of all realities, 
would again dream his dream from these days, […] the later version would embrace his 
deep disappointment over the actual course of affairs.” (ibid.: 428) In fact, he very soon 
became disillusioned with the movement and realised around 1934 that the Nazis were 
not the Heilsbringer des Seins (saviours of being) he had hoped for – he nevertheless 
remained a member of the NSDAP until 1945.  (Rubenstein, 1989: 179) To this extent it 
seems justified to ask “[w]hat would be meant by [his break with National Socialism] – 
an open statement, public protest, resigning from the party, or something similar to how 
such things happen in a society of laws and legality?” (Gadamer, 1989: 427) Taking his 
membership in the NSDAP, his rectorship and his refusal to accept responsibility for his 
commitments between 1933 and 1945 together, Heidegger in many circles became a 
persona non grata. The story, as always in such cases, is, however, more complex than 
this.  
The question that is hereby of most interest to us and for any attempt to introduce 
Heidegger’s thought into the realm of politics is simply how intertwined are 
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Heidegger’s political commitment and the thrust of his thought. In other words, does 
Heidegger’s thought cannot but lead to authoritarianism, is his entanglement with the 
Nazis in line or even worse a logical consequence of his philosophical approach? To 
clarify this right in the beginning, we cannot hope to settle these questions in a definite 
manner, given that this discussion is raging for well over 50 years. There will always be 
scholars who maintain that Heidegger the person is inextricably linked with Heidegger 
the philosopher which means that a separation of whatever kind remains a dangerous 
and unjustified split between thought and action that so detrimentally coincide in 
Heidegger’s case. (Farias, 1989; Wolin, 1990) For these voices, Heidegger remains and 
must remain outside serious philosophical contemplation, with the possible exception 
for the history of philosophy, since his thought is intrinsically linked with the Nazi rule 
in Germany and in a wider context an example of authoritarian thought at its worst. 
(Rubenstein, 1989) “In contrast to what may have been said, Heidegger’s involvement 
is completely consistent with his thought. And the intermixture of ‘politics’ with 
‘philosophy’ was so strong that, after his ‘break’ with the party and until 1944, 
practically all his teaching was devoted to explicating National Socialism, an effort that 
in reality gave rise to the truth that Heidegger … believed to have perceived … .” 
(Lacoue-Labarthe, 1989: 482) 
On the other end of the spectrum we find those who maintain that a separation between 
Heidegger the NSDAP-member and Heidegger the greatest philosopher of the 20th 
century not only can be made but must be made. (Pavel, 1988: 888) “It is possible to 
hold that it is one thing to show that Heidegger’s political and ideological sentiments 
share a great deal with the conservative revolutionaries and that it is quite another to 
argue that the philosophy has been fatally tainted by those sentiments.” (Chytry, 1993: 
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89) After all, Heidegger’s magnum opus Sein und Zeit was written throughout the 1920s 
and published in 1927, full six years before the Nazis rose to power in Germany. 
Additionally, if we read Sein und Zeit it seems indeed hard to maintain that this book 
foreshadows in any concrete way Heidegger’s political commitment in the 1930s. The 
book is inherently philosophical and does not touch on any political issues or subjects 
directly. “For although it is undeniable that in Sein und Zeit there are vague echoes of 
themes found in Nazi ideology (on community, the hero, history, and destiny), the work 
is after all a treatise on ontology.” (Paskow, 1991: 524) As such it can be seen as a 
purely philosophical work that is open to many different interpretations and therefore 
can be misused as was Nietzsche’s philosophy during the Nazi reign. (for positions 
supportive of Heidegger in this way see Fédier, 1988; Derrida, 2004) 
Of course, both positions have convincing and less convincing arguments. In respect to 
the first position, it is certainly true, and that has been reported by Gadamer and Jaspers 
for instance, that Heidegger’s thought as well as Heidegger himself showed inclinations 
to monological and authoritarian points of view. (Grondin, 2003a: 271, Habermas, 
1989: 433) In this respect it seems indeed hard to maintain a separation between person 
and thought by only hinting at the manifold of possible interpretations. And although it 
is certainly correct to point to other examples such as Nietzsche’s thought that have 
been misused for political purposes during the Nazi era, the fact still remains that 
Heidegger joined the Nazi party, executed its doctrines regarding the restructuring of 
the German universities and remained a member until the end of the war. That goes 
certainly further than a mere misinterpretation of his thought for Nazi purposes.  
On the other hand, it seems awfully one-dimensional and spotlighted to simply label 
Heidegger a Nazi in practice and thought. It is indeed true that Heidegger in his early 
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career was not interested or engaged in any political activities. His early writings and 
indeed his main work shows no signs of political conviction in one way or the other. It 
might be true to say that his style of reasoning tends towards a monological, elitist and 
maybe even authoritarian proclivity but to deduce from this a necessary and inextricable 
link with Nazi ideology seems somewhat of a stretch. “If this connection was so firm, 
why did Heidegger subsequently back away from that philosophical necessity to etch 
out or reiterate an alternative philosophical position during the period of National 
Socialism’s greatest advances in the middle and late 1930?” (Chytry, 1993: 89) We can 
certainly assume that Heidegger in his thought was influenced by or at least remained 
situated in a particular political and social climate that found its way into his works. To 
infer from this, however, that his thought cannot but has to be linked to the rise and 
world view of Nazi Germany seems unjustified. (Paskow, 1991: 524) 
As was said above, we cannot hope to resolve this debate especially given the fact that it 
lies outside the scope of this thesis. What we have to do, however, is to at least develop 
a standpoint that expresses the views and utility of Heidegger’s thought for the current 
enterprise. In this line we follow the group of Heidegger scholars and historians who try 
to situate Heidegger’s thought historically and accept his political involvements 
without, however, forfeiting the chance to reclaim Heidegger’s thought in a careful and 
thorough way. (for such a position see for instance Dallmayr, 1993) It is surely true that 
the circumstances in the Weimar republic, the chaotic and unstable political situation 
after the humiliating capitulation in 1918 left their mark on Heidegger. He had served in 
WWI although he was never deployed to the front lines due to its heart condition and 
found himself in difficult personal circumstances both in a material as well as ideational 
sense. His constant struggle with Catholicism, his repeatedly disappointed hopes for a 
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permanent academic position and his peculiar rootedness in the rural life of southwest 
Germany added to the difficult circumstances under which he developed his 
philosophical approach. (Gray, 1970: 237;  Ott, 1994: 42 and 92-4) Again, this is not to 
exonerate the later trajectory of his life by pointing at ‘difficult’ circumstances but to 
point out the conditions under which he matured to become the author of Sein und Zeit 
and subsequently one of the most prominent philosophers of the 20th century. “A 
reevaluation of Heidegger’s place in the context of 20th-century German intellectual life 
is needed, as is a demonstration that the Heideggerian philosophical horizon is still 
relevant for contemporary moral and political concerns. But Heidegger’s admirers 
should realize that, in relation to great philosophers, devotion does not preclude 
distance.” (Pavel, 1988: 895) Even Habermas, himself certainly not a supporter of 
Heidegger, notes that “one consideration is particularly important from the start. 
Illumination of the political conduct of Martin Heidegger cannot and should not serve 
the purpose of a global depreciation of his thought.” (Habermas, 1989: 433) This is the 
case because a “rigorous conception of the unity of work and person seems to me 
inadequate to the autonomy of thought and, indeed, to the general history of the 
reception and influence of philosophical thought.” (ibid.) 
In this line we have to accept, whether we want to or not, that Heidegger’s philosophy 
did exert an influence not only in Germany, probably not even mostly in Germany, but 
around the world that can hardly be overstated. Many of the leading philosophers in the 
later half of the 20th century engaged with Heidegger’s thought either to develop it 
further as we can see in Gadamer, Arendt, Löwith or Jonas or to overcome it as for 
instance Foucault, Derrida, or Habermas. No matter which group we look at Heidegger 
was a seminal influence on their work and we cannot hope to grasp the scope and 
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substance of these philosophers without at the same time analysing and considering the 
influence Heidegger’s thought exerted on them. As his former student Gadamer pithily 
observed: “Whoever thinks we can here and now dispense with Heidegger has not 
begun to fathom how difficult it was and remains for anyone not to dispense with him, 
as opposed to making a fool of oneself with supercilious gestures.” (Gadamer, 1989: 
430) 
In this sense Heidegger has already made it into IR especially into the post-structuralist 
strand and it seems high time to acknowledge his influence and engage more directly 
but still critically with his thought. The present study aims at doing exactly this. As will 
become clear, Heidegger is one of the main thinkers in this study but by far not the only 
one.  
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
In order to develop the philosophical path towards a new social ontology roughly 
outlined above the thesis will proceed in two parts. Part A which is comprised of 
chapters I and II we will lay the foundations for the delineation of a new social ontology 
from a phenomenological angle. Chapter I hereby aims first at preliminarily outlining 
the central claims made in recent publications as towards the nature and role of 
ontology in IR theorising. The focus will hereby lie with two prominent examples in 
shape of the recent studies of Alexander Wendt and Colin Wight and their shortcomings 
in respect to their understanding of ontology. The chapter will also develop the core 
terms which will inform the thematic chapters in part B of the thesis.  
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Chapter II will depict the major thinkers and concepts as well as the trajectory of 
phenomenological thought from its inception in Brentano, through its most systematic 
formulation in Husserl to the Heideggerian turn and its aftermath. The aim hereby is to 
introduce the core elements of this school of thought which will be substantiated and 
elaborated upon in the actual thematic chapters in Part B. Furthermore, an overview will 
be presented that covers the main ramifications of Heidegger’s thought which will 
inform the later analysis.  
Part B, the main part of the thesis, consists of four thematic chapters each of which 
deals with one core term central to social ontology and aims at providing a 
phenomenological framework that clearly develops and substantiates these basic 
elements. 
Chapter III will deal with the conceptualisation of agency in phenomenological thought 
drawing mainly on the work of Heidegger and Gadamer. The chapter hereby proceeds 
in three steps the first of which is an outline of the standard view on agency in 
modernity, labelled detached agency, which is also to be found in the mainstream neo-
utilitarian accounts in IR. This will be followed by a deep analysis and exposition of the 
phenomenological critique of this concept of agency leading to a conceptualisation of 
engaged agency which as will be argued in a third step is an existential analytic that in 
its emphasis on continuous involvement and situatedness of human being portrays a 
powerful critique of the dominant Cartesian conception of agency. 
Chapter IV illuminates the role of language within human existence. It hereby outlines 
first the modern account which conceptualises language as a system of signs that allows 
human agents to designate and communicatively relate to the world. Such an 
understanding which is labelled designatory conceives of language as picturing an 
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outside world and designating meaning to objects by using words. It relies hereby on a 
detached view of agency in which the word is corresponding to a picture or idea in the 
mind of the individual agent. In reaction to this, the expressivist view of language as it 
can be found in the later Wittgenstein as well as in different phenomenologists will be 
depicted. The chapter hereby draws on the thought of Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger. Important hereby is the argument that language does not picture an objective 
reality outside our minds with pre-given and logically structured meanings. Rather 
linguistic practices constitute a world and assign meanings according to socially formed 
rules that can and do change. Language is situated in public discourse rather than in 
individual minds and as such always reaches beyond the individual language user.  
Chapter V will deal with one of the most contentious subjects in modern thought – the 
role and notion of truth. The chapter aims at a reconceptualisation of the notion of truth 
starting with the modern correspondence theory of truth and moving from there in a 
second step to a critical phenomenological enquiry. The thinkers relied upon here will 
be Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur. The focus will lie with conceptualising truth as 
disclosure or deconcealment, an interpretation that is central to the work of Heidegger, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur. 
Chapter VI looks at the role freedom and its conceptualisation under the new social 
ontology. The possibility of human freedom is certainly one of the most discussed 
elements in modern philosophy and received attention by all major thinkers within the 
modern era. Yet it has to be clearly stated that there is anything but agreement about the 
character, role and scope of human freedom; the assessment reaches from a strict 
determinism as can be found in Spinoza to a positing of transcendental freedom as 
absolute spontaneity in Kant. Since a social ontology would have to cope with the 
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notion of change and choice it seems necessary to elaborate more clearly on the 
conception of freedom that frames possible actions for human agents. The chapter will 
hereby shortly outline different conceptions of freedom in modern thought and move 
from there to a phenomenological treatment of the matter that seems to open the notion 
of freedom towards an understanding of human existence and the interplay between the 
human agent and her world. The authors relied upon in such a conceptualisation will be 
Kant, Schelling and Heidegger.  
The four elements presented in the main part of the thesis seem vital in finding a 
philosophical framework that sets the ontological possibilities out of which the more 
concrete concerns in respect to theory building and research methods in IR arise. After 
having developed these four elements from a new ontological angle guided by post-
Husserlian phenomenology we will conclude by drawing the different strands together 
and elaborating specifically on new avenues of research made possible by such a 
reconceptualisation of social ontology (in other words we will reflect upon its ‘added 
value’) as well as showing further elements within its wider scope which are in need of 
further treatment and clarification. As such this thesis has to be seen as an initial 
undertaking that, to say it with Heidegger, aims at providing a ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) 
which allows new perspectives to arise and new research to be done. It is in this sense 
not meant to provide a ready-made and finished product but in many ways it will have 
to be refined beyond the initial conceptualisations presented here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
 
Preliminary Conceptualisations 
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I The quest for a new social ontology in IR – Against a 
‘metaphysics of presence’ 
 
 
“The most thought-provoking thing in our  
thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.”
 
Martin Heidegger 
 
 
 
Fifty years ago Peter Winch published his seminal work The Idea of a Social Science 
and its Relation to Philosophy (2008). The impact of this book has wielded many 
lasting and fierce discussions in which the then already perceived views of a 
Continental and an Analytical strand of philosophy found new expression. The general 
argument Winch elaborately defended took shape before the background of the 
prevalent but misguided attempt to model the Social Sciences on the Natural Sciences. 
“That the social sciences are in their infancy has come to be a platitude amongst writers 
of textbooks on the subject. They will argue that this is because the social sciences have 
been slow to emulate the natural sciences and emancipate themselves from the dead 
hand of philosophy” (Winch, 2008: 1) The aim of his study was to defend an 
independent conception of the social sciences that was still oriented towards a scientific 
understanding without, however, aiming at emulating the methods and theoretical 
assumptions of the natural sciences. In particular, Winch opposed the often perceived 
role of philosophy as an ‘underlabourer’ occupation that is parasitic on the different 
strands of scientific enquiry. (ibid.: 3-6) Instead he tried to show that any social science 
that tries to grasp social ‘reality’ cannot do without a philosophy in place that is 
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occupied with conceptualising the conditions for the intelligibility of the world in 
general. In this sense, for Winch at least, the philosopher will be concerned with 
illuminating these conditions for intelligibility and understanding in general as well as 
in particular for the philosophies of science, religion, art and so on. He explains the 
difference between the general and the particular conceptions of philosophy when he 
maintains that “whereas the philosophies of science, of art, of history, etc., will have the 
task of elucidating the peculiar nature of those forms of life called ‘science’, ‘art’, etc., 
epistemology will try to elucidate what is involved in the notion of form of life as such” 
(ibid.: 39) 
Since the publication of this path-breaking reconsideration of the social sciences as 
apart from the natural sciences and their relation to a conception of philosophy, many 
new accounts have arisen that seemingly break with the original endeavour to reduce 
the social sciences a ‘natural science of society’ or explore new ways in which it is 
possible to be scientific and critical at the same time.  (see for instance Wendt, 1987: 
355 and 370) 
What is of interest for us in respect to the current enquiry is the way in which a new 
conceptualisation of international politics has been attempted in reflective literature. 
(the term ‘reflective’ is here understood in the sense of Keohane, 1988) Among the 
many different contributions to this burgeoning field one can find a renewed interest in 
matters concerning the entities IR as an academic field is interested in. Rather than 
starting from a ‘positivist’ epistemology and a delineation of what can be known and 
how to achieve this knowledge, scholars interested in ontology propose an approach that 
reverses this order. (Wendt, 1987: 352; Wight, 2006: 3) One of the first who attempted 
an ontological reconceptualisation in wake of the reflectivist turn in IR was Alexander 
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Wendt in his constructivist approach to world politics. Many commentaries and 
critiques have been written regarding Wendt’s constructivism and its idiosyncratic 
attempt to bridge the gap between a social ontology and a ‘scientific’ epistemology. 
What still seems floating around from these early days of constructivism in the field of 
IR is his concern with ontology which recently has been picked up by group of scholars 
who label themselves ‘critical realists’. (Wight, 2006; Kurki, 2007; Joseph, 2007; 
Patomäki and Wight, 2000) Again, in their literature, and we will closely examine 
Wendt and a proponent of critical realism shortly, we find a strong commitment to 
ontological enquiries as a starting point for our endeavours in the field of IR. (Wendt, 
1999: 22; Wight, 2006: 2; Patomäki and Wight, 2000: 216-9) 
The entities we encounter in the international realm need more attention, so the 
argument goes, since the primary focus on epistemological or methodological issues 
only distracts from the fundamental ontological basis which alone gives rise to these 
matters. (Wight, 2006: 1-2) Epistemological and methodological approaches always 
already rely on ontological assumptions about what entities are there in the international 
realm to be studied. (ibid.: 2) In this sense proponents of this ‘ontological turn’ 
emphasize the importance of reconceptualising exactly these entities in order to detect 
and eliminate epistemological and methodological problems that arise out of a wrong 
ontology. On the forefront of this movement is a group of scholars who label 
themselves ‘critical realists’ and draw their insights from specific parts of the 
philosophy of science, especially the work of Roy Bhaskar. (Wendt, 1987: 352fn.; 
Patomäki and Wight, 2000: 217-8; Kurki, 2007: 364-5fn.) Much attention has been 
drawn to this group of scholars as can be seen in a variety of publications in main IR 
journals as well as the appearance of book-length studies. (Wendt, 1999; Patomäki and 
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Wight, 2000; Wight, 2006; Kurki, 2006; Wight; 2007a; Wight, 2007b; Kurki, 2007, 
Joseph, 2007) 
As will be argued, however, this renewed focus on ontology in IR is misguided as it 
reproduces the difficulties of the approaches it criticises by merely shifting the 
foundationalist element from epistemology to ontology. The problem lies not in the 
superficially conceived ‘new conceptualisation’ of the entities in the international realm 
and any subsequent means to know them. Rather, it seems, the whole notion of ontology 
these accounts rely on is bound to repeat the mistakes and impasses they aim to 
overcome. If we want to reclaim ontological themes for IR and provide the field with a 
new impetus to engage in research from a critical angle more is needed than a mere shift 
within the foundationalisms we have encountered so many times. 
Starting with a detailed critique of these recent attempts to tackle ontological problems 
and open ways for new and alternative ways of research within the field of IR, this 
thesis sets out to sketch a new social ontology that does not fall prey to different forms 
of foundationalism and that penetrates deeper into the philosophical underpinnings of 
IR theory. In Winch’s spirit we try to overcome the view of philosophy as a mere 
henchman of science and grasp the challenges conceptually and substantially in their 
philosophical domain before bringing them to bear upon International Relations. 
 
What is needed is therefore a thorough and basic reconceptualisation of ontology in the 
light of the reflectivist critiques extended against much ‘mainstream’ work in recent 
debates. The argument is not aiming at defending or critiquing any specific form of IR 
theory or even providing yet another ‘theory’ of international politics. The selection of 
Wendt and Wight as examples for (failed) attempts to reinvigorate ontological 
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conceptualisations is deliberately not meant to be a criticism or defence of specific 
approaches in IR theory but provides the entry point from which a much more basic and 
substantial reconceptualisation of the philosophical framework for much of IR theory 
and the social sciences in general can be attempted. Our focus lies with the ontological 
conditions that set the frame for the study of international politics and in this light we 
must first and foremost be concerned with achieving a conceptualisation and 
understanding of ontology that overcomes the narrow ‘metaphysics of presence’ 
prevalent in treatments of ontology right now. 
Following Winch’s argument that any attempt to grasp and understand social and 
political ‘reality’ must be supplemented by a philosophical delineation of the conditions 
that make such an understanding possible and subsequently and attempt to understand 
‘forms of life’, the thesis sets out to deliver such a delineation by conceptualising a 
framework for a new social ontology. As it is impossible to consider all the relevant 
contributions to such an endeavour we will discuss two exemplary works that explicitly 
dealt with the notion and role of ontology in IR. The thesis proceeds therefore by 
criticising two reconceptualisations of social ontology, drawing on Alexander Wendt’s 
Social Theory of International Politics (1999) and Colin Wight’s Agents, Structures, 
and International Relations. Politics as Ontology (2006). As will be shown, both tried 
to develop a new take on the notion of ontology and its relation to and role in enquiries 
into the social and political realm. Their endeavours, as are those by other confessed 
critical realists, rely upon a specific strand of the philosophy of science, namely 
scientific realism. As we will depict the main tenets of this approach below it suffices to 
say here that by relying upon this approach they want to challenge the dominance of 
epistemology and reclaim ontology and specifically the ‘reality’ of unobservables which 
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is denied by a strict empiricism. (Wendt, 1987: 352; Patomäki and Wight, 2000: 217-8) 
In this way they call for a renewed treatment of the ontological entities existing 
independently ‘out there’ and critically investigating the different ways in which they 
constrain and enable human behaviour. (Wendt, 1987: 355 and 370; Wendt, 1995: 75; 
Kurki, 2007; 364-5; Joseph, 2007: 346) 
Both authors, however, as will be argued, fail in their attempts as they remain stuck 
within modern notions of ontology and epistemology which only allow a mere shift of 
focus but not an original reconceptualisation of the dimensions that frame any enquiry 
into international politics. Rather than being content with a mere shift of focus the thesis 
will deliver a suggestion on how to overcome the established and derivative frame of 
thought that still holds many critical accounts in IR captive. As such it has to be 
understood as an iconoclastic enterprise that aims at radically overcoming the standard 
conception of ontology with its concomitant notions of agency, language, truth and 
freedom.  
Secondly, this chapter will show how such a radical break is already practiced in parts 
of IR theory in which especially the use of language has contributed to a conceptual 
rupture in the study of social and political relations. These already practiced instances of 
iconoclasm within IR theory will provide the entry point for the remainder of this thesis 
in which the main pillars of a new social ontology for IR will be developed. 
After outlining the current problems remaining in instances of reconceptualising 
ontology in the study of IR and instances in which a new way to deal with it has already 
emerged the chapter proceeds in a third step to delineate the main characteristics and 
notions of a social ontology for IR which have to be outlined in subsequent chapters. 
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Ontology in the spotlight – Wendt, Wight and the shadow of the ‘metaphysics of 
presence’ 
 
As was already mentioned above, the current thesis does not present an intra-IR theory 
argument but is more interested in a different ontological conception of human social 
and political life. The level of this enquiry is therefore not one that necessitates a direct 
involvement in the debates between realism, liberalism, constructivism and 
poststructuralism (whatever these labels may stand for). Instead the thesis tries to think 
through the conditions for the possibility of developing these different ‘theories’ 
ontologically. As was already pointed out above and as will be substantiated below, 
ontology in most accounts is understood as a delineation of the meaning and nature of 
beings but completely ignores, much in line with modern thought, the treatment of the 
question what it means ‘to be’. Ontology as will be shown in the remainder of the thesis 
can wield more fundamental insights into the nature of social and political processes 
and dynamics when understood as the quest for the meaning of being as such and in our 
case the meaning of human being in particular. To be clear about this point right in the 
beginning, the ontological delineation of the meaning of human being is not an 
argument that advances yet another stand for individualism as opposed to structuralism 
in IR theory. ‘Human being’ refers to the totality of human existence in the world, not 
to the individual human being. In Heidegger’s words we will be concerned with Dasein 
and not with subjectivity which as we will argue along Heideggerian lines is only 
derivative of Dasein (human being in general). (Macomber, 1967: 29) 
In this way the thesis will progress without delving into the now prevalent polemics of 
labels that haunts much theorising in IR. We are not interested in categorising scholars 
according to ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments but we are 
T o w a r d s  a  n e w  s o c i a l  o n t o l o g y  P a g e  | 35 
 
asking the deeper question of what conditions make the different conceptions of social 
and political processes that underlie these different accounts possible. In order to 
illuminate on these processes the attempts of Wendt and Wight, although they never get 
off the ground, must be welcome. It is indeed the case that in order to think about a 
study of the social and political world we must return to the question of being, i.e. to 
ontology which suffered a miserable existence in the shadow of epistemology for the 
better part of the modern era.  
Wendt and Wight seek to delineate a ‘different’ ontology (read: an ontology that relies 
upon the same characteristics as before but with different emphases) to be able to gain a 
different form of knowledge about the international system. This attempt, however, is 
mainly concerned with fixing and establishing the nature of beings rather than focussing 
on the deeper question what it actually means to be. In other words, whereas Wendt and 
Wight still operate within the notion of ontology as a study of beings this thesis will 
break through to the more basic, phenomenological level of being. From this 
perspective, and again taking the cue from Heidegger, Wendt's and Wight's analyses are 
stuck on the ontic level that deals with the immediate conceptualisation of beings as a 
metaphysics of presence. 
The conceptualisation of being, however, as it is attempted here, is not only much more 
fundamental than those of Wendt and Wight but also more basic. We are not aiming at 
delineating a metaphysical and foundationalist account of being by theorising on a 
systemic level but we are simply trying to delineate what it is to be human and involved 
in a social and political world by looking at and describing what human beings do in 
their everyday lives. This approach as was outlined above takes its cue from 
phenomenological thought in the second half the 20th century. Much in line with this 
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philosophical school we are not aiming at defining essences or fixing specific meanings 
to beings but ask the question what it means to be in the first place. That means that the 
focus of this thesis does not lie with a theoretical appropriation of social and political 
processes which rely on an a priori established ground as is still the case with Wendt 
and Wight but by looking at the question of how beings (entities in our enquiry) are able 
to be what they are and in which relation human being stands to other forms of being. 
As this enquiry takes place on a higher level of abstraction and generality the findings 
are not confined to the study of international politics but pertain to the study of the 
social world in general of which the occupation of IR is only one aspect. 
 
Having outlined the general trajectory of the thesis in respect to its scope we can now 
proceed to the examination of the authors mentioned above. As was argued, we will 
find attempts to reconceptualise ontology in the publications of Wendt and Wight 
which, as will be shown consist in a mere shift of emphasis and exhaust themselves in 
yet another discussion about the relation of material and ideational forces. We will find 
the entry point to a more radical and fundamental reconsideration of ontology in 
examples that elaborate on the role and importance of language thereby having already 
entered into new ontological terrain without however, conceptualising the breadth and 
scope of this challenge (arguably because the aims of the scholars in question lie 
somewhere else in the scholarly debate).2
 
                                                 
2 Examples of this kind of consideration of the role of language can for instance be found in the work of 
Nicholas Onuf, Karin Fierke and Friedrich Kratochwil. 
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Alexander Wendt, scientific realism and rump materialism in pursuit of a social 
ontology 
 
Alexander Wendt was among the first scholars in IR that introduced the broad 
movement of constructivism in the discipline hitherto dominated by neorealism and 
neoliberalism. Although constructivism was on the rise throughout the 1980s and 
conceptually used in relation to IR by Nick Onuf (1989) and Friedrich Kratochwil 
(1989), Wendt’s seminal article Anarchy is what states make of it (1992) opened the 
discussion and subsequent rise of constructivism. As was said above we are not 
concerned here with delineating or even heuristically delimiting the field of 
constructivism as we can find it in IR practice today. What we are interested in is the 
challenge that was posed early on by this newly developing strand of social and political 
enquiry to the underlying ontological assumptions in most ‘mainstream’ accounts at the 
time. Alexander Wendt aimed among other things at an explicit re-evaluation of 
ontology as he found it in the study of international politics. (Wendt, 1999: 6; Smith, 
2000: 162) In his articles (Wendt, 1987, 1995) and more elaborately in the subsequent 
book Social Theory of International Politics (1999) he claimed that a renewed 
discussion about ontology is unavoidable if we want to achieve a better understanding 
of the international political realm.  
In his book-length study which was written as a reply and critique to Waltz’s seminal 
and very influential Theory of International Politics (1979), Wendt spends even more 
time to delineate and defend his new social ontology against structural realism. As we 
only take Wendt as a starting point for our subsequent enquiries we will not be 
concerned with the specific claims he makes in respect to a ‘theory of international 
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politics’. Rather we focus on the question to what extent his ontology is new and can 
solve problems that befall theories of international politics in general. 
From the outset we find that Wendt is situating his study as “an attempt to rethink the 
dominant ontology of international structure.” (Wendt, 1999: 22) Wendt’s shift in his 
ontological account consists in his critique of the overly material and individualist 
conception of states in the international system he finds in Waltz. He argues that a more 
ideationally, i.e. socially guided conception of the system will contribute to more 
conceptual clarity and a better understanding of processes and behaviour in the 
international realm. (ibid.: 20) He nevertheless remains committed to the notion of 
scientific enquiry as well as a rump materialism which should ensure a certain base of 
facts to place his ideational components on. (ibid.: 96) 
Apart from the fact that Wendt consciously reifies the state as something given and 
subsequently focuses only on the construction of a specific systemic culture among 
these states we also find a specific endorsement of scientific realism to underline and 
justify this move. (ibid.) In his defence of scientific realism – as overcoming the 
intrinsic problems in what he terms empiricist and postmodern anti-realist strands – we 
find the starting point of our critique. Scientific realism as Wendt understands it posits 
the world as existing independent of the human mind and outside any linguistic 
conventions. Wendt argues that material facts condition the way in which human beings 
encounter the world and these material facts and their constraining consequences have a 
causal relation to the formation of interests and identities. (ibid.: 110-113) His argument 
proceeds hereby in two steps; first he looks at the real existence of observables and 
moves from there to an argument that should also prove the real existence of 
unobservables. 
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In respect to the first contention that scientific realism provides proof of a mind-
independent world in which material conditions constrain human action he appeals to a 
common sense argument. Dismissing the ‘postmodern’ proclivity towards a relational 
theory of reference which allows only reference to discourse and not to accurate and 
true facts, he states: “The main problem with the relational theory of reference is that it 
cannot account for the resistance of the world to certain representations, and thus for 
representational failures or misinterpretations. Worldly resistance is most obvious in 
nature: whether our discourse says so or not, pigs can’t fly.” (ibid.: 56) Wendt appeals 
hereby to certain facts that are simply materially given and do not depend on any human 
conceptualisation or discursive structure and therefore assume an independent causal 
moment. Pigs cannot fly because they are pigs – this has nothing to do with any human 
involvement, it is just a material fact. At first glance this argument seems watertight 
since any claim that pigs cannot fly because humans have decided it or that they could 
fly just because humans decided it is ridiculous. If we look closer, however, we can see 
that this argument is in fact not as secure as it seems. To restate the claim, material facts 
exist independent of the human agent and therefore constrain human action to a certain 
degree. The power of constraint does not come from any human conceptualisations or 
theory but lies in the nature of specific material entities in the mind-independent world 
– which means that pigs cannot fly because they are pigs. 
Surprising as this may sound, this stipulation is simply not correct. It is right to say pigs 
cannot fly on earth but they can fly, as can humans, on the moon. Therefore we can find 
conditions under which pigs cannot fly and others under which they can. Now, at first 
this argument seems pedantic since human life at least at the moment is organised on 
earth and therefore it can hardly matter whether pigs can fly on the moon or any other 
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planet. In fact, however, the appeal to conditions under which pigs can fly reveals the 
weakness in Wendt’s argument. Remember, for his account of material conditions as 
causes to work, they must evolve out of the nature of the mind-independent object. But 
in the case of the pig they obviously do not. What prevents the pig from flying is not its 
own nature as pig but specific conditions on earth – gravity. Gravity, however, is only 
one way and in fact a human way to state why pigs cannot fly. The notion of gravity 
developed historically with the rise of the natural sciences. In a religiously guided 
discourse we would find the argument that God and not gravity decided whether pigs 
can fly or not, maybe even that God is constantly pushing the pig down preventing it 
thereby from flying.3 Gravity as such and the concomitant belief in scientific enquiry 
can, however, not be understood independent from the human practices that constitute 
the natural sciences. 
This insight is of tremendous importance. If human beings try to discover the reason 
why pigs cannot fly and they appeal to a divine entity that made this decision, certain 
enquiries into the nature of our environment and its manipulability will follow and 
others will not. The assumption ‘humans cannot fly because God decided they cannot’ 
and the assumption ‘humans cannot fly because gravity prevents them from doing so’ 
lead to completely different social realities. In the first there is no point to enquire any 
further into the reasons or causes why humans cannot fly, in the second, however, we 
stipulate that there are certain discoverable reasons and causes and once we have 
discovered them we are able to manipulate them – we can invent the plane to counter 
the gravitational forces that hold us down. 
                                                 
3 A position in the history of philosophy which would represent this or a similar argument can be found 
for instance in Nicholas Malebranche’s occasionalism. 
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Following this line of reasoning further, Wendt is no longer able to maintain his claim 
that mind-independent, ‘real’ existent material facts are directly and causally linked 
with the formation of interests and identities. Even gravity is not just out-there. The 
notion of gravity and any appeal to its causal effects cannot be understood outside or 
beyond its, in this case scientific, framework. To appeal to divine intervention when 
explaining the pigs inability to fly is interwoven with the larger fabric of social practices 
to the same extent as is any explanation that refers to the forces of gravity. The meaning 
of both forms of explanations depends on legitimising processes in the society they are 
exercised in. In a secular society any appeal to divine intervention is labelled 
‘superstitious’ and any appeal to scientific mechanical causes in a religious society is 
labelled ‘blasphemous’. It is obvious that the explanatory power emanates from socially 
accepted and agreed upon practices and not from the material objects themselves. 
Overall, we can see that even common sense facts such as ‘pigs cannot fly’ are in fact 
deeply interwoven and dependent on human practices and not vested in the nature of 
objects in a mind-independent world.  
 
The case gets even worse if we move to unobservables which Wendt claims do also 
exist independent of the mind and language. (ibid.: 51) Here Wendt appeals to 
reasonableness when he maintains that the form of reasoning called “inference to the 
best explanation” (Wendt, 1999: 62) is the way forward. He readily admits that any 
appeal to an independent reality on these grounds is generally falsifiable but until such a 
falsification has been undertaken the fact stands as fact. (ibid.: 62-3) The problem, 
however, is that systems of verification and falsification are not neutrally established. 
There are different ways to conceptualise what a falsification consists in and likewise 
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different ways in which we can conceptualise what is reasonable to infer. It is historical 
blindness to assume that these standards that Wendt introduces here are value free and 
universally applicable. 500 years ago it was absolutely reasonable to assume that 
someone who suffered from epilepsy and went into seizures is actually possessed by the 
devil and has to be burned at the stakes or exorcised while today we would of course 
find it reasonable to look for a bio-chemical process in the brain to explain the 
symptoms. To assume that standards of falsification and reasonableness can be 
maintained outside social interaction and meaning-formation is simply historically 
myopic.  
The same is true for unobservables in the international system. Wendt brings up the 
example that it is ‘reasonable’ to assume the existence of the state based on the 
“activities of people calling themselves custom officials, soldiers and diplomats... .” 
(ibid.: 62) Apart from the fact that any appeal to custom officials, soldiers and 
diplomats already presupposes what it is suppose to establish, i.e. the existence of an 
entity that we call state it is of course by no means and under any circumstances 
independent of human (inter)action. Furthermore, if a state decides not to have a 
standing army or any diplomats, does it cease to be a state? Likewise, if a there are 
soldiers, custom officials and diplomats representing a specific territory, does that 
already constitute a state?  
So what are we left with in Wendt’s account? We have shown that his scientific realism 
is fundamentally flawed in positing a reality that is existent in an essential way outside 
human action or existence. We have argued that one certainly can maintain that matter 
exists but this matter has contrary to Wendt no intrinsic and immediate causal power in 
constraining human action as he stipulates. What has constraining capacity are the 
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socially created systems of meaning that approach this matter and draw it into the 
human realm and thereby imbuing it with meaning. What enables and constrains us 
therefore is not the material circumstances but the socially agreed upon rules under 
which matter acquires meaning. How else could one explain how material 
circumstances can enable and constrain humans in different social settings in different 
ways? The argument is not that there is no matter ‘out there’ but that any attempt to 
conceptualise this matter is already embedded in and derived from socially constructed 
rules of enquiry. What sets the limits are these rules and not the matter they give 
meaning to. 
 
Colin Wight and the ontological primacy of intransitive objects 
 
Colin Wight in his recent book Agents, Structures and International Relations. Politics 
as Ontology (2006) presented a case for rethinking and refocusing on ontological issues 
in even stronger terms than Alexander Wendt seven years earlier. Right at the outset 
Wight claims: “There are simply no epistemological or methodological divides to 
accept, defend or bridge.” (Wight, 2006: 1) The study of IR is in fact not about 
epistemology but about competing ontologies. “Politics is the terrain of competing 
ontologies. Politics is about competing visions of how the world is and how it should 
be. [...] If there were no ontological differences there would be no politics.” (ibid.: 2) 
For Wight therefore the task is clear: Scholars in IR have to rethink their competing 
ontologies in order to understand the conflicts and disagreements within the discipline. 
“As such, understanding the ontological differences that lie at the heart of competing 
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visions of the world should be the aim of any properly conceived critical discipline of 
IR.” (ibid.)  
What Wight has in mind becomes clear early on in the introduction when he launches 
an ill-fated criticism against Kratochwil’s position on matters of ontology and 
epistemology (or at least against the position he perceives to be Kratochwil’s). Wight 
says: “The epistemological way of approaching the issue is deeply ingrained and it is 
not only positivists who adhere to it. Friedrich Kratochwil ... argues that the important 
answers to fundamental questions concerning human action are located in our concept 
of knowledge.” (ibid.: 3) He clearly claims that Kratochwil takes epistemology to be 
prior to ontology and the two are basically causally linked in the way that “world-
images are dependent upon, and derived from, corresponding concepts of knowledge.” 
(ibid.) He goes on to claim that this “assumption is endemic within the discipline. The 
assumption is also wrong. What we think we know exists has no bearing on what 
actually exists.” (ibid.)  
Two elements are important here. First, it seems worthwhile to have a quick look at 
what Kratochwil actually says and then assess whether Wight portrayed the position 
correctly. Secondly, we must have a closer look at Wight’s proposed predominance of 
ontological issues over epistemological ones. If we refer to Kratochwil’s book Rules, 
norms, and decisions (1989), we find on page 21 (the page Wight cited to support his 
claims) the following paragraph: 
 
“How do we understand human action, and what roles do norms play in this 
process? The answers to these questions obviously depend upon our concept 
of knowledge, and this concept in turn, is constituted by our ideas about the 
world we live in and which we experience as reality. One way of 
approaching this problem is, therefore, to reconstruct images of possible 
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worlds and show their epistemological presuppositions. Such a procedure 
might enable us to see in turn the limitations of certain concepts of 
knowledge, based on certain world-images.” (Kratochwil, 1989: 21)  
 
Wight, as we have seen, takes this statement as an example of how epistemology is 
taken to be prior to ontology in the current debates in IR. A closer reading, however, 
reveals that Wight’s interpretation is simply and blatantly wrong. First, Kratochwil says 
that the answers to the questions he raises lie with the concept of knowledge. This 
concept of knowledge, however, “in turn, is constituted by our ideas about the world we 
live in and which we experience as reality.” (ibid., my emphasis) Epistemology is 
therefore not the basic ground out of which ontology arises but it is itself depended on 
our ideas how the world is – obviously an ontological argument. But Kratochwil goes 
further by saying that ONE way to approach the question he raises lies in the 
reconstruction of world images to uncover their epistemological presuppositions and 
then in turn reflect back onto the limitations of these epistemological assumptions that 
arise out of these world-images. What Kratochwil is in fact saying here is that ontology 
(world-images) and epistemology (systems of knowledge) are inextricably intertwined. 
The world we experience is based upon certain epistemological assumptions that in turn 
are limited by the world-image we have – ways of being and ways of knowing are 
inextricably intertwined. Kratochwil argues in fact for a dialectical relationship between 
epistemology and ontology and not, as Wight stipulates, for a primacy of epistemology 
over ontology. (Kratochwil: 2007: 72; see also Fierke, 2005: 7) 
This point is important because if Kratochwil is right, any claim to a primacy of either 
epistemology or ontology is wrong and Wight’s position is subsequently as misguided 
as purely epistemologically based approaches. In order to counter this argument, Wight 
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would have to show that ontological statements provide the basis for any enquiry into 
international politics and everything else is derivate of them. And indeed Wight makes 
this claim when he maintains that “[a]ll theories presuppose a basic ontology from 
which all other considerations follow. No ontology, no theory.” (Wight, 2006: 2) 
In chapter I of his book Wight sets out to lay down his assumptions regarding the 
primacy of ontological facts that exist independent of and prior to any system of 
knowledge. In this sense he admits right in the beginning “Both Wendt and I advocate a 
form of scientific realism” (ibid.: 15) His initial critique is a clarification of the relation 
between scientific realism, positivism and science. Positivism for Wight is not 
synonymous with science but only one particular strand within the philosophy of 
science. (ibid.: 17) In this sense, Wight maintains, one can be a scientist without being a 
positivist. “The scientific realist critique of positivism takes issue with many of the 
fundamentals of positivism, but it does so out of a sincere commitment to science as a 
valid practice in terms of knowledge generation, and importantly, one that can be 
extended to cover the social world.” (ibid.: 18) 
In principle Wight’s account of scientific realism relies upon three stipulations. 
“Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations, however, a series of 
metaphysical commitments is still implied. Broadly put, I consider these to be: 
ontological realism (that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to 
come to know it); epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced); and 
judgemental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible, in 
principle, to choose between competing theories).” (ibid.: 26) 
In the remainder of this section we will show how each of these commitments is 
incoherent and therefore undermines the overall account with which Wight tries to 
T o w a r d s  a  n e w  s o c i a l  o n t o l o g y  P a g e  | 47 
 
rethink and reconceptualise the role and nature of ontology for the social sciences and 
for IR in particular.  
 
Ontological realism and the quest for ‘intransitive objects’ 
In respect to the first point, Wight, as does Wendt, argues for a mind-independent 
reality that exists before and beyond the human agents that are engaged in delineating 
certain features of this environment. “A commitment to depth realism presupposes that 
there are things, entities, structures and / or mechanisms that operate and exist 
independently of our ability to know or manipulate them.” (ibid.: 29) In order to 
substantiate this claim which in due course should open the path towards a depth 
ontology or a depth realism Wight introduces the category of ‘intransitive’ objects. 
“Science is possible, then, because the world consists of ‘intransitive’ objects which 
form the focus of scientific discourses; with the aim of science in particular being the 
production of knowledge of mechanisms that in certain combinations produce the 
phenomena that are actually manifest in experience / appearance.” (ibid.) In Wight’s 
view these ‘intransitive’ objects exist and change without human interference and build 
the ontological foundation out of which the different sciences and varying 
epistemologies evolve. “On a realist ontology ... being is independent of human 
experience and / or expressions of it.” (ibid.: 28)  
The existence of these objects is not confined to either material or natural phenomena. 
Wight sees no problem in identifying ideal and social structures or entities as 
‘intransitive’ objects that exhibit a mind-independent momentum of existence and 
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which only subsequently are approached with different epistemological tools. He 
maintains, for instance, that  
“[m]odern capitalist societies, for example, have not always existed and 
there may well come a time when they cease to exist, and in this sense 
Bashkar is right to claim that they are not time-space invariant. 
Nevertheless, in another sense, it would be correct to formulate, in a 
conditional manner, a law of the form: ‘whenever such capitalist societies 
emerge, with the relevant structures, then these tendencies will operate’. 
Laws formulated in this conditional manner are commonplace within the 
natural sciences. And there is no reason why the social sciences should not 
also construct such laws.” (ibid.: 55)  
 
Therefore, Wight argues that we should “not rule out the idea of intransitive objects in 
terms of social inquiry. The events of 11 September 2001, the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
the Holocaust were as they were, independent of anything we might write of them 
today, just as the men in army battle dress are engaged in a particular activity, and one, 
it needs stressing, can be misdescribed by a putative observer.” (ibid.) 
Both assumptions, the existence of intransitive objects in the natural sciences as well as 
in the social sciences are, however misleading if not outright wrong. In the natural 
sciences the example of the statement ‘Pigs can’t fly’ discussed above is a case in point 
and does not have to be elaborated upon any further. Suffice it to say that the statement 
as such is never independent of the specific frame of reference which is created by the 
humans engaged in stating it. It is probably correct to say that matter in different forms 
exists; we can be agnostic about this. But as soon as we engage in naming this matter 
we already transform it into a social fact by drawing it into our awareness as humans. 
We never have a neutral stand towards objects in our world but always encounter them 
with specific conceptions and categories in place. Therefore, it seems fair to say, that 
although matter might exist beyond the human mind and has existed before the advent 
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of the human species, we as humans have no possibility to encounter matter as matter 
independent of our concepts of the world and anything in it. As will be elaborated 
further below, Wight as well as Wendt, to the detriment of their arguments ignore the 
constitutive role of language. 
Secondly, Wight also maintains as we have seen the existence of ‘intransitive’ objects 
in the social realm. It will suffice to consider one example in this respect, let us say the 
Iraq War in 2003. Wight, we assume, would argue that independent of how we interpret 
or evaluate this event later on, something happened at a specific point in time that 
subsequently qualifies as the object, intransitive object that is, for our studies. Again, 
Wight is correct in stating that ‘something’ happened there but this ‘something’ cannot 
be grasped as what it ‘really’ is beyond the human sphere of meaning. Even a seemingly 
neutral statement such as ‘In March 2003 the United States of America went to war with 
Iraq’ is full of value laden meanings that are socially dependent. For example, the terms 
‘United States of America’ and ‘Iraq’ presuppose the socially constituted notion of 
statehood. Some in the US administration might say, that America did not fight a war 
against Iraq but only against Saddam Hussein and his regime. Others might maintain 
that this whole event was actually not a war and we find certainly many different 
opinions on whether the ‘war’ has already ended or is still ongoing. Likewise, some 
people might say that the US attacked Iraq, others would say that they freed it, others 
might say they intervened. Some might say it is a form of imperialism, others that it is 
neo-colonialism, others that it was self-defence and yet others that it could even be seen 
as a humanitarian intervention. The problem simply is that although we might be able to 
conceptually realise that something happened, what this something ‘is’ cannot be 
described outside human existence and meaning exactly because the only way we have 
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to grasp these ‘intransitive’ objects is through language and language is never neutral 
(again, we will elaborate on this point below). 
Therefore, we end up with asking what this ‘ontological realism’ is actually worth and 
whether it can help us in any way to grasp ‘reality’ outside human existence and use it 
as a neutral base onto which we plant further evaluations and epistemological concepts. 
To be sure, this is not a denial of a material reality outside the human mind nor is it an 
endorsement of a radical idealism as will become clear as the argument of this thesis 
progresses. Rather, the whole endeavour can be seen as relying upon a wrong 
conception of ontology. 
 
Epistemological relativism and judgmental rationalism 
The second and third point Wight proposes in his model of scientific realism regards the 
epistemological relativism and concomitant judgemental rationalism that he endorses as 
key components of his approach. To begin with, Wight accepts the necessity of various 
ways of scientific enquiry to react to the variety of phenomena to be studied. “For 
scientific realists there can be no single ‘scientific method’. Understood as the attempt 
to provide depth explanations of phenomena, it must be the case that different 
phenomena will require different models of explanation.” (Wight, 2006: 19) 
Furthermore, he argues in favour of historically situated forms of knowledge. He 
accepts that at different points in time the epistemological categories and methods 
change. 
“..., since it is difficult to conceive of our minds being formed outside of the 
influence of specific societies, non-scientific knowledge is also historically 
specific. Different societies will instil different ideas and practices. Given 
the historically specific nature of knowledge, we have to accept the fact of 
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epistemological relativism; namely, that all beliefs are socially produced, so 
that knowledge is transient, and neither truth value nor criteria of rationality 
exist outside of historical time.” (ibid.: 39)  
 
So far, we would have no problem agreeing with Wight’s stipulations. He maintains 
beyond this epistemological stand, however, further assumptions that are highly 
problematic. First is the stipulation that there are intransitive objects that exist beyond 
and outside the epistemological and social realms. Why this is problematic we have 
shown above. Secondly is Wight’s assumption that albeit the historically conditioned 
nature of our knowledge we are able to rationally judge which theory or methodology 
that arises out of the epistemic cultures is ‘better’. He says: “Scientific realism is 
epistemologically relativist, that is, relativist about the transitive object, not 
ontologically relativist. And because it is knowledge of an intransitive object, some 
knowledge claims may be better than others. Hence there is at least the possibility of 
judgmental rationalism. The acceptance of epistemological relativism, then, does not 
require us to embrace judgemental relativism. In fact, there may be, and often are, good 
grounds for preferring one theory or account of some aspect of the world to another.” 
(ibid.: 39-40) These decisions, however, that should bring us to judgements about the 
value of differing theories about an intransitive object or its parts rely upon a specific 
epistemological framework in which they are exercised. To underline his point, Wight 
insists that what he identifies as the usually used ‘incommensurability thesis’ is actually 
wrong and cross-paradigm discussions and communication is possible. “..., there is no 
reason to assume that it is impossible to communicate between different theoretical or 
conceptual schemes or that a scientist cannot know the same object under two or more 
different descriptions. To show the difference between Newtonian and Einsteinian 
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dynamics and that the latter is an advance of the former the scientist must be capable of 
doing so.” (ibid.: 42) 
At first glance, again, Wight is of course correct to say first that different theories can 
be known and described by the same scientist and secondly that an evaluation which 
one is better is possible as for example is the case when comparing Newtonian and 
Einsteinian dynamics. There are, however, qualifications in respect to the latter claim, 
the claim that judgemental rationalism is possible, namely that it is only possible within 
an accepted frame of reference. In case of the comparison between Einstein and Newton 
it is obvious that both accepted a specific view of the world governed by scientific laws 
generally discoverable by human agents. The process of discovery and the subsequent 
process of proving a theory is presupposed. In cases, however, in which two completely 
different frames of reference meet Wight’s argument breaks down. If we talk about ‘the 
world’ and why it is rotating, for instance, we can indeed develop different ‘scientific’ 
theories and given the conditions under which theories are accepted (which of course 
are socially produced) we can say which is better. If we, however, address the question 
from a scientific and a religious point of view Wight’s judgmental rationalism is 
impossible. The scientist might argue that the world rotates because of specific physical 
laws; the believer will argue that it rotates because God has wanted it to. Which one is 
the better theory? The intuitive answer is that we can establish and prove the scientific 
arguments and the derived laws in many instances and show that it has general validity. 
This, however, already happens within the scientific framework which the religious 
believer will not accept. He will say that his theory is better because the sacred texts of 
revelation say that God created the world and therefore created it as rotating. In order to 
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accept this argument, however, we have to buy into his core assumptions which the 
scientist does not.  
Another way to find a ‘rational’ solution to this dilemma could be that the one cannot 
show that God exists but one can show that gravity exists. Thankfully, Wight provides 
us with a readymade counter-argument. He says that the model of science he proposes 
“[m]uch like gravitational and magnetic fields, ... cannot be empirically identified 
independently of its effects. Scientific realists argue that it can be known to exist 
through its causal powers, but not shown to exist.” (ibid.: 51)  
The same, however, can be said of God. We cannot prove that God exists but through 
his work we can know he exists. On this basis, for instance, looking at differing views 
on the causes of the hurricane Katrina that destroyed New Orleans we can either say 
that specific natural processes led to the disaster or we can say that God brought the 
destruction on the city to punish the promiscuous and blasphemous behaviour of its 
inhabitants. Like it or not, there is no way we can decide which ‘theory’ is more 
accurate or better. The force behind the causes for Katrina cannot be shown to exist, as 
scientific realists admit, and therefore our decision to ascribe causal power to natural 
processes or God is in this case dependent upon our system of belief. 
In this sense it remains to ask what Wight’s intransitive object, this ‘something’ that 
gives rise to our enquiries, scientific or otherwise, can actually achieve. We think the 
answer is obvious – nothing. 
 
Overall, therefore we are left with a rather problem-laden reconceptualisation of 
ontology. In fact we seem to have come full circle to the initial interpretation of 
Kratochwil’s argument that world-images and systems of knowledge are inextricably 
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intertwined and neither can justifiably serve as a secure and indubitable basis. The crux 
in Wendt’s and Wight’s arguments lies with the fact that they commit themselves 
willingly or not to a foundationalist enterprise and whether based on ontology or 
epistemology this move is indeed a very modern one. Wendt, of course would counter 
this argument and insist that his re-conceptualisation is thoroughly anti-foundationalist. 
He says: “... realism is anti-foundationalist. Thus, although it is common to conflate the 
two, the correspondence theory of truth does not entail epistemological 
foundationalism. What makes a theory true is the extent to which it reflects the causal 
structure of the world, but theories are always tested against other theories, not against 
some pre-theoretical ‘foundation’ of correspondence.” (Wendt, 1999: 58-9) 
What Wendt shows here is not that his theory is anti-foundationalist but that his 
epistemology is not monistic. For his whole account to work, as he admits and we have 
shown, there must be a mind-independent ontological ground which does not depend on 
any epistemological conception. If this ground exists independent of any epistemology, 
his epistemology might be ant-foundational but his ontology is not. Apart from that, 
scientific realism in the form Wendt and Wight present is not able to confirm the 
existence of this ontologically given reality beyond human existence. As was shown by 
reference to examples from the natural as well as social sciences above, any attempt to 
grasp these ‘intransitive’ objects unavoidably draws them into a web of linguistic 
meanings dependent on social practices. Ontology and epistemology are always 
intertwined and cannot be conceptualised independent of one another. Their attempt just 
to say and rely on what ‘is’ and then devise ex post epistemological tools to establish 
knowledge is as misguided as any attempt to devise epistemological devices in order to 
discern what ‘is’. Any conceptualisation of what ‘is’ already takes place within a system 
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of social meanings and knowledge in the same way as any conceptualisation of what 
can be known already exists within a framework of assumptions about what ‘is’. 
The key to the problems with the re-conceptualisations of ontology as attempted by 
Wendt and Wight in recent years is to be found in their views on language. As Winch in 
his seminal work in 1958 already argued: “To ask whether reality is intelligible is to ask 
about the relation between thought and reality. In considering the nature of thought one 
is led also to consider the nature of language. Inseparably bound up with the question 
whether reality is intelligible, therefore, is the question of how language is connected 
with reality, of what it is to say something.” (Winch, 2008: 11) 
It seems therefore that if we accept the initial thrust of Wendt’s and Wight’s arguments 
that a foundationalist concern with epistemology leads to a misrepresentation of the 
(social) world and a re-conceptualisation of ontology might provide some alleviation we 
have to start not by positing some ontological realm independent of human agency and 
therefore commit ourselves to an ontological foundationalism but rather ask what makes 
‘reality’ intelligible in the way it is. For this, it seems, we have to turn to the crucial role 
of language. 
 
Signs of a new ontology – the importance of language in the study of social and 
political phenomena 
 
We have seen above that language and the way we access beings linguistically does not 
allow for a representation of objective or ‘intransitive objects’ that lie outside the human 
purview. Before we elaborate, however, on the way language constrains and at the same 
time enables us in respect to grasping and constructing our environment it seems 
T o w a r d s  a  n e w  s o c i a l  o n t o l o g y  P a g e  | 56 
 
necessary to reflect quickly on the question how such a role for language becomes 
possible. As was already hinted at above, the focus on ontology that we find in scholars 
such as Alexander Wendt and Colin Wight reproduces the problems of foundationalism 
that we have encountered so many times before. It does so because the notion of 
ontology relies already on a pre-conception of the nature of being that subsequently 
leads to inconsistencies. One way to portray this pre-conception and show the way 
towards an alternative is a reflection on one of the most important philosophical 
movements of the 20th century, namely phenomenology. Especially in the work of 
Martin Heidegger can we find the starting point for a renewed reflection on the relation 
between human beings and the world as an ontological question. In his article The end 
of philosophy and the task of thinking (2007e) Heidegger explores the general attitude 
of ontology as metaphysics. This notion and understanding of philosophy we can also 
find in Wendt and Wight. As Heidegger points out:  
 
“Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole— the world, man, God — with 
respect to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. 
Metaphysics thinks beings as being in the manner of representational 
thinking that gives reasons. For since the beginning of philosophy and with 
that beginning, the Being of beings has showed itself as the ground (arche, 
aition, principle). The ground is that from which beings as such are what 
they are in their becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can 
be known, handled, and worked upon. As the ground, Being brings beings 
to their actual presencing. The ground shows itself as presence. The present 
of presence consists in the fact that it brings what is present each in its own 
way to presence. In accordance with the actual kind of presence, the ground 
has the character of grounding as the ontic causation of the real, as the 
transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects, as the 
dialectical mediation of the movement of the absolute spirit and of the 
historical process of production, as the will to power positing values. What 
characterizes metaphysical thinking that grounds the ground for beings is 
the fact that metaphysical thinking, starting from what is present, represents 
it in its presence and thus exhibits it as grounded by its ground.” (Heidegger, 
2007e: 432) 
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What we can find in recent publications on ontology is exactly this preoccupation with 
the presence of beings that provides the ground from which further investigations are 
conducted – what Heidegger called a ‘metaphysics of presence’. The preoccupation 
with the study of beings that are present (observables as well as unobservables) 
penetrates already into the realm of the modern mindset in which these ‘objects’ or 
beings are ontically empowered with forms of causation, characteristics to be known, 
elements to be controlled. We encounter here the objective attitude that sets the human 
being apart from these objects and makes them mind-independent. It is, however, 
exactly this move that brings back the dilemma that we thought was left behind. If these 
beings in their way of being are independent of human existence the question of how to 
bridge the gap between mind and nature remains. Even if we claim that forms of being 
can be grasped by different forms of knowing, any form of knowing, however 
determined, must account for the way the beings in question are known. A mere 
recourse to epistemological pluralism is not enough here. We find the source of this 
problematique in the attitude of encounter. As Heidegger rightly stated “an essential 
distinction prevails between comprehending the ensemble of beings in themselves and 
finding oneself in the midst of beings as a whole.” (Heidegger, 2007a: 99) 
The modern scientific attitude represents the first alternative that tries to comprehend 
the ensemble of beings in themselves. Compartmental science as we understand it today 
with its topical differentiation is first and foremost concerned with beings. “But what is 
remarkable is that, precisely in the way scientific man secures to himself what is most 
properly his, he speaks of something different. What should be examined are beings 
only, and besides that — nothing; beings alone, and further — nothing; solely beings, 
and beyond that — nothing.” (Heidegger, 2007a: 95) This attitude already presupposes 
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a concept of man that sees human beings apart from other beings and in possible control 
of them. Beings can be observed, known and manipulated in many different ways, 
within and across the different sciences. The boundaries of this ‘ensemble of beings’ are 
given by the way the essential features of the beings in question are observed. This is 
exactly the point where we encounter the abovementioned problem that leads us full 
circle to the problem we were eager to circumvent – the question of epistemology.  
The second alternative is grasped by the formulation of ‘finding oneself in the midst of 
beings as a whole’. Here the gap between mind and nature seems avoidable when we 
accept that human beings are not ontologically detached from the environment they live 
in. The question, however, that obviously arises out of this conceptualisation is how, 
when placed into the midst of beings, these beings can be grasped as a whole. There are 
two elements that seem to be important. First, Heidegger argues that in different moods 
we relate to the totality of beings in different ways. (Heidegger, 2007a: 99-100; see also 
Macomber, 1967: 78-80) Secondly, and more importantly for us right now, is the fact 
that whereas the boundaries in the first alternative were determined by observation form 
the outside, in the second alternative they are constructed linguistically from the insight. 
Wittgenstein was right to claim in this respect that “die Grenzen meiner Sprache 
bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt (the limits of my language constitute the limits of 
my world)” (Wittgenstein, 1961: 114-5). We find similar ideas in Heidegger’s dictum 
that “language is the house of being” (Heidegger, 2007c: 237) and Gadamer’s “being 
that can be understood is language.” (Gadamer, 1979: 432) 
Subsequently a major shift occurs in our conception of the beings around us and our 
role in constituting them. As we will see below, to grasp the way beings are requires a 
deeper investigation into the meaning of being and especially human being. Human 
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beings are not just present among or beside other beings. Rather human being or Dasein 
is constitutive of the meaning of beings it encounters, or, in other words, Dasein let 
beings be what they are.  
We can see here already that a simple inclusion of linguistic determinants into the 
ontological conception we found in Wendt and Wight will not do as the role of language 
hinted at here overturns the whole ontology they present, or even more radically, it 
overturns the whole meaning of ontology they exhibit. As Wittgensteinian scholars in 
IR have already pointed out, language is crucial here since it is not just a set of "labels 
that can be compared with the world. Wittgenstein demonstrates that language is 
constitutive of the world. We cannot get behind our language to compare it with that 
which it describes." (Fierke, 1998: 3)  
An enquiry into the nature of beings must necessarily start with an account of the form 
of being that encounters the beings in question and draws them into its awareness. We 
will have to say a lot more about this ‘drawing into awareness’ in the remaining 
chapters. What is clear already, however, is that if we want to conceptualise a path that 
overcomes the problems encountered in forms of epistemological or ontological 
foundationalism we must radically challenge the way beings were apprehended in the 
sciences as we understand them today. Such an enquiry is exactly what is attempted 
here for the social and political world. With this task in mind, it should also become 
clear now why such a sketch of a new social ontology cannot be limited to one field 
such as IR alone. It is indeed a challenge that in its scope transgresses the boundaries of 
the different sciences and their methodological and theoretical apparatuses that aim at 
determining what beings are for their studies. 
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Having so far established the shortcomings of the reconceptualisation of ontology in IR 
that can be found in recent literature we would now have to show that role of language 
sketched out above in somewhat more detail. The discussion here has to be seen as 
preliminary as we will discuss the role of language within the proposed ontological 
framework at length in chapter IV. The focus in the following section is therefore 
informed by Winch's general suggestion that any judgment about the intelligibility of 
reality relies upon a specific conception of language.  
 
Towards an expressivist understanding of language 
 
We have so far dealt with the contentions of scientific realism as it is presented in some 
circles of IR theory in respect to three points: ontological realism, epistemological 
relativism and judgmental rationalism. As we have shown, scientific realism shows 
weaknesses in respect to all three of these notions. We also stipulated that the main 
reason for these weaknesses seems to lie in the neglect of the nature and role of 
language especially in respect to the social realm and subsequently in the concomitantly 
relied upon notion of ontology.  
This neglect of language is based on the views we find in scientific realism as towards 
the nature of language. One element which poses a major concern for scientific realists 
and which will help to illuminate this point further is the question about the reality of 
ontological entities. (Potamäki and Wight, 2000: 217-8; Wight, 2007b: 382; Kurki, 
2007: 364-5) The position scientific realists take as followers of philosophical realism is 
naturally in support of the ‘real’ existence of these entities and in refutation of any form 
of nominalism, especially in respect to the nature of unobservables. (Wight, 2007b: 382) 
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As Colin Wight argues, there is a tendency in some approaches in IR to treat concepts 
as not really referring to real entities ‘out there’ but as placeholders that help facilitating 
access to the social world. (ibid.: 379-80) As such these concepts have no existence 
beyond the conventionalism and instrumental purpose they serve as ideationally 
structuring the world. Based on this supposition which is another instantiation of the 
long-fought battle between realists and nominalists Wight naturally comes to the 
conclusion that only two possibilities exist. Either, following the nominalist mode, we 
treat concepts and terms referring to unobservables as purely ideationally existent, i.e. 
as depending on the human mind. The reference for these terms does not lie in an 
independent reality but in a purely abstract conceptual realm and they serve purely 
instrumental means. Or, and this is the position Wight is presenting, we accept a deeper 
notion of reality and accept that these terms find their references in the ‘real world’ as 
existing independent of the mind. (ibid.: 382-6) 
Nevertheless, this existence of ontological entities and the insistence on this form of 
depth realism exactly runs into the problems outlined above. We can simply not access 
these objects in the way necessary for scientific realism to work and for ontology to be 
more fundamental than epistemology. This is, however, not a refutation of either the 
‘world out there’ or the concept of ‘reality’ as such. As Kratochwil pointed out, the 
stipulation that we do not have any direct access to these ontological entities or ‘things 
in themselves’ does not mean we have no access at all. (Kratochwil, 2007: 67) Neither 
does this mean that we espouse a Kantian dichotomy of a world of phenomena and a 
world of noumena.  
As we remember, for these ontological entities to have any bearing upon our 
understanding of the social world their influences must flow directly from them. If we 
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would accept that the way they enable and constrain human action and understanding as 
arising out of a system of meaning or an epistemology in which we conceptualise these 
ontological entities we would return to the point of departure of the scientific realist 
critique. If ontological views about ‘what is’ are fundamental for the differences within 
IR and if we further want to come to a better understanding of social process through a 
renewed critical debate about these entities and what they are, there must be a way to 
access them pre-epistemologically, i.e. in a way that is not tainted by human 
descriptions, interests and values. If this is not possible, then the whole enterprise is 
useless, at least for the social sciences because any acceptance that these entities cannot 
be accessed independent of humanly devised systems of meaning and knowing would 
negate any notion of ontological primacy – and this is exactly what scientific realists are 
proposing here. (Wight, 2006: 2; Wight, 2007b: 385; for a similar argument against 
ontological primacy see Kratochwil, 2007: 71-2) 
So, what are we left with? Are there only these two alternatives in respect to our 
conceptualization of ontological entities? Do we really have to choose between a 
nominalism which denies reality to ontological entities and a realism that posits these 
entities as real but independent of the human mind? The answer to this question, as will 
be argued in the remainder of this article, is no. There is a possibility to overcome this 
dilemma, not through a middle way or third alternative that operates within the same 
frame of reference but by transposing the problem in toto and searching for a new social 
ontology, i.e. a different understanding of what ontology is about.  
Access to this endeavour is possible when we consider the underlying notion of the 
nature of language. Language in the abovementioned dichotomy is conceptualized along 
designative lines, to borrow a term from Charles Taylor. In his essay Language and 
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Human Nature (1985) Taylor describes a designative understanding of language as 
follows: “There are two sides or dimensions of meaningful objects, which can each be 
taken up as the guiding thread of an answer. The first is what we could call the 
designative: we could explain a sign or word having meaning by pointing to what it 
designates, in a broad sense, that is, what it can be used to refer to in the world, and 
what it can be used to say about that thing.” (Taylor, 1985: 218)  
Language for the nominalist as well as for the realist consists of a system of signs with 
fixed meanings that help to conceptualise the world. The disagreement as we have seen 
is not about the function of language but about the ‘reality’ of the states of affairs 
described by it. Nominalists stipulate that the terms used only structure ‘reality’ without 
having points of reference outside the human mind – for them the terms used refer to 
concepts deployed by the mind. Realists, on the other side, see real entities as referents 
of these terms. Both, however, see language as a tool that can be used to describe 
something or designate meaningful connections between processes in the world. This 
view of language has been the dominant one throughout the modern period and can be 
found in almost all accounts in IR as well.  
As is already apparent in this conceptualisation of language as designative is the 
opposition between the individual language user and the world in which the object 
designated by language exists. As such this conception of language is very much in line 
with Enlightenment thought since it posits the subjective consciousness as distinct from 
the world it inhabits and also ascribes the ability to reflect on this world from a detached 
and objective or neutral point of view.  
In respect to language we find many instances in modern thought in which a designative 
conception of language is implicitly or explicitly expressed. Especially during the 17th 
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and 18th centuries the question regarding the origin of language, a question closely 
connected to a conceptualisation of the nature of language, attracted major philosophers. 
On the side of the modern conception writers such as Hobbes, Locke and Condillac 
delivered influential views on the nature of language. Overall one can say that “[t]his 
project assumes that language is one of the object supremely constituted by 
consciousness, and that actual languages are very special cases of a possible language 
which consciousness holds the key to – that they are systems of signs linked to their 
meaning by univocal relationships which, in their structure as in their function, are 
susceptible to a total explication” (Merleau-Ponty, 1974: 81) 
If we follow Charles Taylor further, however, we find a different conception of 
language, which is no less distinguished in its genealogical development. This 
conception of language Taylor called expressivist and it can be traced back to thinkers 
such as Hamann, Herder and Humboldt as well as the later Wittgenstein and post-
Husserlian phenomenology (here most notably in Heidegger, Gadamer and Merleau-
Ponty). (Lawn, 2006: 4) In this view, language is the medium in which human existence 
is immersed and according to which it allocates meaning. It is not to be found in 
individual consciousnesses as the designative conception would claim but is exercised 
in the public realm and constantly contested.  
Language in an expressivist view relies upon a wider, holistic understanding of 
linguistic practices. The main point of difference here lies with the fact that contrary to 
the designative approach language is seen as a social construct. It does not rely upon an 
individual consciousness that shares modes of perception with others but derives its 
function from its place in the public space. “The language-user is not a Cartesian subject 
in sovereign control of meanings; these are socially produced from the fabric of daily 
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life within which various customs and practices are performatively enacted.” (ibid.: 15) 
Whereas language is more a tool for articulation of thought in the designative model it 
represents more the opportunity for self-discovery and self-expression for the 
expressivists. Language hereby gains its power not from representational functions but 
from participation in the language community from which it develops and to which we 
all belong. This sense of language community of course means that language cannot be 
located in a Cartesian consciousness alone but that meanings are shared publicly and 
also re-shaped in public discourse. The subject involved in this community acquires a 
capacity to take part in communication but is never fully in control of language. Rather 
the linguistic development is a dialogical and continuous process publicly exercised 
within a language community in the form of language-games. (Wittgenstein, 1974, §23, 
p.11; Fierke: 2002: 337)  And in the same way language is never fully understood and 
controlled, the subjects themselves are involved in a constant re-interpretation in respect 
to their self-understanding. (Warnke, 1987:38) 
Following such a conception of language would allow a new approach towards the 
study of social and political phenomena that is partly already exercised in IR. 
(Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1989; Fierke, 2005) The expressivist view of language sees 
human agents always already submerged in systems of meaning. (Fierke, 2002: 333) 
The important point here, however, is that these systems of meaning do not emanate 
from a single consciousness or a group of single consciousnesses. This point is 
important because it disarms Wight’s concerns that reality can simply change when the 
human mind decided it should change. (Wight, 2007b: 392) ‘Reality’ in such a 
linguistically and publically guided system of meaning arises not out of individual 
consciousnesses but finds itself as the contested and constantly reshaped frame of 
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human existence. The gap between mind and nature that still haunts the scientific realist 
account presented here is overcome by relying upon a notion of intentionality that opens 
horizons in which the publicly negotiated and mediated frame of reference interprets the 
enabling and constraining conditions and thereby constitutes reality without making it 
reducible to single consciousnesses or placing it outside them. 
Also, we can see that the abovementioned problems with grasping ‘intransitive objects’ 
do not even arise within the confines of an expressivist view of language. As was 
discussed above, the frame of reference in which ontological entities are experienced 
and encountered structures the conditions and possibilities of action. The constraints, 
although they depend on humanly devised systems of meaning cannot be reduced to 
mere phantasies that can be changed at will and therefore deny any reality outside the 
human mind. Wight and other scientific realists are right to claim that such a view 
would run counter to the experiences and practices we are engaged in everyday. The 
structures in question are very ‘real’ for the humans acting within their confines; and 
yet, they do not exist independent of Dasein which constitutes them. By transposing the 
mediation and deliberation of these social practices away from ‘inside’ individual minds 
into the ‘collective’ level of a linguistic and social community they exist ‘mind-
independent’ (if we understand ‘mind’ as a Cartesian consciousness) but not 
independent of human existence. Human existence or human being must hereby not be 
misunderstood as ‘a’ human being or a number of human beings but refers to the totality 
of human existence. (for an elaborate exposition of the notion of coexistence in 
Heidegger see Odysseos, 2007, especially pp. 57-94) The social interaction and the 
concomitant emergence of shared meanings and practices that constrains and enables 
our actions is always already beyond the individual and can therefore never be changed 
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by ‘a’ human being but only in social discourse. Human being is thereby the space in 
which other entities (observables as well as unobservables) can be what they are; human 
being lets them be so to say.  
In this sense it is important to note that the normative structure that arises out of the 
public mediation and negotiation must indeed be seen as having causal effects (which 
means it must be seen as enabling and constraining) on human action. Scientific realists 
are absolutely right to claim that the standard conception of causality as efficient 
causality puts any engagement with the social and political world into a straight jacket 
and creates rifts within the discipline that are unnecessary and misguided. (Wight, 2006: 
1; Kurki, 2006) It is, however, likewise the case and of equal importance to realize that 
not only are norms causes but also that causes are norms. As we have seen above when 
looking at Wendt’s example of the fact that ‘Pigs can’t fly’, the way in which we 
interpret the reasons of this ‘fact’ conditions (in other words ‘norms’) our attitude 
towards this fact and its consequences for us. In a religiously guided discourse it is more 
likely that we accept this fact as an example of Gods action on earth, in a scientific 
discourse we are more inclined to find a physical force that can be manipulated and 
possibly overcome. The frame of reference in which we let this fact be what it is creates 
hereby a normative space which again assumes causal power. The fact is never 
graspable outside or beyond the collective interpretive frame of reference. It is not 
possible, as was argued before, to posit the fact as existent and subsequently devise 
means to understand and approach it. We as humans can only approach it with an 
understanding in place. Here we reach again the insight defended above that ways of 
being and ways of knowing are inextricably intertwined. It seems therefore that we 
always have to consider both sides: norms as causes but also causes as norms. 
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If we link these insights back to Winch’s original question regarding the intelligibility 
of reality we can see that language is the medium in which we express our self-
understanding and situatedness in the world and allocate meaning to the entities we 
encounter. Such an allocation of meaning does not derive from a primordial deliberation 
or even ‘direct access’ to ontological entities but always presupposes and takes place 
within an involvement in an already encountered world. (Dreyfus, 1991: 41-2) Just to 
point this out very clearly, the impossibility to encounter the world ‘directly’ is not as 
often stipulated an embracement of a Kantian dualism between phenomena and 
noumena. As Edmund Husserl has shown, such a conceptualization simply reproduces 
the dichotomy between mind and nature and all its concomitant problems. (Safranski, 
2002: 25-39) Rather, and again following Husserl and his phenomenology, we have to 
see consciousness as always already reaching into the world, as constantly intending the 
world. (Kockelmans, 1994: 95) “It is not trivial to say that consciousness is 
‘consciousness of’ objects; on the contrary, this statement goes against many common 
beliefs. One of phenomenology’s greatest contributions is to have broken out of the 
egocentric predicament, to have checkmated the Cartesian doctrine. Phenomenology 
shows that the mind is a public thing, that it acts and manifests itself out in the open, not 
just inside its own confines.” (Sokolowski, 2000: 11-2; see also Moran, 2005: 53) The 
point hereby is exactly not to either deny or defend access to the things themselves 
outside and independent of human being. Rather, we have to realize that what we call 
‘reality’ is publicly exercised and not just privately experienced.  
 
Based on our argument thus far it seems that a new way of thinking about the 
ontological status on different entities in the international realm arises together with a 
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different sense of what ontology deals with. The separation between human mind in a 
Cartesian sense and human existence in a Heideggerian sense is crucial. In this vein, 
Colin Wight is right to say that it is ludicrous to assume that unobservables such as the 
state will cease to exist if social scientists cease to exist. (Wight, 2007b: 389) But it 
would cease to exist if humans cease to exist. This is an important point because it 
shows that the emphasis Wight and other scientific realists are putting on science is 
missing the point. In their view science arises out of our encounter (constraining and 
enabling) with ontological entities ‘out there’. (ibid.: 383) Surely, we had many 
different ways to practice science but overall this plurality shares the task to 
theoretically grasp what can and cannot be said about the world. The problem, however, 
is that they take the persistence of ontological entities beyond the confines of science as 
a proof that these objects exist independent of human being. This is simply not the case. 
The state as an unobservable structure is constituted not by the theoretical musings of 
scientists but neither is it detached from the human world. Wight seems to realize this 
problem to a certain degree when he states: “Of course, social objects are not mind-
independent in the same way that natural objects are … .But there are a lot of 
complicated issues here surrounding the issue of just what mind the object is dependent 
upon.” (ibid.: 389) The problem is that Wight never thinks of the possibility that 
‘dependent on the human mind’ and ‘dependent on human being’ are two separate states 
of affairs. Or, to make it even more clear, Wight is simply converging the terms ‘the 
real’ and ‘reality’ and ‘being’ and beings’ to mean the same thing. This, however, is a 
simplification that exactly leads to the perceived dilemma between realism and 
nominalism. Heidegger’s thought suggests a way out of this by maintaining that “reality 
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and being depend on Dasein’s practices but the real and beings do not.” (Dreyfus, 1991: 
265) 
Following this line of reasoning, it is obvious that states would cease to exist as 
unobservable structures when humans cease to exist. Therefore, it seems that there must 
be a third way to conceptualize the ‘reality’ of unobservables in the social world – states 
do not simply exist nominally in our minds but neither do they exist simply in the world 
‘out there’. The key to solve this dilemma is simply a detachment of consciousness and 
human being and a refocusing of our enquiry onto the practices that constitute the state 
and lets it be what it is. This simply means that the state indeed transcends the 
individual consciousnesses that inhabit or encounter it. On the other hand, however, the 
publicity of human minds in Husserl’s sense constitutes the state as an unobservable 
entity dependent on human being (note that it is a dependency on human being not 
human beings!) This way we get out of the dilemma sketched above: the state is not just 
a nominalist entity dependent on consciousness but neither has it to be posited outside 
the confines of human existence to assume ‘reality’ and its concomitant enabling and 
constraining effects. 
In our understanding of the constitution of such unobservable social entities the role of 
social and linguistic practices can hardly be overstated. As we have seen, a theory of the 
state as a relation between mind and independent object is a false abstraction. After all, 
the state as we conceptualizing it right now did not come into being through theoretical 
reflection but through practical concerns and intentional (in a Husserlian sense) action. 
To understand it, it seems plausible, we need to look much more closely at these 
practices rather than trying to conceptualise the entity in abstracto. Language in its 
expressivist understanding is hereby a key element as it highlights the public and 
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illocutionary characteristics inherent in linguistic usage and the subsequent emergence 
of meaning. As Heidegger pointed out: “Man acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man.“ (Heidegger, 
2007: 348) The intelligibility of reality is thereby not dependent on presupposed 
epistemological conceptions; but neither can it be achieved by positing an ontological 
domain independent of human existence. The role of human being and its immersion 
into social and linguistic practices provide hereby the space that lets beings be the way 
they are and at the same time provides an understanding that is always already shaped 
by our constant situatedness and involvement in the world, our being-in-the-world to 
say it with Heidegger. (Macomber, 1967: 75) 
 
Language and the way to a new social ontology 
 
So far we have argued that the recent attempts to reconceptualise the ontology of 
international relations is inadequate since it merely shifts the focus from 
epistemological foundationalism towards ontological foundationalism. The different 
arguments that have been presented thus far from scholars working on this project posit 
a mind-independent pre-epistemological world of ontological facts that causally 
structure human action but stay untouched by human ways of knowing and being. As 
we have seen, such a reliance on mind-independent and seemingly pre-epistemological 
facts is, however, just another illusion in the modern quest for an Archimedean point of 
departure, something that lies beyond doubt. The critique that is put forward in this case 
is a correct one since the preoccupation with epistemological questions that can be 
found in post-Cartesian philosophy is indeed not able to deliver the universal theory or 
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method that is needed to establish indubitable and necessary knowledge. The focus, 
however, that shifts the problem of finding foundations that condition human life by 
relying upon mind-independent ontological facts is as flawed as any attempt to find 
certain epistemological foundations.  
It seems that Kratochwil's original argument presented above is absolutely correct in 
maintaining that ways of being (ontology) and ways of knowing (epistemology) are 
inextricably intertwined and therefore make it impossible to use either as the secure 
foundation from where to start our enquiry into the social and political world. 
(Kratochwil, 2007: 72) The crux with the ontological arguments derived from Wendt, 
Wight and others lie, as we have shown, with the total neglect of the role of language 
and the social emergence of systems of meaning that reach beyond an understanding of 
language as a mere system of signs. Kratochwil again is right to stipulate that "our 
conventional understanding of social action and the norms governing them is defective 
because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the function of language in social 
interaction… ." (Kratochwil, 1989: 5) We have shown that language when 
conceptualised along the lines of an expressivist understanding can yield important 
insights into the nature of social processes and dynamics. These examples show that a 
different way to approach the various ways of being and the various ways of knowing 
and their intertwinement can fruitfully be explored without falling into the 
foundationalist trap in either its epistemological or ontological guise.  
But if this is the case and we can find elaborate examples of scholarship that take the 
role of language and its ramifications for ontological as well as epistemological issues 
seriously what is there left to do? The argument that will inform the rest of this thesis is 
that reconceptualisation of language as can be found in Onuf, Kratochwil, Fierke and 
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others cannot be correctly understood as a mere add-on to existing scholarship in IR but 
has to be seen as a iconoclastic enterprise that in its very nature challenges the 
framework within which enquiries have taken place in the field of IR. This challenge 
presents a pathway to a new conceptualisation and understanding of ontological and 
epistemological issues that are so far mainly unexplored. A conception of language that 
situates the individual agents within a socially constructed and constantly mediated 
network of meanings and actions subsequently shifts our conception of the beings 
around us and our role in constituting them. To grasp the way beings are requires a 
deeper investigation into the meaning of being and the especially human being. Human 
beings are not just present among or beside other beings. Rather human being or Dasein 
is constitutive of the meaning of beings it encounters, or, in other words, Dasein let 
beings be what they are. We can see here already that a simple inclusion of linguistic 
determinants into the ontological conception we found in Wendt and Wight will not do 
as the role of language hinted at here overturns the whole ontology they present, or even 
more radically, it overturns the whole meaning of ontology they exhibit. An enquiry 
into the nature of beings must necessarily start with an account of the form of being that 
encounters the beings in question and draws them into its awareness. Out of this arises 
the necessity to conceptualise a path that overcomes the problems encountered in forms 
of epistemological or ontological foundationalism.  
We must radically challenge the way beings were apprehended in the sciences as we 
understand them today and this thesis tries to make the first steps towards this goal. If 
we take the difficulties encountered in recent attempts to reconceptualise ontology for 
the study of international relations seriously, we have to start rethinking the concept of 
ontology as such and concomitantly reconceptualise our understanding of such central 
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terms as agency, structure, language, truth and freedom accordingly. The focus must 
hereby not lie, as Chris Brown has rightly pointed out in his response to critical realism, 
in meta-theoretical pseudo-debates (Brown, 2007: 415-6) but by taking practice 
seriously Questions that will arise in this endeavour and that demand answers are not 
aiming at delineating theoretical facts about core concepts but praxeological features 
which condition the practical possibilities of the social ontology subsequently 
conceptualised. In this respect, as was already pointed out in the Introduction, we must 
not ask ‘What is agency?’ but rather ‘What are agents doing?’, we must not ask ‘What 
is language?’ but rather ‘How is language practiced?’, we must not ask What is truth?’ 
but rather ‘How are practices verified and validated?’ and we must not ask ‘What is 
freedom?’ but rather ‘What are the praxeological conditions of action?’. 
 
It seems therefore paramount to demarcate the space of such an enquiry into this newly 
opened territory in IR theory. As we have argued above, the reconsideration of 
ontological issues has to be appreciated in general without, however, reproducing the 
pitfalls criticised in epistemologically focussed ways of social and political enquiries. 
The question that is left unanswered thus far is the way in which such an enquiry is 
possible.  
 
The main pillars of a new social ontology 
 
One way that might lead to an insightful answer to this question lies with the 
abovementioned reconceptualisation of language and the concomitant shift from 
questions like 'what is a state' to 'how is the state constituted'. Such a shift entails an 
T o w a r d s  a  n e w  s o c i a l  o n t o l o g y  P a g e  | 75 
 
appreciation of the socially conditioned and fluctuating systems of meaning connected 
to certain terms or events within the international realm. It avoids a foundationalist 
commitment to what things are and instead accepts that their being is a continuous 
process of publicly mediated meaning-formation. Although such an enquiry is certainly 
able to avoid the main pitfalls pointed out above it is in its scope and aim still focussed 
on specific forms of being. To be sure, these forms of being are not foundationally 
reified but nevertheless address specific elements within the social and political 
environment they investigate. The aim of this thesis, however, is not to devise a way to 
grasp non-foundationally specific ways of being in the international system but to 
sketch out the conditions for the possibility for such an enquiry. It therefore deals with a 
more general task that has as its aim to show and describe the conditions for the 
possibility to let things be what they are. In order to achieve such a sketch we would 
have to address not the processes that give meaning to specific ways of being in the 
international system but instead focuses on the question of the meaning of being in 
general.  
 
In order to enquire into such conditions we find many attempts that aim at a theoretical 
reconceptualisation and reconstruction of central assumptions in order to infuse new and 
hitherto neglected elements into the conceptual framework under consideration. As 
should be clear by now such an endeavour would simply reproduce the difficulties 
presented above since we would have to delineate stipulations of an ontological or 
epistemological character that serve as a foundation on which our derivative concepts 
rest. As we have argued above, such an attempt is prone to failure from the very 
beginning as it presupposes a form of detached subjectivity that would allow us to 
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identify something beyond or outside human contingencies. In order to discover 
epistemological or ontological conditions that are not dependent on subjective 
categories or contextual circumstances a Cartesian notion of subjectivity is 
indispensable. As will be shown below in chapter III this notion of subjectivity relies 
upon the human capacity to recognise and abandon any belief or claim to knowledge 
that cannot be validated by scientific method and the use of reason. Core to this capacity 
is the notion of a self-transparent consciousness which allows humans to reflect on the 
content of their consciousness and individually confirm or reject claims to knowledge 
according to the standards of reason. Such a detached notion of agency, however, has 
already been questioned in recent examples of scholarship in IR. (see for instance 
Bleiker, 2000: 23-50) Supposing that human beings are always already embedded in a 
network of linguistic and social practices forecloses the chance of a detached theoretical 
delineation of certain foundations from which an enquiry can objectively depart. 
Exactly here fail the attempts at reconceptualising the social ontology of IR that we 
depicted above in the case of Wendt and Wight.  
If a theoretical reconstruction or reconceptualisation of ontology is no longer an option 
for the above reasons, the question remains how to start the planed reconceptualisation 
of a new ontology for IR. What the thesis seemingly has to achieve then is a pre- or at 
least non-theoretical conceptualisation of being. Such an attempt can be found in post-
Husserlian phenomenology which took its inception in the radical reinterpretation of 
Husserlian phenomenology in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. We will elaborate 
extensively on the main assumptions and developments of phenomenology in chapter II. 
Suffice it to say here that Heidegger and subsequent thinkers in the phenomenological 
movement aimed at a descriptive account of how life is experienced in its everydayness. 
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The situatedness and contextual character of human existence is hereby not 
conceptualised in the abstract and detached fashion of an uninvolved and neutral 
observer (the possibility of such an observer is denied in a phenomenological approach) 
but described from within the facticity of life and the linguistic context in which we all 
are constantly immersed and to which no 'outside' exists. (Fierke, 2002: 337) In this 
vein we would have to have a closer look at the very situatedness within linguistic and 
social practices and try to clear a space within this contextual forest out of which a 
better understanding of being can arise and a path towards a new social ontology can be 
opened. How such a phenomenological ontology is possible will be explained and 
delineated in detail in chapter II.  
 
The one point left to address in this chapter is the scaffold of the proposed new social 
ontology, a demarcation of the central terms and issues that have to be grasped and 
conceptualised phenomenologically in order to think through the effects and 
possibilities such a new ontology provides for IR theory.  
As should be clear by now, the current endeavour is not aimed at assessing or amending 
existing research methods within IR theory or even developing new ones. Rather, the 
focus lies with a philosophical conceptualisation and reiteration of the very core terms 
that open up the possibility to perceive and engage the world through a renewed and 
iconoclastic conception of being.  
Up to now we have talked and continuously pushed for a reiteration of the meaning of 
being and the subsequent delineation of a new social ontology. The question of course 
that has to be addressed before we can engage in this reiteration is ‘What are the core 
notions that have to be considered in such an enquiry?’. The selection again is mainly 
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guided by pragmatism as well as the question which elements can be considered 
fundamental in any enquiry into the social and political dynamics we are interested in. 
The first element hereby seems to be the basic unit by which such interaction is carried 
out, in other words the human agent. Agency is in general of vital importance in IR and 
a concentration on the human agents in our case does by no means imply either that 
human agents are the only agents in the international realm nor that collective agency 
only implies looking at the sum of individual agents involved. What it does imply, 
though, is that in the first instance human agency has to be conceptualised before any 
notion of interaction among human agents or forms of collective agency can be 
considered. To this extent the first element that has to be enquired into is the 
conceptualisation of human agency that opens possibilities for a specific reception of 
processes and events of a social or political kind. 
Secondly, there is certainly a need to think about and elaborate on the medium in and 
through which agency is established and communicated. With hinting already at the 
specific conceptualisation of language as expressivist, there is a need to further develop 
the scope, influence and role language has on our social encounters and how it relates to 
the regulation of behaviour and perception. As was already indicated above, work has 
already been done in this respect by bringing in elements of Wittgenstein’s later 
thought. But even this treatment seems to leave some questions regarding the 
development and change of meanings unanswered or at least problematical. In our 
consideration of language, therefore, we supplement this Wittgensteinian account with 
Heideggerian and Gadamerian thought on language in order to achieve a deepening and 
substantiation of the role of language in assessing the international realm. 
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Thirdly, it seems inevitable to reflect upon notions of validation and verification. As 
discussed above the notion of truth is certainly one of the most controversial in the 
current battles fought in IR theory. We hardly ever find, however, any longer discussion 
regarding this central term but mostly encounter either an unquestioned acceptance that 
truth is achievable or a rather superficial scepticism that denies any validity of the term 
itself. Such an attitude often leads to non sequiturs in which the denial of truth either in 
its objective or subjective form can only have validity if a notion of truth is 
presupposed. It seems therefore necessary to overcome the initial urge to push away or 
even deny the relevance of claims to truth and enquire into the nature and possible 
alternatives to a strictly scientific notion of truth. 
Finally, we must consider the conditions that make meaningful action possible. In this 
vein we would have to consider the notion of freedom and develop clearly the limits and 
meaning freedom obtains within this academic discourse. Some critical accounts within 
IR have already stressed the intrinsic capability of agency to act as if the situation were 
otherwise.  (see for instance Fierke, 2005: 13-4) This ability to act against and beyond 
seemingly fixed structural constrains and therefore induce change in the international 
system requires a notion of freedom that delineates the possibilities out of which such 
an action can evolve. Given that the notion of freedom is one of the most debated terms 
in modern thought it is therefore indispensable to enquire more clearly into the 
circumstances out of which this freedom arises and in which ways it can be employed. 
Before we, however, proceed to the substantial reconceptualisation of these elements of 
the new social ontology it seem necessary to develop more clearly the philosophical 
tradition out which such a critique as it is proposed here arises. 
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II Trajectory of Phenomenology 
 
Back to the Things Themselves! 
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1901 
 
 
In the following lines we will outline the main tenets of phenomenology as it developed 
in continental philosophy during the 19th and 20th centuries. Before we can, however, 
immerse into the assumptions and motivations behind its trajectory it seems necessary 
to say a few words in respect to the conceptualisation of phenomenology as a movement 
within philosophy and also to look at the philosophical environment in the late 19th 
century to situate its emergence historically. As Herbert Spiegelberg in his elaborate and 
meticulous study of phenomenology (Spiegelberg, 1969) pointed out, it seems indeed 
difficult to determine first when phenomenology in a proper sense began and secondly 
whether it is actually accurate to speak of a movement at all. “In fact, the very term 
‘movement,’ applied to phenomenology, requires some explanation and justification. It 
is by no means common among the ‘insiders.’ […] Actually the word used first by the 
German insiders in the earlier days was that of ‘Kreis’ (circle), with several sub-circles 
within the larger circle, a word, much more appropriate for the loose and informal 
association of the members of a group lacking any school-like organization in an 
academic sense.” (Spiegelberg, 1969: 1-2) 
Nevertheless, Spiegelberg defends the notion of movement in the following way:  
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“(1) Phenomenology is a moving, in contrast to a stationary, 
philosophy with a dynamic momentum, whose development is 
determined by its intrinsic principles as well as by the ‘things’, the 
structure of the territory it encounters. (2) Like a stream it comprises 
several parallel currents, which are related but by no means 
homogenous, and may move at different speeds. (3) They have a 
common point of departure, but need not have a definite and 
predictable joint destination; it is compatible with a character of a 
movement that its components branch out in different directions.” 
(ibid.: 2) 
 
Since the term movement describes, as Spiegelberg points out, a vast and fluid 
conception of phenomenology as opposed to a clearly structured academic school, there 
are indeed difficulties in determining its inception in philosophical circles. This initial 
vagueness is aggravated by the wide variety of different philosophical currents at the 
end of the 19th century and their relation to the newly developing movement. These 
different schools themselves had developed out of two major strands of European 
philosophy which had on the one hand Enlightenment thought, especially Kant and 
Hegel, at its centre and on the other drew on anti-Enlightenment thought that developed 
out of the German Romanticist movement and followed thinkers such as Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche.  Phenomenology “was one of several strong currents in philosophy 
prominent at the outset of the twentieth century, alongside, for example, Neo-
Kantianism in its various schools (e.g. Rickert, Natorp, Cassirer, Windelband, Lotze), 
idealism (Green, Bradley, McTaggart), logicism (Frege, Russell), hermeneutics 
(Dilthey, Bultmann), pragmatism (Dewey, Pierce, James), Lebensphilosophie (Bergson, 
Simmel), Existenz philosophy (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), as well as the empiricism of 
Hume’s followers (e.g. J.S. Mill), and the positivism and empirio-criticism of Comte, 
Mach, Avinarius, and, somewhat later, of the Vienna circle.” (Moran, 2000: 1) As we 
can see already, the variety of philosophical approaches covers a huge territory and to 
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make things worse, phenomenology or to be more precise individual phenomenologists 
were influenced by one or more of these already existing schools. It is impossible to 
decide who is on the inside and who has to remain on the outside of phenomenology in 
many cases. Heidegger was influenced among others by Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, 
Bergson and clearly showed affinities to Bultmann and Dilthey. Husserl on the other 
hand was fiercely opposed, as we will see below to the rise of historicism and one of his 
central aims in developing his approach of phenomenology consisted exactly in 
presenting a rigorous science dealing with the content of consciousness against such 
historicist leanings. He hereby was in close contact with thinkers like Frege and Russell. 
Gadamer, another central character which we will refer to repeatedly wrote his 
doctorate under Natorp and joined then the circle of Heidegger. And of course we 
would have to consider the second and third generation phenomenologists or those that 
worked at the fringes of the movement. This would include thinkers such as Merleau-
Ponty, Sartre, Löwith, Jonas, and further away in their development Foucault, Derrida 
and Ricoeur to name just the most prominent. In short, phenomenology, true to its 
conceptualisation as a movement, can hardly be grasped when considered from a 
genealogical point of view. Instead, we should focus on the concerns phenomenological 
thinkers raise and look at the basic problems and questions they try to answer. Seen 
from this perspective it “does not mean that the separate destinations of the various 
currents of the movement are contradictory, and hence that they cancel each other out. 
They rather represent the pursuit of definite and essential assignments of the movement 
in the total pattern of the phenomenological task: the descriptive investigation of the 
phenomena, both objective and subjective, in their fullest breadth and depth.” 
(Spiegelberg, 1969: 2) In this sense we follow a conceptualisation of the 
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phenomenological movement in the broad sense which was expressed in the first 
phenomenological platform in 1913. “In fact this is very much what happened in the 
case of the Phenomenological Movement, whose original ingredients, […], came from 
very different sources, and, even at the time of the first phenomenological platform 
(1913), were never completely co-ordinated.” (ibid.: 2 and 6). 
In this understanding the philosophical movement of phenomenology developed in the 
late 19th and early 20th century and is most closely tied to the work of Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). The term phenomenology as such was 
certainly used in philosophical circles long before Husserl as for instance in Kant’s 
famous ontological distinction between noumena (the things as they are in themselves) 
and phenomena (the things as they appear) or Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. (ibid.: 
12) Husserl recognised these and other instances as certain forerunners to his own 
efforts although his own phenomenological approach as set out throughout his works 
differs quite considerably from its semantic cousins. It is “of particular importance to 
examine and to eliminate certain equivocations which have arisen from the checkered 
history of the very term ‘phenomenology’.  That this term existed long before Husserl 
adopted and assimilated it seems at times not to be sufficiently realized, at least not 
among philosophers.” (ibid.: 7) 
 
In the following lines, a rough trajectory of the phenomenological movement will be 
developed starting inevitably from its conceptual inception in Husserl’s thought through 
its radical re-interpretation in the work of Martin Heidegger and subsequently into the 
various strands of continental philosophical thought that drew and draw from the 
original phenomenological insights. The task of this chapter is hereby twofold: first, as 
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mentioned above, an exposition of the original concerns of the phenomenological 
movement and secondly the depiction of the radical break with central 
conceptualisations in Martin Heidegger’s opus that provided the foundation for 
subsequent phenomenological thinkers. In general it can be said that the focus in the 
remainder of this thesis will lie with Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian 
phenomenology and less with its original exposition in Husserl and Brentano. The 
reason for this focus simply lies with the differing conception of what phenomenology 
can provide in Husserl and Heidegger which will be shown in the following lines. 
 
Husserl’s debt to Brentano  
 
Husserl was originally trained as an astronomer and mathematician at the Universities 
of Leipzig and Berlin between 1876 and 1881 where he studied among others with 
Wilhelm Wundt, Karl Weierstrass and Leopold Kronecker. (Moran, 2000: 67-8) In 
1881 he moved to Vienna and continued his studies in mathematics, earning his 
doctorate in 1882 under the supervision of Leo Königsberger. (Moran, 2005: 16) Until 
1883 Husserl had only marginal contact with the academic discipline of philosophy; he 
had taken some courses during his stay in Berlin but was not yet captured by 
philosophical problems and reflection. (Woodruff Smith, 2007: 15) 
Only as late as 1884 did Husserl start to attend the lectures of Franz Brentano, then one 
of the most eminent philosophers of his time. Husserl stayed with Brentano in Vienna 
until 1886 studying the British empiricists David Hume and John Stuart Mill. (Moran, 
2000: 69) Brentano at that time was preoccupied with developing and refining his 
approach of descriptive psychology which exemplified “the apodictic science of inner 
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perception studying the elements of psychic acts and their relations.” (ibid.: 35) One of 
Brentano’s most important publications laying out his philosophical endeavours was his 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint published in 1874. His view of an empirical 
or as he called it descriptive psychology differed dramatically from the alternative 
approach to psychology at that time which was for instance expressed in Wilhelm 
Wundt’s Principles of Physiological Psychology also published in 1874. The major 
differences between both approaches to the science of psychology and its methodology 
can first be traced to the different conditions of thought under which they were 
developed. “We see, on the one hand, a man [Brentano] who has devoted his ‘hours of 
solitary reflection’ to ancient and medieval philosophy; we see, on the other hand, a 
man who has wrought out in the laboratory his contributions to the latest-born of the 
experimental science.” (Titchener, 1921: 109) Brentano was not interested in the 
connection between physiological and psychological process but focussed his attention 
on the purely descriptive study of mental acts. His main aim was to develop an 
understanding and categorisation of mental acts in order to create a “taxonomy of the 
mental”. (Moran, 2000: 39) This taxonomy would represent a full account of the 
different ways in which mental acts are represented in consciousness and thereby 
provide a guide for understanding the whole variety of possible objects in consciousness 
and the way in which they are presented. In his study of psychical phenomena, Brentano 
came to the conclusion that all mental acts can be differentiated into three distinct 
categories: Ideation, Judgement and Love-Hate. (Titchener, 1921: 113; Moran, 2000: 
45) Based on this general categorisation Brentano achieved the insight that all mental 
acts must have a content and therefore must be directed towards an object. (Titchener, 
1921: 113) It is not possible to see, hear, acknowledge or despise without specifying the 
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‘what’ we see, hear, acknowledge or despise. The term ‘object’ does not refer to a 
necessarily material thing but can also include ideational objects such as numbers, states 
of affairs or imagined entities. In fact, Brentano held the view that mental phenomena 
are of a higher certainty in respect to their features than physical facts. “For him 
[Brentano], the domain of psychical phenomena possessed ‘actual existence’ (eine 
wirkliche Existenz), whereas the purely physical world had merely phenomenal 
existence.” (Moran, 2000: 34; see also Titchener, 1921: 114 and Krantz, 1990: 752) The 
external world is just assumed to exist but the states of consciousness are indubitable 
facts. (Moran, 2000: 42) In fact, Brentano reinterpreted the notion of truth in a number 
of lectures in 1889 introducing the notion of evidence to characterise the nature of 
claims made in descriptive psychology. It is not longer the case that these descriptions 
try to achieve a correspondence with what they describe. Rather than comparing our 
account of mental acts with an assumed reality – to which Brentano maintained we do 
not have any access anyway – we describe mental appearances as they appear in 
consciousness and ascribe an evident truth to them. “Some judgements are evidently 
true, self-evident. They assert what is. Judgements do not ‘combine or ‘separate’ 
elements, as the traditional Aristotelian account maintains, rather they affirm something 
as existing, as being the case.” (Moran, 2000: 31) Therefore, “[t]ruth is recognition of 
what is asserted, and the correspondence is between the thing given and its ‘self-
givenness’ (Selbstgegebenheit). (ibid.) 
Brentano proposes a unity between the object of the act and the act itself. If I see a red 
car the red car is the primary object and the act of seeing itself becomes the secondary 
object. (Kim, 1978: 200-1) “Brentano’s own view is that the presentation (or 
consciousness) of a primary object, i.e., an object which is not a present mental 
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phenomenon belonging to the subject of that presentation, and the inner perception of 
that presentation are one and the same act. (ibid.: 201) Brentano in his descriptive 
psychology is only interested in the very act of perceiving and does not make any 
stipulations about the actual reality of the car. Even if the car is only imagined, the 
presentation of it in the human mind would still be objectively perceivable though in a 
different way. And exactly a taxonomy of the different ways of perception of different 
objects is the aim of Brentano’s approach. “For the philosophers like Brentano, who 
make physical objects into immanent objects, do not thereby rule out objective reality 
(though some might say, they invent there own brand of it); they certainly leave open 
the possibility of error beyond the realm of the infallibility of inner perception.” 
(Krantz, 1990: 751)  
Brentano then is not an idealist who seeks the ground for ascertaining the reality of the 
outside world in the human mind but represents a form of immanent or representational 
realism (Kim, 1978: 204) that is exactly not interested in proving the correctness of our 
assumptions about the world outside of our mind. (Krantz, 1990: 752-3) Rather, staying 
true to his task of describing and categorising the variety of mental acts he approaches 
the object as it appears in consciousness as the ‘real’ object of his enquiry and therefore 
ascribing a reality to this mental act. (Moran, 2000: 31) 
 
The last point worth mentioning in this short survey is the central importance of 
intentionality in Brentano’s and subsequently, although in a different form, in Husserl’s 
thought. As was stated above any mental act, be it an act of ideation, judgment or of a 
love-hate relation is directed towards an object. This directedness towards objects that is 
the shared characteristic of all mental acts Brentano labelled intentionality.  
T r a j e c t o r y  o f  P h e n o m e n o l o g y   P a g e  | 88 
 
“Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
content (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing, or 
immanent objectivity.)” (Brentano, 1995: 88) 
 
 Brentano clearly distinguishes between two different realms – the physical which is 
characterised by outer perception and can be deceptive and the mental which is 
accessible through inner perception and is (self-)evident. (Moran, 2000: 52-4) 
“Consequently, when we say that mental phenomena are those which are apprehended 
by means of inner perception, we say that their perception is immediately evident.” 
(Brentano, 1995: 91) In respect to intentionality Brentano holds that physical objects, 
i.e. objects of outer perception only have an intentional existence which means they can 
be objects of possible perception. Mental objects however are characterised by what 
Brentano called intentional inexistence, i.e. they actually and evidently exist in the mind 
of the subject whose mental acts they are. (Morrison, 1970: 32-35) “By ‘inexistence’ 
Brentano does seem to intend that the object of an act of consciousness is something 
immanent in consciousness, whether or not there is also a real object or ‘reality’ 
(Realität) outside of consciousness.” (Moran, 2000: 48) 
 
The three stages of Husserl’s phenomenology 
 
Having thus far developed the major characteristics and objectives of Brentano’s 
account of descriptive psychology we can now move to Edmund Husserl and his 
transformation of Brentano’s approach into what has come to be known as 
phenomenology. Before outlining the main tenets of Husserl’s thought it is important to 
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note that Husserl conceived of himself as a perpetual beginner (ibid.: 62-65) in the 
realm of philosophy and subsequently developed his thoughts into different directions 
with different results. In order to represent a fair although short account on Husserl’s 
intellectual development we will pick two main publications each representing on 
specific period in his development and a thematic approach to grasp the main 
developments of his later thought. The Philosophy of Arithmetic stands for the first 
phase of Husserl’s thought which is heavily influenced by Brentanian descriptive 
psychology, the Logical Investigations, often cited as Husserl’s main work, is 
representative for the second period which could be summarised under the term 
descriptive phenomenology. As for his later work the focus will lie with Husserl’s 
transcendental turn and the development of the reduction. 
Husserl’s whole œvre is guided by his general aim to go back to and provide an account 
of ‘the things themselves’ as they appear in consciousness. (Husserl, 1970a: 252, see 
also Moran, 2000: 98) This description of appearances which came to be labelled 
phenomenology was seen by Husserl as a rigorous science that rested on secure and 
indubitable foundations found in the descriptive attitude of mental acts.  
Husserl’s first major work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic published in 1891 is still very 
much informed by Husserl’s initial training as mathematician. (Macann, 1993: 2) In this 
work Husserl tried to think through arithmetic by using the descriptive psychological 
approach of Brentano. He was especially interested in finding the origins of core 
mathematical or arithmetical terms in consciousness and he hoped to be able to 
characterise those through a descriptive study of how these concepts appear in 
consciousness as they appear. (McIntyre, 1987: 529) 
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The actual content that deals with the philosophy of mathematics is of no interest to us 
here and can be dealt with rather quickly. As the subtitle to the Philosophy of Arithmetic 
suggests Husserl is engaged throughout this work with psychological and logical 
investigations in the realm of theoretical mathematics.  
The starting point for this enquiry was based on efforts of two of Husserl's most 
influential mentors, the mathematician Carl Weierstrass and Franz Brentano. 
Weierstrass had himself sought for the fundaments of mathematics in simple 
mathematical operations and inspired Husserl to follow this road. Where Weierstrass 
delivered the content of Husserl's early work, Brentano influenced the method with 
which Husserl would try to achieve this aim.  
As said before the exact details Husserl develops in his account of mathematics are not 
of any interest to us here and so we concentrate on the reception of his methodological 
stipulations which are expressed in his early work. Gottlob Frege, a highly influential 
contemporary of Husserl and later to be seen as the founder of analytical philosophy, 
commented on Husserl's exercise in descriptive psychology displayed in the Philosophy 
of Arithmetic. It was this rather critical review which prompted Husserl to leave behind 
the Brentanian heritage and move away from a psychological approach without, 
however, abandoning the complete endeavour. (Farber, 1940: 12) The main criticism 
levelled against Husserl's account was the charge of steering too much in the direction 
of psychologism which, of course, was underlined by Husserl's terminology derived 
from Brentanian descriptive psychology. To Frege, it seemed as if Husserl delivers a 
subjectivist-psychological account especially since Husserl did not differentiate 
substantively between subjective mental acts or presentations and their objective 
correlates. (Moran, 2000: 73, see also Frege, 1972: 335) As a consequence of this 
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omission "the number concepts, then, for Husserl, have a 'psychological origin' 
(psychologische Ursprung) in quite specific acts of the mind: [...]. It is this account that 
Frege claims 'shunts everything off into the subjective' and that he condemned as 
'psychologistic'. (Moran, 2005: 79) After a very elaborate and in-depth criticism of 
Husserl’s account of arithmetic Frege finally identifies one specific tendency in 
Husserl’s work that inevitably led to the shortcomings he pointed out so pithily. “In 
reading this book [Philosophy of Arithmetic], I have been able to see how very difficult 
it is for the sun of truth to penetrate the fog which arises out of the confusion of 
psychology and logic.” (Frege, 1972: 336)4
This lengthy criticism of one of the leading logicians of his age was taken up positively 
by Husserl; maybe because Husserl himself at that point had already realised the 
weaknesses in his early work and had already embarked upon a philosophical journey 
that in due course would lead to his phenomenological breakthrough in the Logical 
Investigations.  
 
Ten years after his first book-length publication Husserl presented what should become 
is best-known and most renowned work – the Logical Investigations. This work is a 
vast, two volume treatise  
“that includes, among other matters, an account of the nature of logic as ‘the 
science of science’, a lengthy refutation of psychologism, a broadly 
Platonist defence of ideal entities in logic and mathematics and cognition 
                                                 
4 To what extend Frege exaggerated his criticisms of Husserl and overemphasised it psychologistic 
tendencies is a matter of debate. I should also be kept in mind that Husserl himself was apparently not 
content with the outcome of his efforts to find the fundamental basis for arithmetic. Since we are here 
only concerned with a rough overview of Husserl’s development and an exposition of the main tenets of 
phenomenology, we will not immerse into this rather specific discussion. For a more elaborate treatment 
of these matters see for instance Farber, 1940: 11-14 or Moran, 2005: 80-89. 
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generally, a rejection of empiricist and nominalist accounts of abstraction, a 
defence of the direct apprehension of universals and ‘categorial unities’, a 
pure theory of wholes and parts, […], a universal formal grammar 
specifying the ground rules for linguistic sense as opposed to nonsense, a 
‘descriptive psychology’ or phenomenology of cognitive experiences […], a 
defence of ‘categorial’ intuition […], and an analysis of the dynamic 
relations between intention and fulfilment in the process of knowledge, 
culminating in a revised account of truth as disclosure.” (Moran, 2005: 94) 
 
It is obviously impossible to pay equal attention to all of these components and 
therefore the focus will lie again with the main elements of Husserl’s thought that 
constituted his influence in the manifold appearances of phenomenological thought 
throughout the 20th century. First and foremost it seems worth pointing to the change in 
terminology that was introduced in the Logical Investigations.  The first volume that 
appeared in 1900 and was intended as the prolegomena to the actual investigations 
exhibits one of the most elaborate and serious attacks against psychologism. As it is 
beyond the scope of this short reiteration of phenomenology to pay attention to all the 
themes expounded in Husserl’s magnum opus, we concentrate on the main pillars of his 
early phenomenological thought. But even this limited task proves rather difficult since 
the Logical Investigations is by no means a logically structured account as even its 
author admits: “Our investigation can, however, only proceed securely, if it repeatedly 
breaks with […] systematic sequence, if it removes conceptual obscurities which 
threaten the course of investigation before the natural sequence of subject-matters can 
lead up to such concepts. We search, as it were, in zig-zag fashion… .” (Husserl, 1970a: 
261)  
Husserl’s overall aim in the Logical Investigations can be said to lie in his attempt to 
establish a pure logic starting from below, i.e. from intuitions in the human mind and 
move from there to the more abstract. In general he is concerned with epistemology not 
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with metaphysics and thereby stands clearly in the modern tradition starting with Kant. 
Against the neo-Kantians, however, Husserl insists on staring with single mental acts in 
the human mind rather than transcendentally deduce a categorical framework for human 
perception. Furthermore, Husserl holds that truth and meaning are ideal and not 
dependent on the a priori categories in the human mind. The latter position Husserl 
refutes since it would lead to a form of species wide relativism that makes truth a 
consequence of the existence of human minds; such a position would constitute an 
anthropologism which is unacceptable for Husserl. Instead, starting from the principle 
of presuppositionlessness (Moran, 2000: 126-7), Husserl puts forward phenomenology, 
a new method, that “contributes to explicating the sense of both logic and knowledge, 
by clarifying their fundamental notions… .” (Moran, 2005: 97) Two of the most 
important concepts used by Husserl in elaborating this new methodology are ‘intuition’ 
and ‘evidence’. As mentioned above, Husserl insisted on the most basic starting point in 
order to develop his pure logic. As such he identified our intuitions as the “concrete 
experiences in which what is intended is directly given. Cognitions and ‘lived 
experiences’ become knowledge when confirmed or illuminated through a return to the 
adequate fulfilling intuition.” (ibid.: 97) Intuitions are given with evidence and provide 
therefore a secure basis on which to place subsequent cognitions. In this respect we see 
clear resemblances to the Cartesian cogito and also to Spinoza’s forms of knowledge 
which also posit intuition as the highest form of knowledge.  
The interesting move Husserl makes in the Logical Investigations in respect to 
intuitions, evidence and the establishment of knowledge is the widening to all 
experiences and cognitions we encounter and not just mathematical ones. Evidence is 
understood as a form of seeing that ‘gives’ objects directly. It is important to note that 
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“evidence […] is not any kind of psychological feeling, however intense, or a kind of 
mysterious, irrational hunch… .” (ibid.: 98) Instead, “[t]he most perfect ’mark’ of 
correctness is inward evidence, it counts as an immediate intimation of truth itself.” 
(Husserl, 1970a: 61) 
The critique Husserl is bringing to the fore here is that most sciences rely upon concepts 
in which such a tracing-back to original intuitions given with evidence has not been 
undertaken. In order, however, to ground these sciences on a firm basis Husserl sees the 
task of philosophy in exactly disclosing these bases. Here we encounter the true 
meaning of what now is conceived as the phenomenological battle cry par excellence: 
“Back to things themselves!” (ibid.: 252) This clarification of the origins and grounds of 
cognitions and experiences is achieved through pure phenomenology. As Husserl 
explains: 
 “[…] we are concerned with discussions of a most general sort which cover 
the wider sphere of an objective theory of knowledge and, closely linked 
with this last, the pure phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and 
knowing. This phenomenology, like the more inclusive pure 
phenomenology of experiences in general, has, as its exclusive concern, 
experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of 
their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real 
facts… .” (ibid.: 249) 
 
 Having outlined his aims to this point Husserl declares that the “great task is now to 
bring the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and 
definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin.” (ibid.: 251) The things 
themselves that are directly given in consciousness “viewed not as psychological 
processes but in terms of their essential natures as ‘meaning-intentions’ and their 
connected ‘meaning-fulfilment’, essential structures in all understanding.” (Moran, 
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2005: 98) His phenomenological method is therefore an attempt to grasp the essences of 
objects given in intuition directly to consciousness and thereby ground the basics of the 
different sciences. In this sense Husserl describes to a form of empiricism since only 
those objects that are intuited can serve as the staring point for a phenomenological 
study. At the same time, however, Husserl is clearly widening the scope of such 
empiricism by including non-sensuous and formal intuitions.  
Having outlined his approach so far, it seems that Husserl could now proceed in two 
different directions. First, he could be occupied with delineating the different varieties 
of objects that are made possible and would fall under his account – a similar effort was 
already made by Brentano’s disciple Alexius Meinong. As said before Husserl clearly 
exceeds the hitherto set bounds of empiricism. An outline as to what objects can 
actually be given in consciousness and how they are given would therefore clarify his 
widened approach. Husserl, for the most part of his work, however, dispensed with such 
an account. Instead, he decided to focus of the second possible route which deals with 
the question how acts of cognition and acts of knowing are constituted within the 
subject. As we will see in a moment, this focus on subjectivity in Husserl led to the 
renewed criticism of psychologism and relativism but also foreshadowed Husserl’s later 
turn to transcendental idealism. For Husserl, however, the question of how subjectivity 
is able to establish objectivity has to be addressed and understood in order to make his 
phenomenological approach work. Although it seems like a relapse into the realm of 
psychologism, Husserl in the second volume of the Logical Investigations addresses this 
subjective dimension. This was unavoidable since, “for Husserl, logic remains a science 
in naïveté if it does not tackle this subjective dimension, which above all, as he came to 
realize, is the problem of exploring the modes of experiencing (or evidencing, 
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understood as the direct givenness of the object) in which objectivities are revealed.” 
(Moran, 2005: 106) And exactly “this exploration of the dimensions of givenness of 
objectivity to subjectivity he names phenomenology.” (ibid.)  
The last stage of Husserl’s development after the publication of the Logical 
Investigations stretches from roughly 1905 to his death in 1938. During this period we 
encounter a variety of publications in which Husserl developed new ways to pursue his 
phenomenological agenda. We also find the development of key terms such as noesis, 
noema, epoché and the reduction that were, if at all, only rarely discussed before. In 
order to portray this last stage of Husserl’s development it seems appropriate to follow a 
more thematic approach as it would be difficult indeed to pin the multi-layered activities 
to one publication of this period.  
There are two interconnected thematic developments in Husserl’s thought in his later 
period that are of interest in the further trajectory of this study: Husserl’s transcendental 
turn and what Husserl himself called his greatest achievement (Woodruff Smith, 2007: 
240), the epoché and the reduction. The approach developed in the Logical 
Investigations that was sketched in its elementary facets above leads in its first stage to 
a purely descriptive account of the essences of experience. Soon after the publication of 
the two volumes, however, Husserl started to think further beyond this descriptive 
phenomenology. “After 1903 Husserl’s thinking also began to take a transcendental 
turn. Phenomenology must explore not just the essential structures of all conscious 
experiences and their intentional objects, but the rootedness of these essences and 
objects in a transcendental realm and the transcendental ego as their ‘absolute source’.” 
(Moran, 2000: 125) This turn towards the transcendental did by no means render his 
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former investigations useless or outdated; rather they now presented a first step in a 
richer and fuller account of phenomenology. (Hammond et al., 1991: 71) In Ideas I we 
can clearly see Husserl’s commitment to the basic assumption and presuppositions of 
the Logical Investigations and the outline of phenomenology he developed there. So he 
writes, “that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, 
that everything originarily (so to speak in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to us in 
‘intuition’ is accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the 
limits in which it is presented there.” (Husserl, 1983: 44) What prompted the further 
development towards a transcendental phenomenology were basically two shortcomings 
Husserl identified in his accounts hitherto. First, he was still discontent with the amount 
of naturalist tendencies within his thought. By turning to an even more remote (remote 
from empirical and naturalistic influences) account he hoped for an even purer 
understanding of mental acts and their meanings and objects. The so far proposed 
“[p]henomenological description of phenomena was hindered by the inherently human 
tendency to interpret, to apply our everyday preconceptions and practical interests, to 
the pure experience.” (Moran, 2000: 137) Exactly against this tendency was the impact 
of his transcendental phenomenology targeted.  
The second shortcoming Husserl identified was the lacking depth in his account of the 
synthesising subject. Although, as mentioned above, the focus lay with an account of 
acts as they appear in subjective consciousness, these acts were considered individually 
without providing for a larger treatment of the ‘ego’ that synthesises the different 
experiences. “His recognition that this neglect of the ego was distorting the 
understanding of the mental processes themselves came during his analyses of the 
nature of our conscious experience of time and the manner in which ordinary acts of 
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perception carry along with them moments of the past (retensions) as well as 
anticipations of the future (protensions).” (ibid.: 138) Husserl’s new found occupation 
with the experiencing subject led to a tripartite account of his whole project of 
phenomenology: ego-cogito-cogitatum. (Hammond et al., 1991: 73; see also Luft, 2004: 
211) The subject is hereby defined as combining the individual experiences as they 
belong to a single identical subject. Furthermore, the subject is also characterised by a 
specific individuality which is developed and continuously developing based on the 
different experiences the subject has. Here Husserl seems to slip into an almost 
historicist mode when acknowledging the influence of past, present and future acts in 
forming the individual subject. And finally, Husserl maintains that this individual 
subject conceives its meaning only in relation to the objects it intuits – a point of view 
that closely resembles Fichte’s idealism. Overall, “the individual subject , which 
Husserl calls the ‘monadically concrete Ego’, consist of the whole of actual and 
potential conscious life.  […] Husserl wants to emphasize that the concrete Ego 
‘contains within itself ‘, and is individuated by, all the experiences it could possibly 
have – all the ways it could constitute the actual or possible world.” (Hammond et al., 
1991: 74) Here again we see Husserl’s closeness to Leibnizian rationalism, not only in 
the ‘monadic’ terminology but also in the view that each individual constitutes and is 
constituted through the actuality and possibility of its experiences. Following these new 
focal points in his account “in Ideas I (1913), phenomenological philosophy appears as 
an explicitly transcendental philosophy, a science of subjectivity as an entirely self-
contained realm which in some strong sense is ‘absolute’.” (Moran, 2000: 141). 
Many of Husserl’s followers up to this point observed this move towards a form of 
idealism with great concern. So far they admired the scientific, foundational realism 
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Husserl seems to suggest as an underlying pattern for his descriptive account of mental 
acts. Now, so it seemed to some, Husserl abandoned most of this account in favour of a 
dangerously subjective and possibly historicist and relativist approach. It is, however, 
important to note that Husserl never gave up his original stipulation that philosophy is a 
science and must yield to insights that are objectively true independent from any 
‘worldly’ factors. In accordance with this view Husserl was convinced that behind this 
subjective veil were essential features and those could be uncovered by what Husserl 
called the transcendental reduction and the epoché. “The terms ‘reduction’ and ‘epoché’ 
are both common logical expressions. Epoché means the suspension of judgment, either 
because one doubts that human beings are capable of knowing anything with certainty 
(radical skepticism), or because one wants to examine an issue before one feels 
confident to have a ‘definitive’ opinion about it.” (Kockelmans, 1994: 118) In the case 
of Husserl we find an example of the latter. Although used interchangeably at times 
(ibid.: 120) the two most important variants of the reduction are the ‘phenomenological’ 
reduction on the one hand and the ‘transcendental’ reduction on the other.  
The phenomenological reduction can hereby be linked to the abovementioned first step 
of Husserl’s phenomenology The phenomenological reduction tries to bracket all 
stipulations regarding the existence of the world. Instead as was outlined above it is now 
only concerned with mental acts of experiences of objects as they are intended by 
consciousness. What Husserl tries to overcome here is the naturalist attitude that we 
normally exhibit in our everyday lives in order to “enter the sphere of philosophy”. 
(Luft, 2004: 203) We just assume that the world exists and all objects within it without 
asking the deeper question as to how these objects relate as mental acts to 
consciousness.  
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“In this epoché consciousness remains a consciousness, and this 
consciousness remains consciousness of something. […] That which we 
are conscious of, however, is not to be taken as such; that is to say, what 
we experience is not to be taken as a being in the real world but 
exclusively as that which is intended by consciousness. The object as 
being in the real world must be placed in brackets.” (Kockelmans, 1994: 
121) 
 
But as said above Husserl in his later work was not content with this form of the 
reduction since it still harboured remnants of the naturalistic attitude. The 
transcendental deduction then set out to bracket the whole of the life-world including 
other experiencing subjects (Hammond et al., 1991: 211) and aimed at finding and 
accepting apodictically given evidence. Here Husserl utilised Descartes’ original 
insights5 and posited a move towards the pure ego. In such a state “I am thus still left 
with the entire universe of all phenomena in the phenomenological sense of the term. 
Through the epoché and reduction, I apprehend myself purely, as ego, as having this 
conscious life, as having the entire objective world. All of this now exists for me as it is, 
precisely as it is for me. The entire world […] received its entire meaning and its 
acceptance as existing exclusively from my cogitations.” (Kockelmans, 1994: 217) 
Husserl himself calls this step the reduction to the sphere of ownness (Husserl, 1960: 
93) or the reduction to one’s monad. The allusion to Leibnizian terminology is 
deliberate here since Leibniz described the life of monads as necessarily solitary and 
without interference from the outside. In Leibniz this conceptualisation is necessary 
since he insists on the substantial form of monads. Therefore, Leibniz maintains that 
each monad brings the world with it and ‘mirrors’ the world inside itself rather than an 
external reality. In this vein Husserl argues that “in the sphere on ownness, one is to 
                                                 
5 Husserl is, however, not in agreement with Descartes in respect of the ramification of his discovery (for 
an exposition of the differences see for instance Kockelmans, 1994, pp.188-194) 
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construe any apparent relation between oneself and anything else as solely a property of 
one’s own subjective experience, a ‘mirroring’ of what is included in one’s monad and 
not a perceiving of something outside.” (Hammond et al., 1991: 211) In this mode of 
the reduction all that one experiences mentally will be world-constituting and therefore 
world-transcendent.  
“In these cogitations, my entire ’world-life’ goes on, including my 
philosophical life. By my living and experiencing, I can enter no world 
other than the one that gets its meaning and acceptance in and from me. 
If I put myself above this entire life and refrain from all believing that 
takes the world as actually existing, […] the pure ego is antecedent to the 
natural being of the world; […] The subject that is brought to light by the 
transcendental reduction is rightly called transcendental subjectivity.” 
(Kockelmans, 1994: 218) 
This reduction to the sphere of ownness seemingly leads to a rather strong form of 
solipsism since the transcendental ego that is constitutive of the world does abstract 
from the existence not only of other subjects as possible perceivable objects but also 
and even more important from the existence of other subjects as other perceivers. 
Husserl responded to the problem of intersubjectivity in its later writings and indeed 
suggested a way from the transcendental reduction to an affirmation of intersubjective 
reality and experience. After the reduction to the sphere of ownness Husserl suggests a 
phenomenological explication of the self, followed by a phenomenological explication 
of other selves and finally a phenomenological affirmation of community and 
intersubjectivity. “Husserl concludes that this transcendental phenomenology can give 
an adequate account of the existence-sense of other selves, and that knowledge of other 
selves is possible. Further, his transcendental phenomenology can give an adequate 
account of our inter-subjective experience of the objective world, and so his account of 
our knowledge of such a world is complete.” (Hammond et al., 1991: 210-1) 
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Martin Heidegger and the radical re-interpretation of phenomenology 
 
So far we have outlined the basic strands and origins of phenomenological thought that 
took early shape in the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano and was then properly 
developed throughout the distinguished career of Edmund Husserl. In the remainder of 
this chapter we will have a look at Husserl’s legacy that, as we will see in due course 
fed many different philosophical movements throughout the 20th century and as will be 
argued from the next chapter onwards can provide a starting point to think through the 
conditions of a new social ontology for IR.  
Before we, however, immerse into the trajectory of post-Husserlian phenomenology it 
has to be made clear that it is impossible to reiterate all the different influences and 
debates surrounding the phenomenological legacy. What we will do in the following 
lines is restricted to the needs of our further enquiry into the main elements of a new 
social ontology for contemporary IR theory and does not by any means represent a full 
account of phenomenology and its development throughout the 20th century.  
The focus will lie on the seminal influence of Martin Heidegger on the one hand and the 
post-Heideggerian developments in the German and French strands of phenomenology. 
Since the details of the different approaches will be referred to in the following chapters 
in direct relation to IR theory we will save a detailed account of their work for the 
individual thematic chapters. What will be provided here is more a genealogical (in its 
original meaning, not in a Foucauldian sense) depiction of post-Husserlian 
phenomenological thought.  
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The first step in this direction cannot but has to be focused on the influence and radical 
re-interpretation of phenomenology through the work of Martin Heidegger.6
“Philosophy as science, a serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science – the 
dream is over” (Husserl, 1970b: 389), wrote Husserl in 1936 after realising that almost 
all of his former students had considerably moved away from or beyond his original 
account of phenomenological philosophy. In fact, he mourned this development as a 
personal defeat against the growing influence of relativist and historicist approaches in 
continental philosophy – a movement he had fought against his entire academic career. 
Husserl felt like a ‘leader without followers’ and as the greatest enemy of the 
phenomenological movement as he himself declared in 1931 (Moran, 2000: 2), given 
the fact that his most promising and gifted students and followers had succumbed to the 
temptation of historicism.  
The development of one student in particular made Husserl feel betrayed in his efforts 
to break through to a new method of philosophising. Martin Heidegger read Husserl’s 
work with great interest and was influenced by his phenomenology early on. “In his 
habilitation thesis, ‘The categories and doctrine of meaning in Duns Scotus’, on which 
he was working in earnest from the spring of 1914 onwards, he had laid the foundations 
of a particular interpretative approach, whereby scholastic patterns of thought were 
subjected to a phenomenological interpretation inspired by the work of Husserl.” (Ott, 
1994: 79-80; see also Odysseos: 34-5) His early attempts to get in contact with the then 
                                                 
6 It seems important to point out in the beginning that the thesis is focussed on the impact of Heidegger’s 
work on phenomenology as it pertains to the tasks of this thesis. Therefore, a sustained philological 
critique of and engagement with Heidegger’s interpretation and use of Greek thought cannot be 
undertaken here. The importance of Greek thought for Heidegger’s philosophy will however be 
highlighted and discussed in places where it furthers and illuminates the argument at hand, especially in 
the chapters concerning truth and freedom. 
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famous phenomenologist, however, proved to be in vain. In 1916 Heidegger sent a copy 
of his habilitation thesis to Husserl in the hope of sparking some interest but he was 
largely unsuccessful for the time being. (Ott, 1994: 98) Only from 1918 onwards a 
closer and more fruitful relationship developed between the aging Husserl and his 
promising protégé. In January 1919 Heidegger became Husserl’s assistant and began 
lecturing in the same year. But already “in these lectures, Heidegger criticised […] 
Husserl’s conception of philosophy as a rigorous science… .” (Moran, 2000: 205) 
In the following lines of this section, we will look more closely on Heidegger’s 
criticism of Husserl project as a whole. The deeper appreciation of the particulars of 
Heidegger’s thought will be developed in the thematic chapters in the remainder of this 
thesis. Heidegger’s main criticism of Husserl consists in the stipulation that Husserl, 
especially after his transcendental turn, had been too eager to bracket the natural attitude 
with which we approach our everyday experiences. Heidegger maintained that this 
epoché or reduction completely ignored the question of existence or being in favour of 
an appreciation of essences. As was outlined above Husserl was keen on phasing out the 
natural attitude that, according to him, prevented an eidetic account of consciousness 
and mental phenomena. Heidegger on the other hand insisted that by trying to reach an 
essential account of human subjectivity, any attempt to bracket the question of existence 
must lead to a distortion of human being since the very essence of human being, or in 
Heidegger’s terminology, Dasein, “lies in its existence” (Heidegger, 1996:40) 
Heidegger was nevertheless intrigued by Husserl’s new approach which he saw in 
general as a viable and fruitful way to tackle the most fundamental philosophical 
problems. However, this affection for phenomenology was also coupled with an early 
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critical attitude towards Husserl himself. Even before they met Heidegger uttered 
doubts regarding Husserl’s breadth of vision or his status as a true philosopher. His 
criticism culminated in the publication of Being and Time, which, “if the treatise was 
written ‘against’ anyone, it’s against Husserl”, (Carman, 1993: 98) as he told Karl 
Jaspers in 1926. 
In general we can identify three major disagreements between Heidegger’s notion of 
phenomenology and Husserl’s original account – scientism versus hermeneutics, the 
question of phenomena and the relationship between essence and existence.  
First, Heidegger was opposed to the intrinsic scientism in Husserl’s approach, a feature 
which Heidegger linked to the inherent debt to Enlightenment thought in Husserl’s 
project. “Husserl inherited from rationalism and idealism a conception of philosophy as 
a rigorous discipline or science (Wissenschaft), and that methodological ideal, 
Heidegger contends, clouded Husserl’s view of the phenomena from the outset, contrary 
to his own stated aims.” (ibid.: 98) Closely linked to this difference towards a possible 
scientific phenomenology are the core elements and their conceptualisations, i.e. the 
things themselves. Heidegger was also committed to the focus on phenomena but saw 
himself as staying closer to and fulfilling in a better way the original promise, or at least 
what he took it to be, of such an endeavour. What troubled Heidegger early on was 
Husserl’s neglect of the question ‘What are these things themselves?’ Heidegger saw 
that Husserl in his attempt to reach a pure phenomenological description of these 
phenomena had completely neglected the question of what makes these phenomena 
perceivable as phenomena in the first place. As was stated above, Husserl saw 
phenomena in the literal sense as appearances and treated these mental acts or objects as 
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worthy of description in their own right and interpreted them as subjective occurrences. 
They have a real existence, actually ‘more’ real than physical objects since mental 
objects as they appear to or in consciousness are given self-evidently through their 
status of inexistence. 
“Phenomena are, for Husserl, appearances, which is to say the contents 
of or in consciousness, not the things themselves appearing to 
consciousness. Phenomena are subjective, and phenomenology is 
essentially an inquiry into the nature of subjectivity in its own right, in 
strict distinction from the objective entities and structures studied by the 
empirical and formal sciences, in abstraction from our experience of 
them.” (ibid.: 100) 
 
The question that Heidegger judged to be essential here and not addressed by Husserl is 
the ontological status of the phenomenon and its relation to the concepts of subject and 
object. Heidegger will maintain throughout his philosophy that the distinction between a 
subjective appearance and an objective thing that appears is nonsensical. (ibid.) 
Therefore, “in Heideggerian phenomenology, then, a phenomenon is not an appearance 
in contrast to something that appears, but rather ‘that which shows itself, the manifest’, 
a primitive notion that, he insists, ‘has in the first instance nothing whatever to do with 
what one calls ‘appearance’, or indeed ‘mere appearance’.” (ibid.; see also Heidegger, 
1996: 25) Out of this follows that phenomena are exactly not, as they were for Husserl, 
representations in consciousness of something transcendent to consciousness; 
phenomena for Heidegger are not essentially subjective. As Heidegger explains, a 
phenomenon is 
“something that does not show itself initially and for the most part, 
something that is concealed, in contrast to what initially and for the most 
part does show itself. But at the same time it is something that essentially 
belongs to what initially and for the most part shows itself, indeed in 
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such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground.” (Heidegger, 1996: 
31) 
 
The last point of major disagreement between Husserl and Heidegger concerns one of 
the major methodological devices Husserl developed after the publication of Logical 
Investigations and that formed the backbone of his phenomenology – the reduction. As 
was outlined above, the different forms of the reduction aimed at bracketing what 
Husserl called the naturalistic attitude in order to be able to achieve an eidetic account 
of mental acts and, in the case of the transcendental reduction, an account of 
transcendental subjectivity itself. Heidegger disputed the soundness of this 
methodological tool because “the phenomenological reduction is misunderstood if it is 
interpreted […] as being a philosophical technique which makes possible the disclosure 
of a pure, absolute transcendental consciousness which requires no relationship to the 
world in order to be.” (Seeburger, 1975: 213)  
In Husserl these idealist tendencies and allusions led to a disregard of the always 
already factical involvement of human being in the world. As Heidegger pointed out 
many times: “Man, […], is not ‘in’ the world as one object present at hand, among other 
objects, but is ‘in’ the world precisely as that being through which the world first comes 
to be disclosed as world.” (ibid.) The neglect of direct experience and the bias towards 
ideal essences caused Husserl to turn away from the fact that phenomena are to the sole 
focus on what they are. The important point here is not that both aspects, the existential 
and essential should be dealt with and Husserl neglected just one of them. The crucial 
and indeed highly problematic fact is rather that in the case of human being its very 
essence lies in its existence. (Heidegger, 1996: 40) “If the very fact of our existence is 
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constitutive of our self-understanding, then the eidetic reduction suppresses what is 
most essential to intentionality, namely the existential moment.” (Carman, 1993: 108)  
Here we see the most fundamental difference between Husserl and Heidegger. Where 
Husserl distinguished most fundamentally between consciousness and world – thereby 
staying heavily indebted to the Cartesian project – and accordingly between whatness 
and thatness, Heidegger insists that “the traditional concepts of whatness and thatness, 
precisely by admitting of a sharp conceptual distinction, fail to capture the way in which 
the very being of human beings is inextricably bound up with what they take themselves 
to be.” (ibid.: 107) What Heidegger is changing here is the whole direction of Husserl’s 
project. At the outset Husserl started with a complete disregard of the existence of the 
objects we intend in consciousness and focused instead on the very essence 
intentionality has in consciousness and the different ways in which intentionality related 
to mental objects and intends them. And “precisely because Husserl mistakes human 
existence for mere objective presence, he wrongly infers that the essence of 
intentionality can be grasped apart from any interest in its existence.” (ibid.: 108) But if 
Heidegger is right and the essence of human beings lies with their existence and their 
constant involvement in the world, this attitude towards intentionality is completely 
mistaken. Indeed, Heidegger suggests,  
“we do not understand things, least of all ourselves, in this blandly 
objective way. Instead we make use of things, we rely on them, we take 
them for granted by manipulating, adjusting, wearing, stepping on, and 
ignoring them. Only rarely do they stand over against us as mere objects, 
In short, we do not simply intuit them as ‘occurrent’ (vorhanden), we 
treat them as ‘available’ (zuhanden).” (ibid.: 109) 
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Overall, as this short depiction has shown, Heidegger shares a common starting point 
with his erstwhile mentor Edmund Husserl and follows him in his attempt to go ‘back to 
the things themselves’. But whereas Husserl follows a more scientific-foundationlist 
approach in line with the Cartesian ideal of scientific certainty, Heidegger deviates quite 
clearly in taking a more historicist-hermeneutical road.  
“For both Husserl and Heidegger, […], phenomenology is essentially a 
descriptive, not a hypothetical or explanatory, enterprise. […] But 
whereas Husserl aspires to what he calls ‘a systematic and eidetic 
morphology’ of intentional attitudes, Heidegger explicitly renounces any 
purely observational conception of description.[…] Rather, ‘the meaning 
of phenomenological description as a method of interpretation.’ In a 
word, ‘The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic.’” (ibid.: 101; see 
also Heidegger, 1996: 32-3) 
 
Therefore, it seems fair to say, that “while Husserl’s phenomenology was a crucial 
formative influence on Being and Time, it was an influence that exerted itself only at a 
rather abstract and programmatic level, touching neither the core nor the details of 
Heidegger’s project.” (Carman, 1993: 98) 
As will be illustrated in the remainder of this thesis, Heidegger’s hermeneutical re-
interpretation of phenomenology coupled with his enquiries into the nature of Being in 
general and human Dasein in particular together with the work of later 
phenomenologists forms a viable background for the current search for a new social 
ontology for IR theory. 
Before, however, we can turn to this fruitful exposition of the possible contribution of 
post-Husserlian phenomenology to the new social ontology it seems necessary to 
quickly present the reception and development of Heideggerian thought in German and 
especially French philosophy.  
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Post-Heideggerian phenomenology – the German and French repercussions 
 
The influence of Heidegger’s thought on continental philosophy, independent of any 
discussion about its proclivity towards authoritarianism and Heidegger’s complicity 
with the regime during the Nazi rule in Germany, can hardly be overstated. Not only did 
his thought influence discussions within the field of philosophy but also sparked many 
debates in related areas such as aesthetics or religion. At the centre of attention in our 
case are the repercussions of his thought in the German and French post-War 
philosophical environment, the place in which his impact was most immediate.  
The difference in perception and treatment of Heidegger’s intellectual legacy in 
Germany and France after WWII is striking. Generally it seems fair to say that the fame 
Heidegger enjoyed in Germany was accompanied with recognition of his work abroad. 
After 1945 the situation reversed and Heidegger became much less influential in 
Germanywhere he lost his leaching license and was eventually only granted the status of 
professor emeritus. In France, and in many other countries around the globe, 
Heidegger’s star, however, rose to unprecedented heights. It is certainly true to say that 
the two most influential philosophical strands in France after 1945 were Marxism and 
Heideggerianism. 
Heidegger remained an important figure in certain philosophical circles in Germany but 
was mainly invited to talk by former students and individual admirers. He was 
repeatedly urged, as was already hinted at in the Introduction, to engage with his past 
and take responsibility for his political commitments but he refused until his death in 
1976 to come even close to any form of regret. And although Heidegger resurfaced 
repeatedly in discussions and TV documentaries as well as in interviews, he was never 
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able to regain his former stature as a leading intellectual within the German academic 
environment. His thought, however, provided starting points for other important post-
War German thinkers. Habermas, Gadamer, Jonas, Löwith and Arendt are certainly 
among the most prominent. The reception of Heidegger’s thought abroad, however, 
reveals a strikingly different picture. He became influential in many parts of the world, 
especially Latin America, Japan, and the US but also gained tremendous influence in 
European countries, especially France. As Tom Rockmore in his extensive study has 
shown, “that as measured by a variety of criteria – including the sheer size of the 
discussion concerning his thought, the number of philosophers interested in his position, 
his impact on the subsequent debate – as we approach the end of this century, 
Heidegger has attained exceptional status as one of the several most influential 
philosophers of this period. This is nowhere more clearly the case than in France… .” 
(Rockmore, 1995: 1 and 18-9; see also, Ungar, 1989 and Wolin, 1988)  
Initially, Heidegger’s thought entered France mainly through the work of such eminent 
philosophers as Kojève, Koyré, Lévinas and Wahl during the late 1920s and early 
1930s. (Koyré, 1998: 521-30) The second even more influential wave started with the 
publication of the Letter on Humanism. (Heidegger, 2007c) “It was sustained through 
the determined efforts of Jean Beaufret, its addressee and from the mid 1940s until his 
death in 1982 Heidegger’s most important French student, to transform the view of this 
text into the French view of Heidegger.” (Rockmore, 1995: xvii) 
Especially the decline of Marxism in French thought during the late 1970s and 1980s, 
however, left Heidegger almost unchallenged in his position as master thinker.  
Until the mid 1970’s, Marxism satisfied the need for a radical anti-liberal 
doctrine and encouraged the hope that the programme of the 
Enlightenment might be achieved after all. Heidegger’s conservative anti-
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modernism was then countered by the Marxist confidence in a future, fully 
rational society. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, however, in the wake of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the military repression in Poland, 
French intellectuals began to associate Marxism with imperialism and state 
terror. After the decline of Marxism, they were left with Heideggerism as 
the only radical critique of modern society.” (Pavel, 1988: 890-1) 
 
This of course does not mean that Heidegger’s thought stayed untouched but rather that 
the intellectual engagement with political and social circumstances was broadly guided 
by Heideggerian ideas. The variety of thinkers that developed against the background of 
this Heideggerian influence is immense and “nowhere more clearly the case than in 
France, where over the last half-century his ideas have left their mark on a wide range 
of leading philosophers (Lévinas, Derrida, Lyotard, Henry), on philosophers committed 
to detailed historical studies of such figures as Aristotle (Pierre Aubenque, Rémi 
Brague), Suarez (Jean-Francois Courtine), Descartes (Jean-Luc Marion), Schelling 
(Courtine, Miklos Vetö), Hegel (Kojève, Jean Hyppolite, Dominique Janicaud), as well 
as on social theorists (Foucault), feminists (Luce Irigaray), psychanalysts (Lacan), and 
others.” (Rockmore, 1995: 1) 
In this view, the range of thinkers that were influenced by Heideggerian philosophy 
throughout the 20th century offers a seemingly endless choice for appropriating their 
thought to projects of the social sciences. Phenomenology became such a vast 
undertaking that most philosophers working under this umbrella turned to different 
subject areas to explore the ramifications of phenomenology. In the following chapters 
we will present a selection of the most important philosophers in the post-Husserl era of 
phenomenology and their impact and contributions to the Heideggerian project of 
Fundamentalontologie (fundamental ontology) as they pertain to our project at hand. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Part II 
 
A new social ontology 
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III Agency – The constant involvement of Dasein in its 
world 
 
Man is not the lord of existing things.  
Man is the shepherd of Being. 
 
Martin Heidegger 
 
 
The notion of self and agency is certainly one of the most central to both philosophical 
reflection and political action. In both fields the notion of agency is heavily discussed 
and forms one of the main centres of gravity. In the following chapter the attempt will 
be made to show the deep and substantial challenge that will start the proposed 
reconceptualisation of ontology in IR challenging the hitherto dominant interpretation 
of the individualistic and rational concept of agency shared by realists and liberals alike. 
It has to be admitted that the concept of agency has started to change in recent accounts. 
It seems, however, that we are in need of a more substantial evaluation of agency 
especially in respect to in place in the wider ontological form that emerges concomitant 
to it. In order to achieve this deeper and more substantial account this chapter will 
proceed in three steps. First, it seems necessary to quickly portray what the notion of 
agency was taken to be in modern philosophy as well as in its representatives in IR 
theory. Secondly, the phenomenological conceptualisation of agency has to be depicted 
and the differences between the hitherto dominant conception of agency and a 
phenomenological one have to be elaborated. Finally, this chapter will look at the 
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challenges posed by this differing understanding of agency and its ramifications for 
other core terms (which will be discussed in subsequent chapters) sketched out. 
 
Agency and modernity 
 
The role of the human agent in respect to her mental capabilities as well as her place 
within nature was and still is one of the major themes of philosophical, anthropological, 
sociological and political reflection. The modern assumptions regarding human agency 
which by and large still dominate the majority of the humanities and certainly the 
natural sciences emerged with the philosophy of Descartes. In modernity they 
underwent certain refinements and changes but the central message they conveyed – the 
possibility to master the world and objectively grasp and understand it – is still intact. 
This view of a unitary, self-aware form of agency lay at the heart of Descartes’ “Cogito 
ergo sum” – I think therefore I am – and can be seen as expressing the modern 
worldview in a nutshell. Descartes’ original endeavour was an attempt to tackle the 
rising scepticist tide and to ground human knowledge about the world on secure, i.e. 
indubitable foundations. (Sedgwick, 2001: 3) His focus on epistemology was to become 
the central focus of most philosophical endeavours in the following 300 years. In order 
to find this indubitable ground on which all knowledge can rest Descartes decided to 
question every belief that seems to stem from tradition, convention or prejudice. The 
mind, cleared of all these mere beliefs should then proceed and confirm the one fact that 
could not possibly be doubted – the existence of a thinking thing, i.e. its own existence 
as mind. “So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that 
this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or 
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conceived in my mind.” (Descartes, 1996: 17, see also Sedgwick, 2001: 5) Taking the 
cue from this secure foundation Descartes moved on to confirm other facts not through 
reliance on tradition, convention or myth but through the exercise of reason. “Reason 
now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not 
completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are 
patently false.” (Descartes, 1996: 12) A fact should be conceived of as certain and 
therefore as established knowledge if reasonable proof for its correctness can be brought 
forward. This of course, in a very simple formula, entails the nucleus of scientific 
research that in due course led to unprecedented successes and advancements in the 
natural sciences (which in turn of course corroborated this world view and made it the 
dominant one in the modern era). 
Of importance for the topic at hand are basically three ramifications of Descartes’ 
revolutionary approach that emerged out of the general tendency to depict the human 
agent as disengaged and detached from the world. First, the introduction of the mind – 
body dualism or alternatively a material mechanism to ground the claims for disengaged 
agency, secondly the inherent conception of a self-transparent consciousness and finally 
the role of reason. 
In respect to the first point, the provision of a ground from which to argue for a 
disengaged form of agency two alternatives developed in early modern thought. On the 
one hand we find the Cartesian dualism between mind and body. By separating the 
mind from the body, it became possible to ascribe to the mind the powers of developing 
a picture of the world that is not tainted by feelings, prejudices or conventions, that 
presents the world neutrally and achieves through critical self-reflection an objective 
view of the world. (Taylor, 1993: 205; see also Sedgwick, 2001: 7) Certainly, the ideal 
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of objectivity is often not reached and contaminated by personal attitudes and 
convictions but these negative influences can be attributed to the body with its fallible 
senses and its involvement in nature. The mind, however, through its inherent 
rationality can overcome these distorting factors and achieve a factual representation of 
the world without any recourse to values. (Taylor, 1993: 205) 
The second approach that led to a detached notion of human agency can be found in 
mechanistic materialism which is closely linked with Spinoza’s philosophy. The core of 
Spinoza’s philosophical outlook was his stipulation that God is Nature. (Stewart, 2006: 
158; see also Spinoza, 2000: 226) What Spinoza tried to convey with this utterance was 
a radical break with the old medieval conceptualisation of a transcendent God that 
willingly and purposefully created the world and its inhabitants and now watched from 
afar. Spinoza for his part insisted on the logical necessity that God as an infinite 
substance cannot be apart from his creation since a substance in its Aristotelian sense 
cannot be limited by anything outside itself – it has to be in and for itself. (ibid.: 75; see 
also Della Rocca, 2002: 11ff.) Therefore the one substance must completely coincide 
with its creation in the form of Nature.  
The natural order Spinoza identified was an order in which mechanical necessity 
prevailed and all living beings had to be conceptualised as modes or specific finite 
expression of the all-encompassing Nature-God. The principle of sufficient reason 
loomed large in Spinoza’s system and coupled with his extreme determinism, Nature 
necessitated a predetermined mechanical sequence of events in which human agents are 
only elements among others that express this naturalistic panentheism (see for instance 
Spinoza, 2000: 86) and its inevitable course. As was stressed by many different authors 
on the subject, Spinoza was in fact the first thinker that systematically portrayed a 
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modern worldview in which rationality and the belief in scientific explanation were 
placed at centre stage. (Stewart, 2006: 310; see also Hampshire, 1951, p.17) One of the 
consequences was the separation of fact and value since “the new science had negative 
implications for value theory. It seems that there is not room for values in the world of 
pure motion.” (Koistinen and Biro, 2002: 8; see also Spinoza, 2000: 233)  
 
Inherent in both views is the conception of a self-transparent mind or consciousness. 
(Sedgwick, 2001: 9) In order for Descartes’ approach to work it must be possible for the 
mind to empty itself from all beliefs and reflect critically on each component that 
constituted a part of our convictions and opinions through the powers of reason. In the 
same vein, Spinoza through his mechanistic materialism reduced the processes and 
features of the mind to mere physical states. The physical states, however, can be 
described and discovered through the use of method. Each physical state causes hereby 
by necessity another physical state and so on. In this picture, no room is left for the 
influence of contextual, conventional or traditional variations. The world unfolds itself 
in all eternity according to a pre-determined causal chain of events whose rules and 
conditions can be discovered and described through the use of reason.  
In these two descriptions we find the second feature of disengaged agency. Notions of 
language, culture and custom can be phased out in a rational reassessment of our 
knowledge about the environment we live in. Our social role, our identity, our historical 
situatedness are to be bracketed or simply put aside as unimportant in order to ensure a 
correct and neutral representation of the world. 
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Finally, and of course most importantly for this new approach to work, the nature of 
reason had to be redefined. To depict the change in the meaning of the word ‘reason’ 
modernity brought about, in both its object and the role of the reasoning subject, it 
seems prudent, as Nicholas Gier suggested, exploring not only the etymological roots 
but also the content of its meaning. The word for reason in ancient Greece was logos 
that simply translated just means ‘word’. Metaphysically, however, logos means reason 
as the controlling principal in the universe. (Gier, 2001: 13-5) 
We encounter a view based on this meaning in the use of the word logos in the famous 
prologue of the book of John were it says: “In the beginning was the logos, and the 
logos was with God, and the logos was God.” If we now apply the original Greek 
meaning of logos as reason understood in terms of the controlling principal of the 
universe we can see, that in the pre-modern understanding reason was first a faculty of 
the human mind that was given by God and secondly that this faculty gave man the 
opportunity to grasp an idea of what God as the principle of the universe intended us to 
do by picking up and combining pieces given to man. (Descartes, 1996: 36) God as 
Reason describes the order of the world as a wilful act of creation by a divine being, 
endowing man with a spark of the divine understanding in form of ‘human reason’. In 
Descartes this belief in reason as the faculty able to discover a pregiven structure in 
nature rests upon the faith in the equity of God and his conviction that God is not 
deceitful. “To begin with, I recognize that it is impossible that God should ever deceive 
me. For in every case of trickery or deception some imperfection is to be found: and 
also the ability to deceive appears to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to 
deceive is undoubtedly evidence of malice or weakness, and so cannot apply to God.” 
(ibid.: 37) A similar understanding of reason as coupled with faith is also dominant in 
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Leibniz (Stewart, 2006: 116, 191 and 237; see also Barnouw, 1981: 619ff.) and only 
dies slowly with the re-definition of reason and its purpose in Kant. (Neiman, 1994: 34-
8) 
The modern understanding on the other hand shares the notion of reason as a faculty of 
the human mind, manages however to strip reason from all divine connections. 
Furthermore reason is not the faculty that established knowledge – in Kant this faculty 
becomes the understanding. Arguably, in Kantian terms the logos in the meaning of 
‘picking up’ and combining different perceptions to a form of knowledge is more 
independent from reason than its was before. When the understanding in Kant becomes 
the logos, reason becomes ratio. The difference is indeed a considerable one since 
reason in a pre-modern understanding is concerned with finding means to achieve a pre-
given end; in other words reason is responsible to discern the will of God. In modernity 
however reason is equated with freedom, a freedom that allows reason to create its own 
ends and prescribe imperatives to experience. This crucial move is worth reflecting 
upon since its presents the final step in the development of the modern notion of 
agency. 
The shift in Kant’s philosophy is best explained when looking at the first Critique in 
which Kant discussed the nature and possibility of synthetic a priori judgments – 
judgements that add actually something new to human knowledge but are not derived 
from experience. Here we discover the scope of the Kantian redefinition of reason since 
reason becomes the faculty that is suddenly active, free and potent to create something 
new. (Neiman, 1994: 36) Synthetic a priori judgements require such a faculty since they 
have to be derived totally independent from our senses and also must not just be 
analytic in deducing pre-given truths. In this understanding reason is no longer the 
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faculty of the human mind that just passively deduces knowledge but becomes an active 
part that is actually able to imprint its mark upon the external environment. Kant 
stresses the fact that reason creates ideas and he also recognises that these ideas, since 
they lack material existence and therefore cannot be objects of sensual perception, 
cannot be known. “But recognizing the limits of our knowledge allows us to realise our 
real power: to use the ideas of reason to judge, evaluate, and transform experience.” 
(ibid.: 38) Suddenly, reason is no longer man’s capacity to discover the order of the 
world, its underlying structure – this is not possible according to Kant. But it actually 
and revolutionary allows for something else: the order of the world, even if it may not 
be discovered, may be constructed by dint of our ideas derived from reason. 
The main difference in Kantian epistemology to earlier forms lies therefore in the 
capacity of reason to determine ends rather than contemplating about means to achieve 
pre-given ends. (ibid.) In this way reason became externally active and was an 
important factor in influencing the way we perceive our environment.  
In allowing for this active part of human reason, Kant set the tone for the subsequent 
development of modernity as this new epistemology freed man from an order that was 
assumed to be naturally given (maybe there is one, but we cannot know it) and made 
him the master of his own experience. It was no longer deduction or induction that was 
used to decipher the logic of our environment but the actively shaping influence of ends 
determined by man alone that dictated the way nature was perceived. This newly found 
role of human reason had of course detrimental effects for the role of God in everyday 
discourse. The loss of a naturally ordered world shifted the attention away from the 
creator of this order to the agents that are now able to infuse their own ways into nature.  
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As we have seen above, before Kant, with few exceptions such as Spinoza, God was the 
centre of the universe in ontological and epistemological terms. Everything that existed 
and happened was attributed to this divine being and the capacity of man to know was 
also seen as depended on the assumed coincidental relationship between nature and 
reason, i.e. on the belief that God invested his creation with a certain order that is at 
least partly accessible to human reason. With the abandonment of God as the 
constitutive principle reason as the active faculty of the mind became thereby not only 
responsible for determining ends but also for critiquing all our beliefs. All knowledge, 
all truths that we cherish have to stand before reason and pass its critical scrutiny.  
There were of course other effects that an abandonment of God as the constitutive 
principle brought with it. First and foremost was the necessity for man to replace not 
only God as divine being but even more important man had to find replacements for 
God’s qualities in order to ensure a viable foundation for the new order of the world. In 
order to allow human reason to define ends it was necessary to find a way to match 
possible experience with these pre-determined ends and to be able to do that man had to 
believe in his capacity to transform his environment according to the demands of 
reason. The power to transform the environment, i.e. to power to create, had so far of 
course only been attributed to God. In particular it seemed necessary to match God in 
three respects: omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence.   
Indeed, during the following 200 years after the publication of Kant’s critique man tried 
to emulate these three characteristics. Science replaced divine omniscience, technology 
replaced omnipotence and human ethics replaced divine omnibenevolence. This 
endeavour, however, proved to be a long shot from the very beginning. Whereas 
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omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence constituted attributes of God, science, 
technology and ethics were human inventions. They were and still are external to the 
human agent and were able to shape and reshape not only the environment on which 
they were employed but also the human agent himself. The very use of these tools to 
master nature had lasting effects on what it meant to be human – overall, without 
drawing any premature conclusions, it seems fair to say that the effects were detrimental 
to the natural environment as well as to mankind in general. What started with the 
planed conquest of nature, the mastery of the world according to human reason and 
instrumental rationality, soon deteriorated into a conquest of man himself. 
Metaphorically seen, the world suddenly faced not one God but billions and as it turned 
out these all-too-human ‘gods’ were everything but omniscient, omnipotent or 
omnibenevolent. Every community presented a different way to master nature and 
reason soon proofed to be not as universally valid or abstractly definable as Kant had 
wished.  
 
The role and understanding of the human agent that evolved out of these initially 
philosophically abstract approaches managed to dominate not only academic discourse 
be it in the social or the natural sciences, it also managed to seep into the common sense 
of society. The belief that human agents are able to mould nature according to ideas and 
concepts derived form the minds capacity to reason and objectively analyse its 
environment was taken as given through the better part of the last 300 years. Certainly 
there were always critics of this rationalistic approach the role of humanity and its place 
and relation to nature but these voices grew only stronger in recent years and for the 
most part are still confined to academic, mostly philosophical, discourse.  
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As Charles Taylor among others pointed out this account of human agency “has to some 
extent colonized the common sense of our civilization. [It] offers us the picture of an 
agent who in perceiving the world takes in ‘bits’ of information from his or her 
surroundings and the ‘processes’ them in some fashion, in order to emerge with the 
‘picture’ of the world he or she has, who then acts on the basis of this picture to fulfil 
his or her goals, through a ‘calculus of means and ends’.” (Taylor, 1993: 204) This act 
of processing relies heavily on the abovementioned assumptions of disengaged agency, 
self-transparent consciousness and a specific interpretation of reason.  
It is this notion of agency that the new social ontology proposed here argues against. 
The next section will shed more light on the philosophical background of this criticism 
and is therefore basically concerned with elaborating and conceptualising the deeper 
implications of this critique and show how a inclusion of reference to phenomenology 
can underline and strengthen a different conception of agency without, however, risking 
the fallback into a foundationalist or objectivist enterprise. 
 
The phenomenological conception of agency – Towards a hermeneutics of the Self 
 
If we come to the topic of agency in IR we can hardly avoid sparking huge discussions 
as to what agency actually entails and who can be said to be an agent in a meaningful 
sense. Classical realists on the one hand focus on the individual that acts in and through 
history. Human nature which is characterised by desires above all ambition if we follow 
Morgenthau is the most important background out of which individuals form and make 
the decisions in positions of power and influence. (Morgenthau, 2006) 
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Neorealism and large parts of the neoliberal strands fought successfully against this 
conceptualisation aiming at an objectified and quantifiable conception of agency that 
allowed the use of scientific methods. It is now no longer the individual decision maker 
and her nature that lies at the centre of attention but the constraining necessities of the 
system it exists in. Agency here was mostly reduced to mere instrumental rationality, 
the agent became a mere utility maximiser acting according to zweckrational principles. 
(Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1986a; Waltz, 1986b; Mearsheimer, 2001) In this view agents are 
reduced to rational entities whose decision can be calculated, objectified and quantified. 
(for a translation of this view into methodology see for instance King et al., 1994) Any 
meaningful engagement with self-reflecting and self-interpretive elements is strictly 
avoided due to their intrinsic resistance to scientific conceptualisation. This picture of 
agency is strictly modelled along the line of disengagement typical for the modern 
conceptualisation depicted above. 
Since the mid- 1980s a third conception developed under the large umbrella of 
constructivism. In its critical strand constructivism puts forward a conception of agency 
that is based on choice and contextually situated. (Fierke, 2005: 7-8) Agents can act 
individually or collectively and always have a freedom to act as if the situation they are 
in could be otherwise – they have the undeniable capacity to change their environment 
through social interaction and a changing understanding of their social surroundings. 
(Checkel, 1998: 330-2; see also Fierke 2005: 12-4) The main difference interpretivist 
approaches emphasise in respect to agency is a limited notion of freedom which allows 
the introduction of a meaningful notion of change that goes well beyond the quantifiable 
shift of capabilities. Likewise, they accept structural constrains and therefore do not 
posit an absolute freedom of the agents in question but maintain the fluctuation of these 
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structure-providing norms and rules through an intersubjective framework based on 
practices.  
The question therefore arises how the concept of agency can be conceptualised more 
substantially outside or at least different from the hitherto dominant disengaged picture 
modern philosophy and science has painted. Again, the general argument here will 
focus on the centrality of a new social ontology of the notion of human being. On the 
very fundamental level we will challenge the rationalist mainstream through the 
introduction of a new and radically different ontology that can be grasped more clearly 
and substantially than so far by reference to post-Husserlian phenomenology. As 
opposed to the traditional ontology and its assumptions especially in respect to human 
agency, the ontology presented here can roughly be described by a reversal of the 
Cartesian tantrum ‘I think, therefore I am’ – ‘I am, therefore I think’. (Dreyfus, 1991: 3; 
see also Bowie, Andrew, 1996: 106)7
This ontology is in the first place not about philosophical idealism or materialism, i.e. 
not about the nature of what lies behind our conceptions of what exists. The debate 
between materialism and idealism is just another example of the modern attitude to 
solve the problems of human agency through bifurcating human existence.  
The ontology that might just add new insights to the study of human social and political 
relationships must therefore be of a very different and in many ways more fundamental 
kind. We can find such a conceptualisation of human existence and human agency in 
post-Husserlian phenomenology and it seems odd that no scholar in the vast field of 
                                                 
7 It is important to point out that the inversion suggested here can only be seen as a rough appropriation to 
a post-Husserlian phenomenological position as the ‘I’ even in the inverted statement would certainly 
remain a matter of concern for Heidegger and its successors.  
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reflectivist accounts has yet developed an account of agency by drawing on 
phenomenological insights.  
 
The way into this conceptualisation of agency leads through the seminal work of Martin 
Heidegger. As is well known, Heidegger in his magnum opus Sein und Zeit, tried to 
reinvigorate philosophical enquiry into one of the most neglected concepts since the 
time of Plato – Sein (being). (ibid.) According to Heidegger, modern humanity has 
forgotten what it means to ask for the meaning of being. It does not mean that no one 
asked the question regarding the nature of entities but the answers that were given did 
not properly address the nature of being as such; instead they only dealt with entities 
whose being was taken as given and not enquired into. The nature of being was hereby 
seen as self-evident but, as Heidegger points out, “[t]he fact that we live already in an 
understanding of being and that the meaning of being is at the same time shrouded in 
darkness proves the fundamental necessity of repeating the question of the meaning of 
‘being.’” (Heidegger, 1996: 3)  
Therefore, in Heidegger’s view, ontology so far has only dealt with Seiendem (entities) 
but not with Sein (being). The reason for this forgetfulness is not to be found in 
ignorance but, on the contrary, in the lucidity of being – being is too familiar, too close, 
too obvious to pose a question or puzzle to the human enquirer. (Heidegger, 1996: 19) 
And yet, Heidegger insists it is necessary to ask the question of the meaning of being 
anew and try to find an answer outside the modern philosophical framework. He was 
not interested in a purely ontic account that treats being as being that arises out of the 
Offenbarkeit des Seins (obviousness of being) but rather wanted to think through this 
Offenbarkeit. In order to achieve this task, he proposes the necessity to use a completely 
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new language that carves out the characteristics of being. As we will see, “Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology thus calls into question both the Platonic assumption that 
human activity can be explained in terms of theory and the central place the Cartesian 
tradition assign to the conscious subject.” (Dreyfus, 1991: 3) 
The first major step Heidegger makes in Sein und Zeit after outlining his task at hand is 
to narrow his focus to one specific form of being, human being or as he calls it Dasein. 
“Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being – one who questions – 
transparent in its being. […] This being which we ourselves in each case are and which 
includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being we formulate terminologically as 
Da-sein.” (Heidegger, 1996: 6) This step that initially seems to leave Heidegger’s 
endeavour open to the criticism of an anthropocentric bias is however justified since 
Dasein as a form of being is special because “Dasein is a being which is concerned in 
its being about that being.” (Heidegger, 1996: 179) In other words, human being is the 
only kind of being that reflects on being. The meaning of Dasein is crucial for 
understanding Heidegger’s initial question and his approach to answer it. First, and 
most importantly, Dasein (literally translated being-there) does not designate a mere 
physical presence in the world. It rather signifies a form of constant involvement in the 
world, a point we will come back to later. Secondly, Dasein does not describe a 
particular human being understood in the traditional sense of a subject. Being-there is 
not a substitute for consciousness. (Kaufmann, 2004: 37) On the contrary Heidegger is 
eager to avoid any contamination of his endeavour with traditional ontology which tried 
to ground “all kinds of being in a causally self-sufficient source” (Dreyfus, 1991: 12) 
such as God or the absolute/transcendental ego we find in the philosophies of Fichte or 
Husserl. Rather than assuming that consciousness is a prerequisite for human existence 
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or human subjectivity, Heidegger proposes that vice versa consciousness can only arise 
out of being. Here we find again the abovementioned inversion of Descartes: Sum, ergo 
cogito (I am, therefore I think). 8
And finally, Heidegger ascribes a specific form of being to Dasein which he calls 
existence. The special characteristic of Dasein as we will see more elaborately shortly is 
that “Dasein’s activity – its way of being – manifests a stand it is taking on what it is to 
be Dasein.” (Dreyfus, 1991: 15). In short, one existential characteristic of Dasein is its 
self-reflexivity; Dasein is the only form of being for which its own being raises 
questions or becomes a matter of concern. For Heidegger “[w]e shall call the very being 
to which Da-sein can relate in one way or another, and somehow always does relate, 
existence [Existenz].” (Heidegger, 1996: 10) Or as William Blattner puts it: “Existence 
is, roughly, that feature of Dasein that its self-understanding is constitutive of its being 
what or who it is.” (Blattner, 1996: 97) 
 
If, as Heidegger points out, the question of being has not only been insufficiently 
answered but has been posed wrongly by the tradition altogether, a reconsideration of 
the methods, ways of thinking and language is necessary. Reconsidering these elements, 
however, means reconsidering main aspects of what it means to be a human being. 
Therefore, “ontology must begin with a discussion of human beings (as it is they who 
ask what ‘being’ means) because their misconceptions about themselves, about what it 
                                                 
8 Heidegger’s indictment of the whole tradition of Western philosophy as having followed the Cartesian 
notion of agency in various ways must be seen as overstated. As Andrew Bowie rightly pointed out, the 
challenges against such a Cartesian notion of subjectivity did not arise with Nietzsche or Heidegger but 
can be traced back to the early anti-Enlightenment and Romanticism in thinkers such as Jacobi and 
Schelling. (Bowie, 1996: 108-9) 
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means to think and what it means to talk, frustrated all efforts to make clear what being 
means.” (Schmitt, 2000: 12-3) 
Based on this emphasis on Dasein Heidegger introduces clear distinctions between 
human beings and other entities. Dasein, in order to ask the question of the meaning of 
being anew and to have any chance finding a more satisfying answer must of course 
have ways to judge whether any reconceptualisation indeed leads to more illuminating 
answers. Heidegger argues that Dasein has this capacity since one of its existential 
features lies with its access to being through a preconceptual or preontological 
understanding of its existence and its relations to other beings. “Such an understanding 
is contained in our knowing-how-to-cope in various domains rather than in a set of 
beliefs that such and such is the case.” (Dreyfus, 1991: 18) 
Such a preontological understanding prevents any effort to achieve a ‘neutral’ or 
‘objective’ account of our environment since it always provides a background that 
shapes the experience in question. “When we find a certain experience intelligible, what 
we are attending to, explicitly and expressly, is this experience. The context stands as 
the unexplicited horizon within which – or to vary the image, as the vantage point from 
out of which – this experience can be understood.” (Taylor, 1993: 210) This background 
which the preontological understanding provides is needed to make our experiences 
intelligible. As such it is neither completely present in consciousness not completely 
situated in the unconscious. The experience at hand expresses the preontological 
understanding in its very particularity but at the same time transcends the singularity 
and specifity of our experience. As Charles Taylor explains: “It is that of which I am not 
simply unaware […], because it makes intelligible what I am uncontestably aware of; 
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but at the same time I cannot be said to be explicitly or focally aware of it, because that 
status is already occupied by what it is making intelligible.” (ibid.) 
Human beings act according to this preconceptual understanding all the time; “we 
understand preontologically what tools are as so far as we reach for them only under 
very specific conditions and in specific ways, and insofar as we know how to use them. 
We understand persons preontologically as the owners of these tools.” (Schmitt, 2000: 
18) “Ontology [therefore means] asking about the nature of this understanding of being 
that we do not know – that is not a representation in the kind corresponding to the world 
– but that we simply are.” (Dreyfus, 1991: 3) This preconceptual understanding is not a 
form of dispositional knowledge and therefore not comparable to what Heidegger calls 
theoretical understanding. (Schmitt, 2000: 166) Rather the preconceptual understanding 
that is an essential feature of Dasein relies upon a practical action-oriented conception 
of knowledge – one knows one’s way around in the world. (Haugeland, 1982: 22) 
“Preontological understanding is not dispositional knowledge that certain statements are 
true. I demonstrate preontological understanding not by talking but by acting (although 
sometimes, of course, the acts are linguistic ones).” (Schmitt, 2000: 19)  
Such an understanding stands in clear contrast to the rationalist tradition that described 
agency as existing at the nexus of mental representations and objects in the world. In 
Heidegger’s conceptualisation preontological understanding precedes any attempt to 
theoretically grasp the way of sensation or the obtainment and validity of knowledge. 
Preontological understanding as the primordial background of human experience can 
best be grasped as a practical disposition of involvement. This practical disposition “can 
not be analyzed into a set of images on one side and a reality portrayed on the other. 
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[…] To know one’s way about is to be really moving around, handling things, dealing 
with things, with understanding.” (Taylor, 1993: 212) 
 
By outlining this centrality of human being or Dasein to his enquiry and also providing 
a new view on what it means to be human in the world Heidegger opens the realm of 
criticism against rationalist accounts by introducing a new set of differentiations that are 
unknown to the modern conceptualisation of human agency. First, based on the above 
arguments, Dasein is intrinsically situated in the world. This does not just mean the 
obvious spatial situatedness of our bodies in a specific environment (Dreyfus, 1991: 40) 
but refers to a form of continuous ‘involvement’ in the world. The world is not just 
there as a neutral place that surrounds us but is always already shaped by human 
involvement in forms of preontological understanding and disposition towards certain 
elements within it. The difference lies here between the factual or the ontic and the 
factical or the ontological. For Heidegger, modern philosophy and science with their 
disengaged notion of human agency only recognised what properly can be called the 
factual or the ontic, circumstances that are not contaminated by the involvement of 
human being. In the natural sciences for instance, the concepts and laws of gravity or 
evolution have validity even without the presence of human beings. There are, however, 
circumstances in which this is not the case. As soon as we pick up a tool or engage with 
other human beings, the following actions cannot be understood without reference to the 
human beings that act in them. Tools would not exist without human agents and their 
use expresses already a clear disposition of the human agents towards their world. Of 
course one could argue that some primates also use tools and therefore would exhibit 
similar features as a human being. There are, however, two factors that constitute a 
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decisive difference here. First, using tools in the case of human beings is always 
connected to appropriateness that is “tools have proper uses – for each tool there is a 
‘what it’s for’. If an ape uses a stick to get bananas, whether cleverly or not, whether 
successfully or not, it has in no sense used it either properly or improperly. […] An ape 
could not misuse a stick, no matter what it did.” (Haugeland, 1982: 18) The second 
important difference concerns the unique human characteristic to form second order 
desires in respect to actions within a given context. An ape or any other animal follows 
its simple first order desires – if it desires a banana it gets up and gets one. It would 
never occur to it that the situation in which it finds itself presently makes it 
inappropriate to get up and get a banana. In contrast, human agents in most of their 
actions consider the specific self-understanding they have of themselves. If a bank 
manager has a meeting with her customers, it would be inappropriate to just leave the 
room to eat a banana. Her desire for food is in this instance overruled by her second 
order desire to appear as a professional person. (for an in-depth analysis of second-order 
desires and their relation to human agency see for instance Taylor, 1985: 23-42) 
This self-reflective disposition towards the environment is not neutral or simply to be 
grasped by reference to instrumental rationality in form of means-ends calculations or 
any other theoretical methods but has to be understood as being embedded in a specific 
self-interpretation of the human being and its contextual aims.  
All factical circumstances can be grasped by asking “What is it for?”, the answer to 
which will show a certain disposition and involvement of human agency that always 
already includes a preconceptual understanding of the situation. (Heidegger, 1996: 17) 
If the question “What is it for?” cannot be meaningfully asked we encounter mere 
factual statements or as Heidegger calls it mere occurrences.  
A g e n c y   P a g e  | 133 
 
Most importantly then,  Dasein is for Heidegger always already in the world which 
means it is impossible to step back from Dasein and look at it and its environment as an 
object of or for scientific enquiry since Dasein always already is involved. As Inwood 
puts it: “Dasein is essentially in the world, not simply in the sense that it occupies a 
place in the world together with other things, but in the sense that it continually 
interprets and engages with other entities and the context in which they lie, the 
‘environment’ or the ‘world around us’. It is in a way only because Dasein does this that 
there is a unitary world at all rather than a collection of entities – Dasein brings the 
whole world along with it.” (Inwood, 1997: 22) 
 
The most important ramification for human agency that follows from this 
reconceptualisation of being and especially human being, lies with Heidegger’s insight 
that Dasein as opposed to other forms of being does not have an essence – or rather that 
its essence lies in its existence. Whereas normally we try to determine ‘that’ something 
is or ‘what’ it is in the case of human being the most appropriate question is ‘how’ it is. 
So compared to Dasein “[t]he being of entities that are merely present at hand and 
which are therefore not appropriately addressed as “I” or “You” is a matter of 
indifference to them. Since they cannot, like Dasein, take charge of their own being, 
they need, if they are to be anything at all, a definite ‘what’. But a human being is 
whatever it decides or has decided to be.” (ibid.: 23) Dasein therefore is not a definite 
actual thing, but the possibility of various ways of being. Central hereby is the view that 
“humans are given their content neither by an ahistorical, transcultural essence, nor by 
nature. Rather, Dasein itself determines this content in its act of self-understanding.” 
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(Blattner, 1996: 97) The notion of self-understanding is central to Heidegger’s 
conception of human agency.  
Understanding in a phenomenological sense does not refer to either a faculty of the 
mind or a cognitive state but describes capabilities. If we therefore say that someone has 
a specific self-understanding it does not mean that she has a specific form of knowledge 
about herself, maybe even complete knowledge. This in fact would lead us directly back 
to the Cartesian notion of a self-transparent consciousness which, as shown above, was 
of course one of the major targets of post-Husserlian phenomenology. Understanding 
therefore is closely linked to two features of Heidegger’s thought depicted above. First, 
it describes the ability of human beings to ponder about the possibilities of their being. 
If Dasein lacks any definite essence and consists existentially in its own possibility, 
self-understanding describes the mode of grasping and deliberating about the various 
possibilities of being.  
Now, of course this seems to suggest that Dasein can be whatever it wants. This is 
obviously not the case. (Polt, 1999: 102-3) First, and most fundamentally, we cannot 
decide to be. We can certainly decide not to be and kill ourselves but we are unable to 
bring ourselves into existence. Heidegger calls this ‘Geworfenheit’ – thrownness. 
(Heidegger, 1996: 127) But even beyond the fundamental decision of to be or not to be 
we are constrained by circumstances that place restrictions upon us.9 Heidegger 
expresses this with the term facticity which brings us to the second point. “’Facticity’ is 
the name that Heidegger gives to Dasein’s determinacy as an existential entity. Despite 
Heidegger’s referring to it as ‘Dasein’s own manner of ‘occurrentness’, […] he wants to 
contrast it with whatever might be natural in Dasein.” (ibid.: 102)  
                                                 
9 The nature and role of these constrains will be illuminate in more depth in chapter VI on freedom. 
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And yet, human beings have the existential characteristic to project themselves into the 
future and deliberate about possibilities. Dasein is never a finished state but always 
involved in becoming. All the existential characteristics of Dasein are not to be 
understood as mere factual appearances or state-characteristics. On the contrary, since 
Dasein is always already involved in the world and constantly exhibits a form of self-
understanding its characteristics are ability-characteristics. (ibid.: 100) Certainly we can 
make mere factual statements about human agents as for example concerning their 
height and weight. These, however, are not concerned with the human being qua being 
but just with its factual appearance. Height or weight, when we consider the human 
being qua being, gain a completely different, factical quality since the self-
understanding of the human being in question is certainly influenced by them. “Being 
tall has in this way to do with one’s stature, not just one’s physical height. A person 
who understands herself as unusually tall might talk down to people, use her height to 
lord it over them; on the other hand, she might be embarrassed by her height, more shy 
about physical encounters.” (ibid) In this sense being tall is an ability not just an 
physical feature. To be clear, and Heidegger acknowledges this, it is of course possible 
to make statements regarding only the factual characteristics of Dasein but only under 
the pretence of ignoring the ‘existential make-up’ of being-in-the-world. “… those 
beings which are not worldless, for example Da-sein itself, are objectively present ‘in’ 
the world, too. More precisely, they can be understood within certain limits and with a 
certain justification as something merely objectively present. To do this, one must 
completely disregard or just not see the existential constitution of being-in.” (Heidegger, 
1996: 52; see also Dreyfus, 1991: 44)  
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Dasein in all its existentiality is of course still factually situated in the world. It is 
therefore fair to say that “not only is Dasein’s activity conditioned by cultural 
interpretations of facts about its body, such as being male or female, but since Dasein 
must define itself in terms of social roles that require certain activities, and since its 
roles require equipment, Dasein is at the mercy of factual events and objects in its 
environment.” (ibid.) 
Having said this, reactions to and interpretations of facticity are not given but remain a 
matter of choice. But are these choices completely our own? Arguably they are not. 
Rather, “[t]he concept of facticity implies that an ‘innerworldly’ being has being-in-the-
world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the 
being of those beings which it encounters within its own world.” (Heidegger, 1996: 52) 
This situatedness or being-in-the-world is missed in modern conceptions of subjectivity 
and agency. (Janicuad, 1996: 49) But apart from Dasein expressed in the form of ‘I’ or 
‘You’ Heidegger develops the notion of ‘das Man’, ‘the they’. (ibid.: 118-22; Dreyfus, 
1991: 151-62) The they is a conventional normative background that governs much of 
our everyday life. Due to it we do not have to make decisions or even think about 
possibilities of decision-making in everyday situations. This is what Heidegger refers to 
as “Uneigentlichkeit” – inauthenticity. This is not a negative notion, it just describes 
that every human agent is already embedded in a network of social conventions norms 
and rules that governs large part of our everyday-behaviour. (Heidegger, 1996: 40; 
Guignon, 2006: 276-81) 
One way to conceptualise ‘the they’ a little bit more is by looking at the work of one of 
Heidegger’s most influential students – Hans-Georg Gadamer. Where Heidegger was 
always more concerned with the disclosure of being Gadamer oriented his thought more 
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towards the social interaction between human beings and especially tried to re-think the 
notion of understanding. Gadamer, in order to defend the all-encompassing historicality 
of being and the utterly dialogical nature of understanding criticised the notion of self-
transparent consciousness by emphasising its impossibility. The sheer thought that 
consciousness could be purged from tradition and prejudice appears absurd to Gadamer 
since human existence, the Heideggerian being-in-the-world always already 
presupposes a situatedness we cannot leave. As we have seen, “the distinctive feature of 
Dasein or human life for Heidegger is that … in living human beings relate themselves 
interpretively to their lives, that they understand themselves in a continuous process of 
self-understanding, experience and re-interpretation.” (Warnke, 1987: 38) The past 
acquires hereby its meaning in light of present experiences and anticipations while the 
meaning of the present and the anticipation of the future are conditioned by the way in 
which the past has been understood. Heidegger therefore considers self-understanding 
to be ‘thrown-projection’. (ibid., 38-9) On the one hand it involves projecting a future 
for oneself or projecting one’s possibilities. On the other hand, these possibilities have 
already been conditioned to some extent by the way the future has already been 
projected in the past. Gadamer took this Heideggerian thrownness and maintained that 
we understand history not simply because we make it but also it has made us already. 
By developing this dialectic Gadamer presents a whole new meaning of the notion of 
‘mutual constitution’ in respect to agent and structure. While the agent certainly is 
constantly involved in making history, history is also constantly conditioning these 
actions since they rely upon past projections that are our present in the same way as our 
present projections for the future become one day the present of other actors that will be 
conditioned by them. 
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This conditionality is described in Gadamer with reference to the terms ‘tradition’ and 
‘prejudice’. (Gadamer, 1979: 245-53; Palmer, 1969: 182-4; Weinsheimer, 1985: 167-8)  
Through his reintroduction of prejudice and tradition Gadamer takes a clear stand 
against the Cartesian conception of the self-transparency of the mind. Relying on the 
Heideggerian conception of ‘thrownness’ Gadamer reaffirms the contextual and 
situational mode of human existence which does not allow for a purely neutral, abstract 
and theoretical conceptualisation of social and political life. (Gadamer, 1979: 245) This 
thrownness Gadamer captures in the notion of ‘historically effected consciousness’ 
(wirkungsgechichtliches Bewusstsein) (Warnke, 1987: 79-80; Wachterhauser, 2002: 65 
Gadamer, 1979: 305-10) which describes the embeddedness of our understanding in a 
tradition that reaches infinitely into the past as well as the future and escapes our grasp 
in its entirety.  
If we now take the insights of the above discussion together, a fuller and deeper notion 
of agency seems to develop. Human agents are characterised by the capability and 
practice of deploying a vocabulary of worth displaying a choice already made that 
illuminates the way of the life imagined. Agent’s actions are qualitative and not 
completely quantifiable, calling for a deeper social analysis of their decisions and 
actions. Furthermore, agents are not isolated subjects but always already in-the-world 
by being embedded in a tradition that reaches beyond their actuality and informs 
decisions and judgments that cannot be analysed form a neutral self-transparent point of 
view. The world we live in constitutes the agents in the same way as the agents live out 
the world through tradition. These agents are not only the makers of their own destiny 
but constitute through their situatedness a unity of the world that transcends a mere 
agglomeration of different things. Agents make judgments about the world and give 
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meaning to it through a never-ending process of social interaction and self-
interpretation.  
 
Grasping the scope of the challenge – A hermeneutic conception of agency and its 
ramifications for IR theory 
 
Taking the account of agency embedded into the larger question regarding the meaning 
of being that we find in post-Husserlian phenomenology we can now move to an 
analysis of the consequences and differences for a new ontology and IR theory in 
general. As depicted above, modern conceptions of agency rely upon a specific 
interpretation and reification of subjectivity. (Janicaud, 1996: 47-8) This basis out of 
which all but a few accounts in IR take their point of departure, however, can be 
questioned by a new ontological conceptualisation of what it means to be human.  
The phenomenological conception of agency is critical of the rationalist model of 
enquiry at the heart of which still lies the Cartesian notion of detached observation and 
scientific explanation. The intersubjective emergence of meanings and practices cannot 
just be observed from the outside in a neutral or objective way.  Rather, the emphasis in 
our research endeavours must be placed on the contextuality and situatedness in which 
agents interact and make decisions.  
The challenge, seen in the light of the abovementioned phenomenological 
reconceptualisation of human agency, is indeed a much bigger one that usually thought. 
What appears as a quarrel between different epistemological camps turns out to be 
rooted in a deeper disagreement regarding the nature and meaning of human existence 
and the relationship human beings exhibit to other human beings and to their 
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surroundings on an everyday basis. On this level the question emerges as to whether the 
disengaged picture the modern sciences and many scholars in IR paint and suggest to be 
the correct one for analysing and explaining events in international relations is not 
dependent on a deeper pre-theoretical level in which human beings are involved in the 
world in an active rather than cognitive way. The answers given by Heidegger and 
many of his successors form a strong case in favour of this existential notion of 
involvement qua being-in-the-world. (Dreyfus, 1991: 3) 
 
To be sure, a disengaged picture dealing with factualities is possible but it is not the 
most fundamental mode of engaging with the world – this is the true challenge which 
Heidegger posed philosophically and which some scholars in IR have already started to 
explore as well. The Cartesian world-view that wrote rationality into the actual make-up 
of the human mind and lead to the widely held view of the mind as a processor of 
externally perceived sensations in order to achieve a factual value-free mirror-image of 
the world must be reconsidered given the phenomenological insights that arose during 
the 20th century. 
We can identify a number of arguments in the phenomenological account of agency that 
warrant such a move. First comes the insight that human agents always already belong 
to a world they understand pre-conceptually, i.e. before they have the chance to relate 
themselves theoretically or scientifically to this world. The world is not just a place of 
objects that stands opposed to a subject but the subject through its being-in the world 
always already relates to the objects in a way that makes a detached observation without 
existential interference impossible. It is possible to describe and observe factual 
characteristics of entities and human beings in the world but only at the price of 
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ignoring the existential nature of Dasein. Heidegger insist that such a neglect leads 
necessarily to a distorted picture of human agency which Heidegger calls it 
Seinsvergessenheit (forgetfulness of being) – an unwarranted de-contextualisation of 
human practices. It simply refers to the fact that in order to truly understand what 
human agency entails and how it relates to the environment it finds itself in requires a 
recognition of the always embedded nature of human existence in the world which 
makes the Cartesian bifurcation of subject/object and the concomitant conceptualisation 
of disengaged agency difficult to defend. “When we inhabit something, it is no longer 
an object for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to other objects in the 
world.” (ibid.: 45) This is meant by the Heideggerian term ‘dwelling’ and finds its 
equivalent in the notions of context or discourse already referred to in some quarters of 
IR theory. 
Out of this contextuality arises the next parallel, that of the lacking essence of human 
beings. In some classical as well as modern accounts we find the stipulation that there is 
something unchanging at the heart of the human agent. Whether this is a lust for power 
or ambition that is immutably at work and compels us into certain actions or the reliance 
upon rationality as a feature of the human mind that conditions our perceptions and 
allows the objective and neutral depiction of our environment. Phenomenology, at least 
post-Husserlian phenomenology, criticises this de-historicised and de-contextualised 
conceptualisation and turns the question away from what human beings are to the 
question how they are. The how already indicates that there are different states of 
human being and if one wants to enquire into relationships between human agents and 
their actions within a specific environment one has to accept the intrinsic possibility for 
change that is vested in human being as such. The notion that agents can act ‘as if’ the 
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situation would be otherwise is at the same time a critique of deterministic theories of 
human political action as it is a proposal for an anti-essentialist reading of Dasein. For 
human being to act within a constantly changing environment and the ability to adapt 
and think through different possibilities not only of action but first and foremost of 
being is indispensable. Only through this existential feature of projection and ‘running 
ahead’ of oneself is change in the social and political world possible and 
comprehensible.  
Of course these possibilities find their limits in the specific setting and the 
understanding thereof. Heidegger describes these limits by using the term facticity 
which includes cultural, political and social norms that guide our behaviour and at the 
same time also includes our understanding and disposition towards other entities we 
encounter in our everyday activities. These norms and rules provide a framework for 
action transmitted linguistically and can be very closely associated with the 
Heideggerian notion of ‘das Man’ or alternatively with Gadamerian tradition. In many 
instance we operate according to these normative frameworks and exhibit a specific 
understanding of them. That does, however, not foreclose the capability and possibility 
of change within these sets of norms and rules. Agency in phenomenological 
understanding is fluid and involved in a constant process of self-understanding and self-
evaluation. It is in constant dialogue with its environment and fellow human beings 
conditioned by and at the same time reconditioning its life-world factically. 
 
In such a conceptualisation is no room for a clearly bifurcated understanding of human 
existence in which we try to access a world ‘out there’ and mirror it in our minds. The 
standard terminology that relies upon the dualisms of subject/object and 
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internal/external becomes dissolved in an engaged picture of agency. But such a picture 
of agency must be philosophically buttressed by referring and exploring the deeper 
ontological deliberations of what it is to be a human agent as such. Before we can 
immerse into the concreteness of political life and events in which we try to analyse and 
understand human agents and their actions, in Heidegger’s terminology before we dive 
into the ontic make-up of politics, a substantial clarification must be delivered in order 
to clearly explicate the conceptualisation of agency any research into international 
events and changes is derived from.  
As we have seen reference to the post-Husserlian movement of phenomenology can 
provide such a conceptualisation that in its core coincides and ontologically 
substantiates claims regarding human agency. An existential analytic, as it was first 
attempted by Heidegger and later further developed by many phenomenologists can 
give us a starting point from where we can discuss processes and events we all seek to 
understand. Central in this undertaking is the critique, as was outlined above, of the 
assumed centrality of consciousness and the concomitant view of subjectivity as part of 
a substance-ontology. As was shown above, the advent of the modern interpretation of 
the subject and its place in the larger order of things emerged as a radical break with 
earlier conceptions centred around a higher guarantor of this order. Starting with 
Descartes, medieval cosmology was severely challenged and although attempts have 
been made during the 17th century to combine the rise of reason with religious doctrine 
as for instance in Leibniz’ philosophy the fate had already be decided against the 
centrality of a divine Being at the heart of the order of the universe. Human subjects 
became the ones that replaced God in respect to creative power and knowing intellect. 
As was argued above, the rise of modern subjectivity and agency coincided with a 
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concerted attempt to inscribe certain powers into the human being; central hereby was 
the pivotal demand to secure human existence and its role in relation to the world 
around it as certain. Again Descartes dictum ‘cogito, ergo sum’ served as the backbone 
of these efforts. Humans convinced themselves that they had the powers inherent in 
them to replace the one substance that for so long dominated their view of the world and 
the universe. Before long, they endeavoured to replace God’s qualities with human 
one’s; they could create through technology, they could know through science and they 
could act according to human ethics. With the rise of modernity, man became the 
measure of all things, a being invested with the potential and the capacity to rule of his 
environment and shape it according to his will.  
We have seen that such an attitude necessarily entailed the rise of a disengaged picture 
of agency and situated the human mind as over and against an outer world which it 
encounters to know and master. 400 years on we still see the huge influence such a 
conception left on the sciences and our everyday lives. Heidegger and with him the 
phenomenological movement throughout the 20th century posit a renewed interest in the 
creation of this form of subjectivity. They question in many different ways the attitude 
inherent in such a picture and aim at disrupting the veil of tradition and convention that 
transformed the modern notion of subjectivity into a naturalised and taken for granted 
truth. Ontology for them is not exhausted by ever new modes of relating to the objects 
‘out there’ and tries to achieve a correct representation of them. Ontology is not 
primarily the study of beings that are fixed and ready in their existential make-up – it is 
not a substance-ontology phenomenological thinkers represent. Rather, the relation 
between subjectivity and objectivity as such is fundamentally drawn into question and 
the account which seems to precede any account of the nature of beings is supplanted by 
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the more primordial question of what it is to be human and how this being-human 
relates to other entities in the world. The ramification of such a refocusing towards the 
existential nature of human being is not a simple supplement to other enquiries and can 
simply be added on. Rather, the findings of this renewed enquiry into human being, as 
we have seen, challenges the most basic beliefs and convictions on subjectivity and 
agency that dominated the last 400 years in many different forms. One consequence of 
this reconceptualisation of agency and subjectivity was recently pointed out by Louiza 
Odysseos in her intricate study on the notion of co-existence in the social and political 
realm.  
The most common view of co-existence in the political and social realm is 
conceptualised along the lines of subjectivity and agency in their modern guise. As 
Odysseos points out, “the modern subject is generally understood as a completed self, 
already fully constituted when it enters into relations with others, relations that are 
considered ontologically secondary to the subject itself. Its main attributes are self-
sufficiency, nonrelationality, and autonomy; these become instrumental in determining 
coexistence as the presence of multiple units, in other words, as a composition of 
otherwise nonrelational subjects.” (Odysseos, 2007: xii-xiii) The central distinction 
between subject and object that lies behind such a conceptualisation and provides the 
necessary ‘security’ for both leads subsequently to a substance-ontology in which 
subject and object are reified in the dynamic of the thinking mind as representing mind. 
The quest for a true account that mirrors the ‘outer’ world factually starts exactly here. 
The dichotomy coupled with the specific powers of the mind are taken as a given and 
remain unquestioned in these attempts to access the world of objects and achieve a 
correct representation. One form this can take we have seen in the case of Wendt and 
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Wight above. Both posit most strongly the ontological distinction between human 
subjects and mind-independent objects. Only in this way are they able to distinguish 
between the accepted different ways of apprehending objects and their reality which 
serves as a ground for the activity we call science. As was shown above this dichotomy 
between subject and object and, in the form of scientific realism, the primacy of 
ontology (understood as substance-ontology) over epistemology is impossible to 
maintain. Apart from the obvious problem to account for a mind-independent reality 
when the only way this reality can be grasped is by a mind, the naturalised conception 
of subject and object and subsequently the whole ontological outlook as substance-
ontology can be severely questioned. The conundrums and tensions that result out of the 
relation of subject and object and ontology and epistemology in these accounts can not 
simply be overcome by shifting the burden of certainty away from epistemology to 
ontology. What has to be done instead is a fundamental reconceptualisation of the very 
conditions that made these problems endemic.  
 
In this respect an existential analytic, i.e. an analysis of what it is to be human and the 
subsequent conceptualisation of human agency can here only provide the first step of an 
enquiry that necessarily leads to adjacent terms which will be discussed in length over 
the next chapters. Such an enquiry will ensure a proper and full consideration of the 
scope of the new social ontology that we try to outline. The next step in this 
consideration will lead us to one of the most fundamental features of human existence 
that since the beginning of the 20th century was subjected to heavy debates regarding its 
role in human life, namely the function and conception of language. 
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IV Language – The House of Being 
 
Man behaves as if he were the creator  
and master of language, whereas on the contrary, 
 it is language which is and remains his sovereign.  
 Martin Heidegger 
 
The second key element in our quest for conceptualising a new social ontology is the 
notion of language. The main starting point for enquiries into the notion and role of 
language in political and social discourse is widely associated with the ‘linguistic turn’ 
brought about at the beginning of the 20th century. In this respect the thinker most often 
referred to is Ludwig Wittgenstein, or more precisely the work of the later Wittgenstein 
that centres around his second magnum opus, the Philosophical Investigations. Much in 
line with the trajectory of the linguistic turn the focus of this chapters will lie on an 
exposition of language that is closely tied in with the notion of agency developed above. 
Wittgenstein will certainly feature in this exposition but first he will have to be placed 
into a historical trajectory of thought on language that reaches back to the early 
beginnings of the counter-Enlightenment and secondly in this respect supplemented by 
a range of phenomenological thinkers that might be able to tackle some of the 
unresolved tensions in Wittgenstein’s thought and lead to a comprehensive placement of 
language as central to the new social ontology proposed here. 
In order to present this line of argument the chapter will proceed in three steps. First, it 
seems necessary to depict the conceptualisation of language against which the thought 
of the later Wittgenstein and post-Husserlian phenomenology is directed – following 
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Charles Taylor we will label this conception of language ‘designative’. Secondly, an 
exposition of the alternative view of language – called expressivist – will be presented 
drawing upon phenomenological thinkers as well as elements of Wittgenstein. Finally, it 
will be shown how this enlarged conceptualisation can be seen as providing a viable 
philosophical approach to language for the development of a different and more 
substantial depiction of the relation between Dasein and its world within a new social 
ontology. 
 
The Enlightenment and the designative conception of language 
 
The purpose of this section is the short portrayal of what above has already been 
introduced as a designative conception of language. The term ‘designative’ that is used 
here to describe a specific approach to the role, function and nature of language is taken 
from the work of Charles Taylor and as was pointed out in chp. I it entails the 
opposition between the individual language user and the world in which the object 
designated by language exists. As such this conception of language is very much in line 
with Enlightenment thought since it posits the subjective consciousness as distinct from 
the world it inhabits and also ascribes the ability to reflect on this world from a detached 
and objective or neutral point of view.  
In respect to language we find many instances in modern thought in which a designative 
conception of language is implicitly or explicitly expressed. Especially during the 17th 
and 18th centuries the question regarding the origin of language, a question closely 
connected to a conceptualisation of language, attracted major philosophers. On the side 
of the modern conception writers such as Hobbes, Locke and Condillac delivered 
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influential views on the nature of language. In Hobbes’s Leviathan chapter IV on 
speech we read: “The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Dicourse, into 
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two 
commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of our Thoughts; […] 
So that the first use of names, is to serve for Marks, or Notes of remembrance. Another 
is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to 
another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; […] And for this use they are 
called Signes.” (Hobbes, 1997: 25) Hobbes sees language and speech as a tool that can 
be used as either ‘marks’ or signs’ in order to structure and communicate thoughts and 
ideas. Language hereby resides within the individual and is used by a single 
consciousness to communicate the consciousness’s mental states and relations to other 
consciousnesses or the world which they inhabit.  
Communication therefore relies in successful cases on a transmission of clearly defined 
meanings assigned to words expressed in speech. As such the complexity of language 
can be reduced to logical connections and the whole system of a language can be 
mastered by those who know the defined meaning of words and their relation to other 
words as well as the appropriate circumstances in which they can be used. “When a man 
upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech, 
and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to 
understand it: Understanding being nothing else, but the conception caused by Speech.” 
(ibid.: 30)  
 
We can already see in this early conception of language as a system of signs with fixed 
meanings a tendency to regard words to stand for mental content and not for the objects 
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signified themselves. John Locke in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
makes this feature explicit when he says: “Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was 
further necessary that he should be able to use these words as signs for internal 
conceptions, and then to make them stand as marks for the ideas within in his own 
mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men’s minds 
be conveyed from one to another.” (Locke, 1972: 9) Famously for Locke, there is not a 
direct representation of objects in the world in our minds but the object is represented as 
an idea in our mind and relates to the world by way of these ideas. In the same vein, 
Locke suggests that words do not stand for direct objects but for ideas of these objects, 
ideas formed in the mind when we perceive the object in the world. He further explains 
that the relation between words and ideas are not natural, otherwise there would only be 
one language. Rather the allocation of words to ideas is arbitrary and differs from 
language to language. (see also West, 1984: 749-50) Once, however, a word is assigned 
to an idea in a specific language its meaning becomes fixed for all those who speak this 
language. “Thus we may conceive how words, […] came to be made use of by men as 
the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between articulate 
sounds and certain ideas, […] but by a voluntary imposition whereby such a word is 
made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.” (Locke, 1972: 12) The sequence in which 
language develops in Locke therefore starts with the perception of objects which form 
ideas in the mind of the individual. These ideas are always the same for all individuals 
when encountering the same object. Words are then introduced arbitrarily to signify 
these ideas in individual consciousnesses and enable individuals to communicate and 
convey the content of their minds to others.  As Locke concludes: “words in their 
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primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him 
that uses them… .” (ibid.) 
A very similar conception of language can also be found in the thought of Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac. Condillac, although focussing on the origin of language, a 
discussion we have not the time or need to immerse into, produced valuable insights 
into the function and nature of language. In this respect, he is perceived as being clearly 
in line with John Locke. “Condillac followed Locke’s hint in making the origin of 
language the cornerstone of his entire philosophy.” (West, 1984: 751) Condillac, as 
Locke, emphasised the close connection between the acquisition of knowledge and the 
capacity to communicate this knowledge. He remained hereby in the mould of 
Cartesianism in allocating the attainment of knowledge to a single consciousness and 
the use of language as expressing ideas of this single consciousness through signs. 
“Ideas connect with signs, and it is, as I will show, only by this means that they connect 
among themselves” (Condillac, 2001: 5) Condillac maintained hereby that language 
evolves spontaneously by convention and cannot be seen as a natural phenomenon. 
From the early origins of humankind direct signals such as gestures or cries were used 
to communicate. At one point “actions not originally intended as signals to others at all 
came in time to be deliberately made as signals because a secondary effect of these 
actions was first noted and then exploited.” (Wells, 1987: 9; see also Sapir, 1907: 5-6)  
It is remarkable how closely the description of language here resembles the 
development of other tools and techniques to simplify human life. Language was seen 
as a human invention and “[j]ust as a machine is a tool, a means for bringing about 
certain desired mechanical effects, so language was looked upon as a tool, a means for 
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bringing about certain other desired mechanical effects  - namely: the communication of 
ideas by means of audible, secondarily by means of visible, symbols.” (ibid.: 109) In 
very much the same fashion as Locke, Condillac argues that the acquisition of language 
occurs parallel to the acquisition of higher mental capacity. “He then notes that the use 
of signs led to a development of the mental powers and this in turn led to an 
improvement in the signs.” (Wells, 1987: 9) The whole complex of language is seen as 
an elaborate system of signification developed out of and used by individual 
consciousnesses. The use of signs hereby is very much portrayed as the invention of an 
almost technological but certainly technical nature that eases the communication 
between human beings.  “[... ] we clearly see how good sense, intellect, reason and their 
contraries are all equally the product of a simple principle, namely the connection of 
ideas with one another; and that we see how, on a higher level, this connexion is 
produced by the use of signs.” (Condillac, 2001: 69)  
From these early beginnings this Enlightenment conception of language was developed 
by many different thinkers for very different reasons but the general conception of 
language as a system of conventional signs with fixed meanings was maintained. 
“Posited in this way as an object before thought, language could not possibly play any 
other role in respect to thought than that of an accompaniment, substitute, 
memorandum, or secondary means of communication.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1974: 81) We 
can find examples of the further development of this position in thinkers as diverse as 
Monboddo, Reid, Smith, Russel, Frege, Quine, Davidson, Dummett and Kripke to name 
just a few. (see Hanna and Harrison, 2004; Kaye, 1924; Berry, 1974; Land, 1976; Land 
1977; Formigari, 1974 and Bakalar, 1976) Certainly, the conception of and thought on 
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language came a long way since the discussions in the 17th and 18th century but what all 
these thinkers  share at the very basic level is the designative conception which posits 
language as a logical structured system of signs.  
Taken the view on agency developed above, it seems apparent that a designative view 
on language is not compatible with a notion of engaged agency. If we always already 
are embedded in a world and cannot detach ourselves from the context in which we live 
and which determines a pre-theoretical understanding of the world a designative view 
on language is inconceivable. It rather seems that interpretations and meanings of words 
and propositions have to be situated in these contexts in which they are used. Human 
beings are never detached from the world they encounter, they cannot flee form their 
historical situatedness but are always already involved in the world. Such a conception 
of human agency seems to call for an equally embedded view on language in which 
fixed and universally applicable meanings give way to the manifold instances, 
perceptions and interpretations of contextually situated human agents. It seems then that 
language is in fact much more primordial than any conception of a mere tool developed 
to ease matters of communication could ever admit. In other words, if the notion of 
agency stands and should acquire meaning in a larger context we would have to turn to 
an alternative view on language. As was already hinted at above we can find this 
different view on language in the early reactions against thinkers such as Locke and 
Condillac in Hamann, Humboldt and Herder and also, taking the cue from these early 
critics, in the writings of later periods including the later Wittgenstein and post-
Husserlian phenomenology. It is to these accounts that we now turn. 
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The alternative – an expressivist conception of language 
 
In the same way as the designative conception of language relates and compliments a 
disengaged picture of human agency, the expressivist view of language is closely tied to 
the above discussed conception of engaged agency. Language in an expressivist view, 
as the next lines will show, relies upon a wider, holistic understanding of linguistic 
practices. Therefore it can be traced back to the work of thinkers such as Johann Georg 
Hamann, Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt.  
In respect to language these thinkers laid the foundation on which in our own age new 
insights into the nature and function of language and associated philosophical problems 
were based. In his writings “Hamann does make some statements which may be 
interpreted as implying that the use of language is not necessarily a process of fitting an 
appropriate term or phrase to some alleged bit of mental activity which is called 
‘thinking’.” (Anderson, 1969: 248) Certainly, Hamann did not develop all the 
implications of such a perspective but Isaiah Berlin for instance acknowledges that 
Hamann’s “greatest discovery is that language and thought are not two processes but 
one; that language (or other forms of expressive symbolism – religious worship, social 
habits, and so on) conveys directly the innermost soul of individual and societies… .” 
(Berlin, 1956: 273) In his critique of the Enlightenment and its unfettered belief in 
reason and rationality Hamann insisted that “rationality is answerable to language rather 
than the other way around. Reason is not a purified given working its way into the 
capillaries of language; on the contrary, it is only possible once language is a going 
concern.” (Lawn, 2006: 14; Wells, 1987: 63) 
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Herder, who was thoroughly influenced by Hamann (Sapir, 1907: 30-1), showed a 
similar disposition in his famous attack against Condillac’s account of the origin of 
language. (Wells, 1987: 31-47) Whereas Hamann was very much rooted in a religiously 
infused view regarding the conceptualisation of human existence in general and the 
origin of language in particular, Herder overcame the then predominant dichotomy 
according to which language was either a human invention or divinely ordained. It was 
with Herder’s response to the question given out by the Berlin Academy in 1769 that 
the move from the old to the new question regarding the origin of language was made. 
In this respect Herder achieved both, “the doing away with the conception of divine 
interference, and the introduction of the idea of slow, but gradual and necessary, 
development from rude beginnings… . The very answer that Herder gave to the 
question posed made the question itself meaningless… .” (Sapir, 1907: 110)  
Against the conventional view that conceptualised language as a human invention and 
tool for communicative purposes Herder asked how the general ability to link signs to 
specific ideas or objects can be accounted for. (Lawn, 2006: 7) Herder stressed the fact 
that allocating the origin of language in the accidental discovery that language can be 
used to communicate easier already takes the general ability of human agents to make 
mental connections between sign and the signified for granted. Herder therefore 
defends, similar to Hamann, a conception of language that is rooted in specific human 
expressivity and relies upon a special role of language for human existence that reaches 
far beyond the mere technical or tool like characteristics put forward in designative 
conceptions. Herder conceives the gift of language hereby to be “as characteristic of 
man as the ability to construct a hive is native to the bee – with this notable difference: 
the bee, acting mechanically by virtue of its inborn instinctive powers, build as 
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efficiently the first day as the last, […]; the language of man, however, increases in 
power and efficiency with every use that is made of it.” (Sapir, 1907: 131) 
 
Wilhelm von Humboldt also contributed to the expressivist picture of language that was 
drawn up against the formulaic view formed by Enlightenment thinkers in a very similar 
vein especially in his On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and Its 
Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species. “Language […] is not the 
mere adventitious or epiphenomenal outward manifestation or garp of thought for the 
utilitarian purpose of communication, for if that were the case we would be making the 
false assumption that words merely constituted a nomenclature of tags for concepts that 
had been offered ready-made to the mind by the self-sufficiency and autonomy of 
perception.” (Aarsleff, 1988: xix) Humboldt based his thoughts on his extensive studies 
of different languages and their embeddedness in and close connection to the social 
environment of a language community. Exactly because he combined philosophical 
insight with first hand experience of other cultures and languages Humboldt rejected the 
formulaic and sterile conception that the Enlightenment brought to bear upon the role 
and nature of language. For Humboldt it was clear that “language is not like a toolbox 
with discrete instruments and parts designed for particular tasks that are known in 
advance. It is not already given work, like the contents of the tool-box, but a creative 
power – or in Humboldt’s famous words, it is not ergon but energeia… .” (ibid.) The 
expressivist view of language embodied in this conceptualisation shows itself in 
communal self-perception and self-interpretation. This interpretation still relies upon 
individuals in which language manifests itself but at the same time Humboldt had 
already realised that language in this function always already transcends the individual 
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mind in which it resides. The public linguistic sphere is the place in which language 
achieves its consummation as the medium through which meaning arises. “So although 
languages are thus the work of nations, in a sense of the term liberated from all 
misunderstanding, they still remain the self-creations of individuals, in that they can be 
produced solely in each individual, but only in such fashion that each presupposes the 
understanding of all, and all fulfil this expectation.” (Humboldt, 1988: 44) Following 
this understanding of language and its relation to the community in which it is practiced 
Humboldt maintained that “[l]anguage is, at it were, the outer appearance of the spirit of 
a people; the language is their spirit and the spirit is their language.” (ibid.: 46) 
The conclusion one can draw out of these arguments comes very close indeed to the 
modern conception of language as expressivist. In Humboldt we can already see that 
“[o]nly by virtue of language do we gain self-awareness, knowledge and mastery of 
reality. […] This philosophy does not have room for the copy-theory of knowledge; 
language is not merely designative; it is not representation but expression. Language is 
constituent of thought and for that reason it must stand at the center of any viable 
epistemology.” (Aarsleff, 1988: xix) 
 
Overall, these three thinkers present certainly important forerunners of present 
conceptions of language and recognised early the centrality and crucial importance of 
language in assessing and understanding the complexity of human existence. And 
though they were not able to produce a full-fledged appreciation of the consequences of 
their thought, we find their original work continued in contemporary thought. “It is not 
till our own day, and especially as a result of the ideas of Wittgenstein and his disciples, 
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that the cardinal importance of such an approach to the problems of philosophy was 
realized.” (Berlin, 1956: 275) 
In a similar fashion, post-Husserlian phenomenology treated language in a more 
existential and fundamental way. In Heidegger and even more importantly Gadamer and 
Merleau-Ponty, language was seen as the medium in which as well as through which we 
relate to our environment. The constant process of Dasein’s thrown-projections, i.e. its 
constant evolving into its own possibilities, is expressed in language and language only. 
As Gadamer pointed out: “Being that can be understood is language.” (Gadamer, 1979: 
432) 
Central hereby is the insight that “[t]he language-user is not a Cartesian subject in 
sovereign control of meanings; these are socially produced from the fabric of daily life 
within which various customs and practices are performatively enacted.” (Lawn, 2006: 
15) Language hereby gains its power not from representational functions but from 
participation in the language community from which it develops and to which we all 
belong. The subject involved in this community acquires a capacity to take part in 
communication but is never fully in control of language. Rather the linguistic 
development is a dialogical and continuous process publicly exercised within a 
language community in the form of language-games. And in the same way language is 
never fully understood and controlled the subjects themselves are involved in a constant 
re-interpretation in respect to their self-understanding. (Warnke, 1987: 38) 
In order to elaborate further on these general points it seems worthwhile to depict in 
more depth the approaches to language we find in phenomenological thinkers such as 
Heidegger, Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty and also include and assess in this light the 
relationship between phenomenological thought and the later Wittgenstein. As will 
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become clear in due course, we can identify a number of important parallels that seem 
to suggest a common goal or approach to linguistic practice. We will also find certain 
disagreements, each with its own positive and negative consequences, that stem from 
the differing starting points of phenomenology on the one hand and Wittgenstein’s work 
on the other. We will show how a complementary appreciation of the commonalities 
and differences between phenomenological thought on language and the later 
Wittgenstein will contribute to a more substantial account and deeper understanding of 
the role of language and its place in a new social ontology. 
 
 
Anti-foundationalism and the existential role of language 
 
On a very general level both post-Husserlian phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s later 
thought on language share a deep rejection of traditional modern philosophy and its 
foundationalist aspirations. The expressivist conceptualisation of language shows that 
“Gadamer and Wittgenstein are ‘anti-foundationalists’, that is, thinkers who place in 
doubt the whole project of philosophy as traditionally conceived since the seventeenth 
century.” (Lawn, 2006: 30) At least in Gadamer’s case this thoroughgoing anti-
foundationalist sentiment is rooted in a Heideggerian conception of human agency as 
engaged agency. Since human beings always already are in a world they have not made 
and that is not graspable from a detached, scientific point of view language assumes a 
broader and at the same time more specific role in expressing the self-understanding of 
human beings and thereby revealing or disclosing partly at least Dasein itself. (Blattner, 
1996: 97) In this approach, and Gadamer makes this abundantly clear in his works, 
language is no longer a tool aiming at a representational picture of the world. Language 
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is the defining medium in which and through which Dasein expresses its existentiality; 
“language is not an instrument of communication but communication itself.” (Lawn, 
2006: 32) 
In a very similar fashion Maurice Merleau-Ponty points towards the role of language as 
a fluid realm in which human existentiality appears. Language ceases hereby to be a 
transparent tool, a set of fixed symbols or signs with designated meanings and becomes 
a whole in which the human being performs his or her existential expressions. In this 
sense, language is never finished, it is never completely grasped but always already lies 
beyond the individual human being. Language “is never composed of absolutely 
univocal meanings which can be made completely explicit beneath the gaze of a 
transparent constituting consciousness.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1974: 84) And Merleau-Ponty 
continues in an almost Wittgensteinian formulation: “It will be a question not of a 
system of forms of signification clearly articulated in terms of one another – not of a 
structure of linguistic ideas built according to a strict plan – but of a cohesive whole of 
convergent linguistic gestures, each of which will be defined less by a signification than 
by a use value.” (ibid.)  
This anti-foundationalism that is shared by phenomenological thinkers and the later 
Wittgenstein rests on an interpretive and contextual understanding of language. 
Language as the medium in which and through which we express our self-
understanding can only be grasped in its meaning through a hermeneutical rather than 
scientific or logical approach. Gadamer develops this need for a philosophical 
hermeneutics in his magnum opus Truth and Method.  
From his initial criticism of Dilthey and Schleiermacher Gadamer turned to the 
phenomenological thought of Husserl (in respect to his concept of life-world 
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(Chatterjee, 1969: 119-20) and Heidegger. What attracted Gadamer in his efforts to 
conceptualise the central role of language and interpretation in our everyday encounters 
with the world we live in was the already mentioned concept of ‘thrownness’. As was 
outlined in Chapter III, thrownness describes the specific circumstances of human 
agency that is always already situated in a world. “In considering being-in-the-world 
fundamental, Heidegger places historicity at the foundation of the objective sciences… . 
Scientific objectivity is no longer regarded as the measure of legitimate knowledge in 
general but as a methodological standard appropriate to certain projects within the life 
world. At the same time Heidegger suspends the search for ultimate cognitive 
foundations below the life-world and thus replaces Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity 
with being-in-the world.” (Warnke, 1987: 38)  
Apart from the fact that we encounter again the thorough anti-foundationalism of post-
Husserlian phenomenology we also can see how language now moves to centre stage in 
such a conception. Far from being a simple tool of communication, language becomes 
the medium through which human agency and the world around it is constituted in the 
way it is. There is no longer a pre-established and simply given reality we try to grasp 
but our self-understanding and constant existential relation to ourselves, others and the 
world around us which can only be expressed through the medium of language 
constitutes this world. Accordingly in order to understand this world and the human 
agents within it a hermeneutical, i.e. interpretive approach is needed. “The question of 
being that arises in Being and Time no longer refers to the question of how the objective 
world is constituted in consciousness, as it still does for Husserl; the focus is rather on 
the question of what human being is, or, rather, how human life is itself a process and 
product of interpretation.” (ibid.)  
L a n g u a g e   P a g e  | 162 
 
Wittgenstein in this respect argues in very similar fashion. In his later work 
“Wittgenstein, like Gadamer, starts from the assumption that we ought to refrain from 
epistemologically driven metaphysics – the foundationalist philosophy we get in 
modernity, from Cartesianism to positivism – and stay close to the actual uses of 
language.” (Lawn, 2006: 34) Language for Wittgenstein assumes hereby a public rather 
than private role. It is not tied to a specific consciousness that derives meaning from 
ideas formed in the mind on the basis of perception and then communicates these ideas 
via language. Rather, Wittgenstein points towards the intersubjective dimension 
language takes in its everyday use. “As a system of communication, a language has 
rules, binding on those who wish to play the ‘game.’ Yet language is not an exact 
calculus; we are not forced to follow its prescriptions.” (Munson, 1962: 40) Here we 
encounter a second important parallel between the later Wittgenstein and Gadamer: the 
notion of ‘game’. 
In line with the thus far developed understanding of language as expressive rather than 
designative Wittgenstein maintains that “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring 
into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of 
life.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, §23, p.11) In this sense language is transformed from a pre-
existing system to be explored to a form of interaction with potentially unlimited 
usages. The possibilities that are expressed in Dasein’s existential form and the 
subsequent ways of being (what Wittgenstein might call ‘forms of life’) are expressed in 
different and varying language-games, each with its own rules and system of meaning. 
In this sense language is always open ended, or to put it in more Heideggerian terms, 
language is open towards Dasein. As Wittgenstein explains: “But how many different 
sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command? – There are countless 
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kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. 
And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new kinds of 
language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become 
obsolete and get forgotten (Wittgenstein, 1974, §23: 11) In this conceptualisation 
Wittgenstein denies us the possibility to relate to the world in a clear subject-object 
scheme which would allow the discovery of the world in its actual state. Reality 
vanishes in Wittgenstein and is transformed into and confined to a linguistic realm 
whose rules are in constant flux as the participants are on the one hand following the 
existent rules of the language-game but at the other hand, through this use, are involved 
in changing these very rules. (see for instance Mauws and Phillips, 1995: 325) 
“Meaning is use, though a word’s meaning is not determined by its use, not even by the 
sum of all its possible or actual uses. Rather, the question of determination does not 
even arise. Meaning is situated in a given context but not determined by it.” (Shaviro, 
1986: 224) This context is hereby not to be understood as existing separately or even 
logically or temporally preceding the production of meaning. “Relations and contexts 
are matters, not of determination, but of production. Although relevant context is always 
needed in order to give sense to a particular utterance or action this by no means implies 
that the context logically or structurally precedes the given instance.” (ibid.) 
The meaning given to a word is therefore never fixed but only achieves a punctual or 
contextual meaning in which “the use of words teach[es] you their meaning.” 
(Wittgenstein, 1974: 220) Wittgenstein’s conception of language as dispersed into 
different language-games and his concomitant grounding of meaning in the contextual 
use of words and propositions shares again many aspects with phenomenological 
thought on language. (for a detailed study of these similarities see Gier, 1981)  For one, 
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“Wittgenstein’s analysis of ostensive definition, which shows that this type of definition 
cannot be the primary way to learn the meaning of words because understanding it is 
parasitic on knowledge of the language, corresponds to Heidegger’s qualification of the 
‘objective’ attitude to the world as a deficient mode of a more fundamental indwelling-
in-the-world.” (Philipse, 1992: 255) Very similar arguments can indeed be found in 
different thinkers of the phenomenological tradition. For Merleau-Ponty for instance 
“the most outstanding feature of the linguistic sign does not reside in the fact that the 
signifier and the signified constitute two discontinuous orders, nor that the former 
comes to break the continuity between consciousness and its ‘object,’ but on the 
contrary that the two are continuous, that the corporeity of language disappears in the 
very fact of its utterance.” (Donato, 1970: 808) The quest for a universal essence that 
lies at the heart of language (in the abstract sense) is under these considerations a futile 
undertaking since a formulaic conceptualisation of language could never live up to the 
manifold instance of contextual use and meaning. “If universality is attained […] [i]t 
will be through an oblique passage from a given language that I speak and that initiates 
me into the phenomenon of expression, to another given language that I learn to speak 
and that effects the act of expression  according to a completely different style – the two 
languages (and ultimately all given languages) being contingently comparable only at 
the outcome of this passage and only as signifying wholes, without our being able to 
recognize in them the common elements of one single categorial structure.” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1974: 84) 
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The notion of ‘game’ in linguistic practice 
 
Even more important in respect to the parallels between the later Wittgenstein and 
phenomenological thought on language appears to be Gadamer’s use of the notion of 
‘game’ or ‘play’ in his own writings. The first hint of this notion of play and its 
centrality in Gadamer can be found even before the introduction to Truth and Method. 
At the beginning of the book we find a poem by Rainer Maria Rilke which seems worth 
quoting here: 
   Catch only what you’ve thrown yourself, all is 
   mere skill an little gain; 
   but when you’re suddenly the catcher of a ball 
   thrown by an eternal partner 
   with accurate and measured swing 
   towards you, to your centre, in an arch 
   from the great bridgbuilding of God; 
   why catching then becomes a power –  
   not yours, a world’s. (Gadamer, 1979) 
 
As we can already see the notion of play is not just a form of interaction between two or 
more subjects; the game itself presents something that reaches beyond the players and 
engulfs them – catching becomes a power, not of an individual but the power of a 
world.  
Gadamer starts his elaborations on the notion of play in the first part of Truth and 
Method where he contemplates the shortcomings of the many approaches in aesthetics 
that deny art any truth value on its own. Indeed, as Gadamer claims, the interpretation 
of art has been completely decoupled from the purely scientific understanding of truth. 
This argument and the wider ramification of the quest for truth will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter V. What is of interest at this point is Gadamer’s introduction of 
the notion of play (or game, depending on the translation of the German word Spiel) in 
chapter two of Truth and Method. As Gadamer formulates: “I select as my starting point 
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a notion that has played a major role in aesthetics; the concept of play. I wish to free this 
concept from the subjective meaning which it has in Kant and Schiller and which 
dominates the whole of modern aesthetics and philosophy of man.” (Gadamer, 1979: 
91)  
We can see here already that Gadamer aims at giving significance to the notion of play 
beyond a mere aesthetic experience. The notion of play in relation to art has not been 
introduced by Gadamer himself but is in fact taken from Johann Gottfried Herder’s 
discussion of play in Kalligone. (Burwick, 1990: 60) But although the initial scope of 
the notion of play, both in Heidegger and Gadamer, deals with the encounter with a 
work of art, it has hermeneutic significance beyond this realm in our everyday 
encounter with other human beings in different contexts. Games constitute specific 
realms with a clear normative content. To play a game is to follow rules, to act in 
specifically defined ways. “Playing a game involves not only entering a different reality 
but, more importantly, submitting to its norms and requirements. Games comprise a set 
of rules and principles to which participants must adhere and which at least partially 
determine those participants’ own goals and aspirations. The game thus has authority 
over its players and even specifies a range of appropriate attitudes and responses.” 
(Warnke, 1987: 49) Gadamer is adamant that the nature of play cannot be grasped in its 
entirety by only looking at the subjective reflections of the players. “Our question 
concerning the nature of play itself cannot, therefore, find an answer if we look to the 
subjective reflection of the player to provide it.” (Gadamer, 1979: 92; see also Burwick, 
1990: 62) Gadamer here clearly reacts against the Cartesian notion of agency in which 
any agent is conceptualised as disengaged and therefore able to step back form her 
experience and describe this experience in an objective and neutral way. What Gadamer 
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demands instead is an ontological understanding of game that can only be achieved by 
“enquiring into the mode of being of play as such” (Gadamer, 1979: 92), in other words 
through a phenomenological analysis of play. The mode of the being of play as such is 
characterised by the oddness “that, on the one hand [games] have authority over their 
participants, determining their goals and aspirations for the duration of the game, while 
on the other they exist in a concrete sense only through the participation of their players. 
A game both determines the actions of its players and is nothing other that these actions 
themselves.” (Warnke, 1987: 50) 
We can see here clear parallels to Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games. As 
pointed out above language-games draw their participants into a normatively regulated 
speech situation. This contextual linguistic situation and the rules that characterise it is 
not a static one. The language-game as game is only constituted through the interaction 
of the participants. It does not exist in any meaningful sense outside or prior to the 
engagement of the participants but at the same time must in its normative contents be 
understood by the participants before constituting an instance of the game. This leads to 
the peculiar situation in which “[t]he players thus ‘create’ the particular instance of the 
game although, at the same time, they could not create or play it if it did not already 
exist.” (ibid.) Likewise, games or language-games in particular are not normatively 
stagnant. Again the notion of game helps to make this point very clear. Although a 
game has a set of rules and regulations each instance of the game leads to different 
outcomes. No game will exhibit exactly the same sequence of events or the same 
consequences and outcomes. The players enter the game not neutrally but already 
equipped with contextually dependent aims and objectives that they try to realise during 
the game. How the different aims and objectives are being played out is by no means 
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predictable but depends on the perceptions and judgment of the participants – Gadamer 
refers to this as the to-and-fro movement.  (Gadamer, 1979: 96; see also Burwick, 1990: 
62 and Warnke, 1987: 48) “This suggests a general characteristic of the way in which 
the nature of play is reflected in an attitude of play: all playing is a being-played. […] 
Even when it is a case of games in which one seeks to accomplish tasks that one has set 
oneself, there is a risk whether or not it will ‘work’, ‘succeed’, and ‘succeed again’, 
which is the attraction of the game. […] The real subject of the game […] is not the 
player, but instead the game itself.” (Gadamer, 1979: 95-6) 
Furthermore, not only is each instance of the game different but also the normative 
framework of the game, the rules that regulate it, might be and continuously are subject 
to change. The participants willingly or unwillingly alter the game by playing it. Old 
rules and meanings constantly give way to new rules and meanings. The new rules and 
meanings are not externally and vertically imposed but rely upon an intersubjective 
dynamic of acceptance or rejection. Therefore the game that is manifested only through 
being-played is always already beyond the players who participate in it. There is never a 
situation in which the play can be mastered and fully understood in a theoretical sense. 
The constant change that is perpetuated by playing the game forbids any notion of 
finality in respect to understanding and mastering each instance. 
 “We have seen that games have a priority over their players since their norms and 
purposes dominate the players. At the same time, however, a game is not simply that 
which is codified in a book of rules or reflected in a set of strategies; it is rather that 
which is played. Thus, despite the dominance of the game over those that play it, their 
playing it remains essential to it. For this reason, Gadamer calls games ‘self-
representations’.” (Warnke, 1987: 50) 
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The conceptualisation of ‘tradition’ and ‘form of life’ 
 
The final important parallel between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and 
phenomenological thought on language can be seen in the commonalities to be found in 
Wittgenstein’s abovementioned notion of ‘forms of life’ and Gadamer’s use of the term 
tradition. At the same time these two terms will guide us into the main differences that 
remain between Wittgenstein and phenomenological conceptions of language, 
especially between Wittgenstein and Gadamer.  
So far we have portrayed the later Wittgenstein as an anti-foundationalist philosopher 
that continued the tradition that sees language as an expression of what it is to be 
human, or at least we can say he moved close to it. We have to recognise that language 
as it is used in our everyday situatedness is always contextually embedded. The 
meaning words assume depends not on an abstract, formulaic and logical system of 
meaning but on the use of the words within a given context. We have also seen that 
Wittgenstein argues that there are many different contexts coinciding with the different 
social, political and cultural environments in which we live. Linguistic activities 
practiced in these environments or contexts Wittgenstein labelled language-games. 
“Wittgenstein’s concept of a language game is clearly to be set over and against the idea 
of language as a system of meaningful signs that can be considered in abstraction from 
its actual employment.” (McGinn, 1997: 44)  
These language-games are, however, a part of the larger framework of human existence 
as such. Here again, Wittgenstein in the same vein as the post-Husserlian 
phenomenologists stands clear of an essentialist or foundationalist account. He 
acknowledges that the realm of human existence is as fragmented as are the linguistic 
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expressions that give meaning to it. “Wittgenstein […] emphasises the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of both language-games, and the social contexts of which they are a part. 
He thereby rejects the linguistic essentialism common to logicist views of language […] 
and to semiotics and structuralism. A human ‘form of life’ is among other things 
inescapably linguistic; however, no grounds exist for privileging the linguistic aspects 
of a social formation over other dimensions of practice.” (Shaviro, 1986: 221) A form 
of life constitutes hereby the realm of human practices within a given context of which 
the linguistic part is one of the most important. Language is the main way of expressing 
intentions, actions and objectives about oneself, others and the environment. Language-
games cannot be judged from a detached perspective to determine which language-
game is richer or more developed or closer to some ideal. (Hinman, 1983: 346) The 
language-games themselves set the limits of judgment to those that are participating. 
These limits are constituted, however, as is the whole language-game, by linguistic 
practice rather than natural or logical necessities. This view ties in neatly with 
Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life. “The idea of language as form of life […] again 
serves to bring into prominence the fact that language is embedded within a horizon of 
significant, non-linguistic behaviour. Thus, just as the term ‘language-game’ is meant to 
evoke the idea of language in use within the non-linguistic activities of speakers, so the 
term ‘form of life’ is intended to evoke the idea that language and linguistic exchange 
are embedded in the significantly structured lives of groups of active human agents.” 
(McGinn, 1997: 51)  
If we now turn once more to phenomenological thought we will indeed find close 
parallels to this conceptualisation of forms of life. Gadamer starts from the 
consideration of what is involved in the process of understanding, i.e. how meanings 
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evolve not from a certain base but are constituted by linguistic practices situated in 
different contexts. The conceptualisation of context here is similar to what Wittgenstein 
named ‘form of life’ and Gadamer termed tradition. “Gadamer follows Heidegger in 
anchoring understanding in the concerns of the interpreting subject or, as Heidegger 
puts it, in a structure of practical involvements. More emphatically than Heidegger, 
however, Gadamer locates this structure of involvements in history. This means that the 
issues we bring to the process of interpretation are not our preoccupation alone but 
rather refer to issues and concerns that have developed within the historical tradition to 
which we belong.” (Warnke, 1987: 78) In the same vein as Wittgenstein insists on the 
impossibility of a private language in line with much modern conceptualisations of 
Cartesian consciousness, “Interpretive understandings of the world (or texts) have no 
absolute grounding but they operate within the temporal unfolding of linguistic 
change.” (Lawn, 2006: 45) Gadamer thereby opens the notion of understanding to the 
public realm. Tradition for Gadamer provides an all-encompassing framework in which 
certain meanings emerge. In emphasising this notion of an all-enveloping tradition 
“Gadamer holds the Enlightenment responsible for both the negative connotations of the 
notion of prejudice and the negative implications of a recourse to the authority of 
tradition.” (Warnke, 1987: 75; see also Mendelson, 1979 and Scheibler, 2000: 9-70) 
Any attempt to delineate a specific meaning of an object or utterance is thereby already 
embedded in a pre-ontological understanding of the interpreting subject. Gadamer is 
here very much in line with the Heideggerian existential analytic in which the notion of 
agency appears as situated, engaged and involved in the world that always already is. 
Heidegger uses the three terms, Vorgabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff to describe the 
involvement of human actors in a net of social and linguistic practises out of which 
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understanding arises. (Dreyfus 1991: 199-202; Heidegger, 1996: 214) There is no 
outside to this contextual situatedness no detached point from which objectified 
observation would be possible. “[Heidegger’s] point is that even before I begin 
consciously to interpret a text or grasp the meaning of an object, I have already placed it 
within a certain context (Vorhabe), apprehended it from a certain perspective (Vorsicht) 
and conceived of it in a certain way (Vorgriff). There is no neutral vantage point from 
which to survey the ‘real’ meaning of a text or object; even a scientific approach to an 
object places it within a certain context and takes a certain attitude towards it.” 
(Warnke, 1987: 77) Here we have reached the more elaborate depiction of our initial 
critique on Wendt and Wight who overlook the crucial situatedness out of which all 
attempts to access and understand the world are made. With Gadamer we see that any 
such attempt always already relies upon a framework of understanding that we bring to 
the situation we wish to analyse. In this sense the scientific approach propagated by 
Wendt and Wight always comes to late as we have already understood the situation and 
can not leave our own contextuality. 
Based on this Heideggerian starting point Gadamer combines Heidegger’s tripartite 
fore-structure of understanding in the word prejudice (Vorurteil) which literally 
translated means pre-judgment which conditions any attempt to understand and interpret 
the world. (Moran, 2000: 252) “Gadamer points out against the Enlightenment that 
prejudice (Vorurteil) literally simply means pre-judgement (Vor-urteil) or in other 
words, judgment made before all the evidence has been adequately addressed. […] To 
assume that all prejudices are illegitimate and misleading as the Enlightenment does is, 
in Gadamer’s view, simply a ‘prejudice against prejudice’.” (Warnke, 1987: 76) Once 
more we encounter the common criticism common to both the later Wittgenstein and 
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Gadamer of the Enlightenment notion of detached agency and the concomitant 
conception of designative language. In this sense the Gadamerian notion of ‘tradition’ 
links very well with the Wittgesteinian ‘form of life’. Both insist on the situatedness of 
the subjects when it comes to the delineation of meaning. The context in which a word 
or proposition is uttered and the way in which it is used determine its meaning. There is 
no outside, no neutral point to this situatedness from which a logical or essentialist 
conception of language could depart. Furthermore, this context is not just a linguistic 
context nor should it be reduced to such; rather, the context provides a wide array of 
social practices of which the linguistic sphere is only one.  “The social and the historical 
are principle features of the linguistic, we might say that we cannot sideline out 
engagement with language. At another level of generality, we might say that the 
linguistic, the social, and the historical are all constituents of an even greater whole, 
Gadamer calls collectively ‘tradition’.” (Lawn, 2006: 45) We have here clear parallels 
that can ultimately be derived from Wittgenstein’s and Gadamer’s (and thereby 
phenomenology’s) commitment to a thorough expressivist view of language that 
strongly combines a rejection of any foundationalist enterprise with a dedication to a 
linguistic situatedness coupled with the intersubjective and publicly achieved 
delineation of meaning. Put in a nutshell, this position can be found in Gadamer’s 
above-mentioned utterance: “Being that can be understood is language.” (Gadamer, 
1979: 432) 
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Language and its role as the ‘house of being’ 
 
So far we have depicted the major parallels that can be found in the thought of the later 
Wittgenstein as well as in post-Husserlian phenomenology referring to the work of 
Gadamer, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In order, however, to show that an 
appreciation of phenomenological thought on language moves beyond mere agreement 
and congruence to the later Wittgenstein we need to point out why a complimentary 
reading of both approaches could be central to a new social ontology. The focus will 
hereby lie with the differences that are important for our matter at hand.  
The following section will therefore be confined to mainly two elements which could be 
seen as problematic in Wittgenstein. In the cases discussed here, the problematic nature 
does not so much arise out of opposing views but rather out of different foci and scope 
we encounter in Wittgenstein and phenomenological thought on language. The 
argument we would like to present here aims at supplementing the later thought of 
Wittgenstein and with phenomenological insights that seem to be complimentary to and 
illuminating for elements in Wittgenstein’s thought that remain underdeveloped in his 
work.  The points in question regard the notions of change or creativity and the role of 
historicity in experiencing the world. 
In respect to the first point – change and creativity – Wittgenstein’s account as we have 
seen above is not only open to change and constant evolution in the realm of language 
but sees such a proclivity towards change as one of the main features of language in its 
expressivist understanding. The language-games that we encounter and that are part of 
our everyday lives present hereby the normative framework in which we linguistically 
and more importantly existentially operate. As such language can only be found in the 
L a n g u a g e   P a g e  | 175 
 
public realm where the complexity of linguistic practices never fully resides in single 
consciousnesses as assumed in a designative approach. Rather, the meanings of words 
and propositions in different contexts are in flux and reshaped by the practices through 
which the ‘games’ are constituted.  
Although Wittgenstein subscribes to a notion of change, there are some questions that 
still need to be answered. Even if it is clear that change can and does occur the question 
how it occurs or can occur is an interesting one to explore. According to Wittgenstein, 
human existence is centrally defined by our use of language and even more important 
by our embeddedness in language-games. These language-games depend on the one 
hand on the social roles that the subjects participating have and on the other on the 
normative framework that governs meaning and establishes the rules of the particular 
game. Two ramifications of this conceptualisation seem important here. First, 
Wittgenstein contends that language-games exist as linguistic systems with clearly 
defined rules that are socially constituted. Any participant is on his or her entrance 
introduced or socialised into these rules and can subsequently meaningfully participate 
in the language-game. Language-games are also posited as necessarily transient since 
meanings and rules can and do change. Secondly, it follows from this conceptualisation 
that the participants once introduced to the rules of this game follow them without the 
need to interpret each single instance of rule-following. (on the relation between rules 
and interpretation see Fierke, 1998: 23-30) 
Given these two characteristics of how Wittgenstein conceptualises his notion of 
language-game the first question to arise seems to be how change is induced in these 
systems of meaning. The obvious answer is that changes in meaning are introduced by 
socially shifting practices as to establish a different meaning for the same term in a 
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context. How, however, do we have to think about this change in practices. The rules 
guiding the meaning and appropriate behaviour within the language-game have to be 
changed and any change of rules in a system of meaning must imply a ‘violation’ of the 
rules themselves, otherwise change cannot occur. Now initially such a violation with the 
prospect of change is not necessarily problematic but it seems worth exploring by which 
means violations of rules and subsequently changes within in a language game are 
accepted or rejected. It arises the question of legitimacy at this point. One way to 
answer this question is by pointing towards the power relations within this language-
game and stipulate in an almost Foucauldian fashion that the distribution of power 
among the participants lies behind changes in discourse. (Thiele, 1986: 248) This 
change, to be certain, might not turn out in the way it is initially intended but the fact 
that change occurs at all and this occurrence as a violation of existing rules is still 
possible, can be interpreted by a close intersection between discursive power and the 
probability to induce change.  
As said, this intersection between power and change is only one possible way and it 
seems to solve the initial question as to how change is possible and can be legitimised in 
a system governed by certain rules. If we, however, take a closer look we would have to 
ask what kind of discursive power can introduce change and why exactly these 
circumstances are seen as legitimate to induce change. In other words, we would have 
to look into the rules that govern the change of rules. Because even if socially and 
politically powerful actors might be seen as able and in some instances legitimate to 
induce change, they are so not by nature but again by social practice. In Western 
societies right now, for instance, it is certainly possible to make an argument that key 
agents in the social and political realm are able to induce change, key agents in the 
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religious realm, however, are less likely to succeed. This constellation that allocates 
power and influence to a certain set of agents, however, arises itself out of the secular 
setting within the community under scrutiny. 500 years ago, religious authority was 
certainly perceived as being able to and legitimate in changing the meanings and rules 
of specific discourses and subsequently affect the social practices in which these appear. 
In other words, the ability to change the meaning of words and propositions within 
language-games must depend upon a deeper social stratum in which the rules for 
changing the rules are made, again based on social practices and intersubjective 
agreement. If we, however, stipulate, and we would argue such a stipulation is 
necessary if we do not want to fall back into a form of foundationalism here, that in 
order to grasp the process of changing rules regarding meanings and social practices we 
have to understand which rules guide this process of changing rules, we will end in an 
infinite regress. This is because even if we can identify rules that regulate the change of 
rules these rules themselves since they rely on social practices as well must generally be 
changeable. And if they are changeable we would have to ask again how does this 
change occur and what are the rules for changing the rules to change the rules and so 
on. 
The point this is leading towards is the neglect of history and the treatment of first order 
rules in Wittgenstein’s thought. If we understand human existence as inherently social 
and linguistic we would have to consider the wider realm in which particular language-
games are embedded especially in cases in which rules and practices undergo change. 
Before we address this point further, however, it seems necessary to point out another 
potentially problematic feature in Wittgenstein’s thought which is closely connected to 
the issue of first order rules. It lies with Wittgenstein’s conception of the language-game 
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as a system of linguistic practices into which one can be socialised by internalising the 
rules and participating meaningfully in the game. Wittgenstein repeatedly points out 
that language-games are embedded in a form of life, a way in which a world is 
established and imbued with meaning. There are in fact five instances in the 
Philosophical Investigations in which Wittgenstein refers to ‘form(s) of life’. In four 
instances Wittgenstein speaks of ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1972: 8, 11, 88 and174) in 
the singular and only once, at the very end of the Philosophical Investigations he uses 
the plural ‘forms of life’. (ibid.: 226) What Wittgenstein seems to suggest, and 
suggesting is the only thing he does since he is not elaborating on this notion of ‘form of 
life’ in any substantial manner, is that language-games are embedded and have to be 
situated in a larger context. This meaning becomes clear when he says: “And to imagine 
a language means to imagine a form of life.” (ibid.: 8) or “the speaking of language is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life.” (ibid.: 11) Two elements of Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of the notion of form of life seem worthwhile mentioning here. First, a form 
of life encompasses a number of language-games and secondly language as such is only 
part of a form of life which suggests that this form of life finds expression in other than 
pure linguistic practices. This seems to be somewhat at odds with his conceptualisation 
of language-games as systems of meaning with socially constituted rules. This is 
because Wittgenstein seems to suggest that we take part in language-games that seem 
semi-permeable in terms of normative content. On the one hand the agents can and do 
switch between different language-games but each time they change they enter a new 
world of meaning.  
At first glance, this seems to make sense since language in Wittgenstein is needed to 
constitute a world and words and propositions can assume different meanings in 
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different contexts and also are guided in their use by different rules within different 
language-games. The concomitant picture of human linguistic practices, however, is 
rather kaleidoscopic as it suggests many different language-games and therefore many 
different ‘worlds’. The notion of ‘form of life’,  however, as well as the actual 
experience of our existence suggests a perception of our environment as ONE world in 
which different roles and language-games are embedded. With Wittgenstein’s 
conceptualisation of monadic language-games, each of which constitutes a world of 
meaning and governing rules the question arises how such a perception of ONE world is 
achieved. This of course feeds also into an implicit notion of agency and Wittgenstein’s 
view on the human subject. It seems, although Wittgenstein again never elaborated on 
human subjectivity or agency in any depth, that the subject that is introduced and 
participating in different language-games is more or less split in different existences. If 
the language-games he or she takes part in constitute different realms of experience and 
practice, in other words constitute worlds for their participants, how is a unified 
perception of identity over time achieved? In fact there must be a background against 
which the subject is still able to perceive herself as self-identical over a period of time 
when partaking in different social and linguistic environments.  
 
In conjunction with the argument regarding the notion of change outlined above, 
Wittgenstein himself seems to hint at a possible solution to the notion of change and the 
perception of one world and a concomitant emergence of a subject that perceives itself 
and is perceived by others as identical over time that avoids both a step back into 
foundationalism and an infinite regress. The ‘form of life’ appealed to sporadically in 
the Philosophical Investigations can be seen, as was argued above, in light of 
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Gadamer’s notion of tradition thereby introducing a missing historical angle into 
Wittgenstein’s thought. If a ‘form of life’ provides the background in which different 
language-games and practices develop and form a continuous perception of one world 
inhabited by subjects there have to be, however, some supplements to Wittgenstein’s 
work in respect to the notions of historicity and linguisticality. 
First, the historical dimension will overcome Wittgenstein’s rather presentist outlook on 
language-games in which “language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and 
others become obsolete and get forgotten”. (ibid.) In their embeddedness in a ‘form of 
life’ language-games cannot become obsolete in terms of meanings or be simply 
forgotten or inaccessible. They certainly can change and maybe abandoned in favour of 
other language-games but they will still exist within the ‘form of life’ in which they are 
embedded and out of which they arose. We can basically distinguish between active and 
deactivated language-games here. Deactivated language-games are thereby games that 
are no longer played but they are not forgotten in any meaningful sense. They might 
have contributed to inducing change into the system at one time and thereby live on in 
the change they helped to bring about.  
Here, we reach a second amendment which can be made to Wittgenstein’s thought in 
light of phenomenological insights, namely the linguistic interconnectedness of 
language-games. Although it is the case that language-games have rules and specific 
linguistic practices, the fact that subjects perceive themselves and are perceived as self-
identical over time even when changing language-games, suggests that a cross-
application of meanings and rules is possible and unavoidable. Agents participating in a 
language-game do not leave their involvement in other language-games and therefore 
their other identity facets behind but bring them to bear in each specific language-game. 
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It is necessary to take into account that although the players within a language-game 
seem to follow certain rules and practices they exist in a basic ontological sense beyond 
the language-game they are taking part in at the moment. Only in this way is it possible 
to understand the different motives, aims and objectives different players have in each 
language-game. Suggesting that participants in a language-game only focus on and exist 
within the scope of this game, i.e. exist only in the moment would ignore their historical 
being as well as suggest that they should share basic interests and identities arising out 
of this particular instance.  
The important difference here lies with the insight that from the moment human beings 
are socialised into linguistic practices onwards they not just learn, as Wittgenstein 
seems to suggest, specific rules and meanings in language-games but they are in fact 
introduced to linguisticality itself which means they acquire a capacity to access and use 
the general disposition of human beings towards language as an existential 
characteristic of being. 
Gadamer, indeed in much agreement with Wittgenstein, captures this component very 
well. For Gadamer a ‘form of life’ or in his terminology a tradition is a repository that 
includes all past language-games that have emerged out of this tradition. They might be 
no longer in use but they are still accessible and exert their influence in the present in 
form of the change they induced during their active phase. “At work here is what 
Gadamer calls ‘effective history’ (Wirkungsgeschichte) by which he means the 
operative force of the tradition over those that belong to it, so that even in rejecting or 
reacting to it they remain conditioned by it. […] In either case, the interpreter remains 
subject to the hold of effective history, to the way in which the object has already been 
understood in the tradition to which he or she belongs.” (Warnke, 1987: 80) As 
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Merleau-Ponty reminded us in respect to the present and past of language: “Far from 
our being able to juxtapose a psychology of language and a science of language by 
reserving language in the present for the first and language in the past for the second, 
we must recognize that the present diffuses into the past to the extent that the past has 
been present.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1974: 84) 
The way we can still engage with this legacy of the past is certainly determined by and 
has to be situated in our current understanding of the world. Gadamer labels this 
engagement between two different elements of social practice ‘fusion of horizons’. 
(Risser, 1997: 80-1; Taylor, 2002: 133; Gadamer, 1979: 273-4) The original meaning 
might be lost but the words that are still known can assume a new meaning in the light 
of current circumstances and interpretations. Old or deactivated language-games still 
have meaning and are therefore not obsolete or forgotten. In Gadamer  
“[h]orizons are fused in everyday linguistic encounters. Concerns draw 
the participants into dialogue and in the meeting both language and 
horizons are changed. A ‘fusion of horizons’ also takes place when one 
inevitably and unwittingly encounters the language-games of the past. 
For Gadamer past language-games are not repositories of redundant 
meanings. On the contrary, they sustain their effects in the present. 
Without past meanings, current meanings would be impossible. What 
makes the fusion of horizons possible is the assumed commonality of 
tradition.” (Lawn, 2006: 29) 
 
In other words, language-games in Wittgenstein are framed by an intersubjectively 
created set of rules that lay down what is a meaningful utterance and under which 
circumstances it is meaningful in a given discourse. For Wittgenstein, as mentioned 
before, the fragmentation of linguistic practices is a fragmentation on the surface of 
day-to-day interaction only. It is based on an underlying agreement made manifest in 
regular linguistic activity which guides the speaker into an appropriate practice. There 
L a n g u a g e   P a g e  | 183 
 
is, however, on another level still a fragmentation between language games both 
thematically and temporally that Wittgenstein does not try to overcome. 
Gadamer in this respect embeds his account of language again in his notion of tradition. 
As Chris Lawn points out for Gadamer “[t]here is no internalising of a set of rules for 
particular language-games, one is not merely socialised into the specifics of language 
but brought to linguisticality itself.” (ibid.: 27) From a Gadamerian perspective, 
Wittgenstein never advanced beyond the elementary stage of linguistic appropriation. 
Central for Gadamer is hereby the above-mentioned term of ‘fusion of horizions’. (ibid.: 
29; Weinsheimer, 1985: 210-1) As he points out, all linguistic understanding takes place 
from within a specific horizon. Horizon here describes the totality of all that can be 
realised or thought about by a person at a given time in history and in a particular 
culture. In the everydayness of linguistic interaction it is the horizons of the 
speakers/texts involved that interact and in the attempt to reach an understanding of one 
another are fused. Hereby, each horizon that takes part in the dialogue is transfigured. 
Whereas “Wittgenstein sees only a logical relationship between rules and application 
Gadamer sees the hermeneutic circle in operation.” (ibid.,: 28) 
It is important to understand that this historical background that is grasped in terms such 
as ‘form of life’ or ‘tradition’ is not an extra-existential structure that exists beyond 
human beings. Rather, in the same way particular language-games in Wittgenstein are 
constituted through practices, the tradition is constituted through current practices as 
well. Any participation in present language-games brings with it the whole of the 
tradition and expresses this tradition in the actual practices and rules which arise out of 
its totality. It is exactly in this sense that Gadamer reinterpreted and refined Heidegger’s 
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stipulation that being is essentially temporal by “equating the temporality of Being with 
the historicality of tradition… .” (DiCenso, 1990: 32) 
 
Overall we have to admit that in respect to the understanding and nature of language 
and its role in social and political discourse important work has already been done by 
quite a few scholar in IR influenced by the later Wittgenstein. Opposed to the 
designative understanding of language, in which words are representations of ideas of 
perceived objects developed in individual consciousness, the later Wittgenstein, as we 
have seen, proposed and followed a more expressivist understanding of language that 
was foreshadowed by the three Hs: Haman, Herder and Humboldt.  
The above chapter presents the attempt to portray the scope and importance of language 
for the new social ontology developed here. We have seen that close parallels and 
commonalities can be drawn and developed between the later Wittgenstein and 
phenomenological approaches to language. Not only do the latter share the same 
conceptualisation of language as expressivity but they indeed exhibit corresponding 
terminologies as was shown in the case of ‘game’ or ’play’ as well as in the case of 
Wittgensteinian ‘forms of life’ and the Gadamerian notion of ‘tradition’. We are 
reminded that language is more than a system of signs that can be used as a tool readily 
available in our project of mastering the world around us. Instead we are made sensitive 
to the ontological and existential dimension that every linguistic encounter brings with 
it. For the study of political and social relations on the international scene especially 
after the rise of influential non-state actors such a conceptualisation of language will 
help to grasp the elements of identity formation that have been proven to be so 
important in evaluating and understanding developments on the international stage. The 
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clear connection between any notion of identity and language as the medium through 
which these are expressed is much more substantial than portrayed in mainstream 
accounts. Not only are identities not induced from an exogenous source such as the 
structure of the international system and therefore conceived as being immutable. 
Language in this respect is also more that a simple tool that allows statements such as: 
“I am x.” The notion of identity here is constructed out of an existential characteristic of 
human agency that relies upon the centrality of possibility. Any statement that tries to 
describe a feature of identity is at the time of its utterance always already beyond itself. 
It is the linguistic expression of past and the anticipation of future projections. Identity 
in this sense is in a constant process of re-definition and re-interpretation. Language 
expresses this fact by revealing not an essence of the human being or other beings she 
encounters (as for instance the conceptualisation of intransitive objects would presume) 
but the existential frame in which human agents engage with the world. This world that 
is expressed through notions of identity by the way of language is not there to be 
discovered. It is not the case that identities are to be projected as over and against a 
material environment which in some instance even assumes causal powers in identity 
formation. Rather the utterance involved in instances of self-interpretation brings the 
world along with it. Any statement of a human being is derived from the pro-ontological 
situatedness of the human agents out of which an interpretation of the world arises. In 
this view, and this is stressed by both the later Wittgenstein as well as post-Husserlian 
phenomenology, the world is constituted through linguistic practices of self-
interpretation.  
What this entails on a larger scale is of course the rejection of a clear-cut dichotomy 
between agent and structure or subject and object. If the world as interpretation is 
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constituted through linguistic practice it has no detached and independent standing in 
respect to the agent. Any question regarding the primacy of either agent or structure is 
hereby not only misguided and a fallback into Cartesianism, in a phenomenological 
understanding it is outright meaningless.10 Even instances that stress the ‘mutual 
constitution’ of agent and structure it has to be made clear that this does not simply 
mean that there exists a mere dialectic between two separate elements which are 
somewhat entangled and influence one another. Phenomenological conceptions of 
language as well as Wittgenstein’s later thought overcome these seeming opposites in 
which world is set over and against word. It is important to understand that the 
separation of word and world is a theoretically detached simplification of a much more 
existential and complex process. There cannot possible be world without word since the 
constitution of any world is brought along in the social and linguistic practices of our 
everyday engagements.  
The context out of which meaning arises, as we have seen in Wittgenstein and 
Gadamer, is not to be posited as prior in any sense. This seemingly leads to the 
abovementioned contradiction that the context of meaning is established through 
language but at the same time is needed for any linguistic engagement. This 
contradiction seems to suggest a fallback into some kind of dualism that in its simplest 
way is depicted by saying that past actions constituted a context which is now 
restricting our future actions and also provides a frame of reference for meanings.  
Such an argument, however, is misguided in the light of the insights we have stated so 
far. Such a context would again be a structure that exists outside language as a 
                                                 
10 for a more elaborate depiction of the agency-structure problematique in light of the ontological 
arguments presented here see chapter VI. 
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repository of meanings in front of which we encounter ourselves and others. It would be 
principally graspable through abstraction and reflection – from there the step towards a 
half-hearted Cartesian account is a small one. Instead we have to understand that 
meaning in deed arises out of a speech community that provides a linguistic context (for 
lack of a better word) but since language in its expressivist view is always public and 
never private it transcends the individual in each instance of its use. What that means is 
that the context in which meaning arises is at the same time constituted by the 
individual and transcends her through the constitution and reiteration of the constituents 
of a speech community. The remnants of past linguistic encounters certainly have an 
influence but never independent of the individual language user. Rather, the way 
language is used in constituting the world and representing a certain self-interpretation 
of existential possibilities brings these past encounters with it in their entirety and 
makes them bear upon the world anew in every instance. It is not about structure and 
agency or about subject and object but about the realisation that language is constitutive 
of being as such. Heidegger would say that Dasein always brings the whole world with 
it and in this respect that “language is the house of being”. (Heidegger, 2007c: 237) 
 
First in line stands of course the central function of language as the expressive medium 
through which we relate to the world and each other. In order to understand social 
relationships and the emergence of intersubjective meaning, identities and rules that 
govern these relations it is impossible to ignore this wider scope and different 
conceptualisation of language. On the other hand, the points raised above also remind us 
of the historicity of our being in a wider context. Although language is indeed a central 
characteristic of human existence and the prime medium through which relations and 
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self-interpretations are constituted we must not forget that even this central role of 
language is itself part of a variety of practices that define the social realm. The 
reduction of human existence to language use or purely linguistic practices forecloses a 
deeper and wider conceptualisation of other existentials. We are reminded of this wider 
scope even within the work of Wittgenstein when he maintains that “language is part of 
an activity, or a form of life.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, §23: 11) 
Furthermore, phenomenological thought can certainly help to compliment Wittgenstein 
by focussing and elaborating more on the concept of linguisticality and creativity. In 
respect to linguisticality it seems necessary to move beyond the narrow analysis of 
language-games and how specific terms changed. In order to develop a broader 
understanding of the dynamics of change it is worthwhile first to take into account the 
role of first order rules and their embeddedness within a historically constituted form of 
life or tradition. Each instance of a present language game is so to say impregnated with 
past meaning in which light current rules and practices can be accurately understood.  
Beyond the scope of language, however, or at least connected to it lie other elements 
that define and characterise the social and political involvements of human beings. We 
have already seen that an expressivist view of language also implies a specific form of 
agency, namely engaged agency. Wittgenstein himself did not enquire into the 
conditions and conceptualisations of other existentials of human being since his main 
occupation lay with language. What is needed, however, in any analysis of political and 
social events and relations is a conceptualisation of these other existentials. In this 
respect, phenomenological thought reminds us and delivers a wider and account of 
agency and as we will see of notions of freedom and truth that cannot be found in 
Wittgenstein. It is here that the claim for a complimentary reading of the later 
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Wittgenstein and post-Husserlian phenomenology becomes strongest. The ontological 
thought of many phenomenological thinkers explores elements of human being that 
remain necessarily shadowy when focussing on one thinker alone.  
The final element that achieves a substantiation and expansion when being considered 
in the light of both the later Wittgenstein and phenomenological thought is the notion of 
change. In this respect a deeper and widened understanding of the range and historical 
situatedness of human creativity can be gained from insights drawn together from 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of language and phenomenological thought on the wider theme 
of human existentiality which situates the potential for change in a specific 
conceptualisation of human being that looks well beyond the linguistic realm.  
Doing this, both Wittgenstein and Gadamer grasp wider aspects in which particular 
language-games are situated and, as shown above, conceptualise it in the terms’ form of 
life’ or tradition. This tradition provides the totality (not in foundationalist sense 
though) out of which a pre-ontological understanding of the world and other beings 
arises. This totality, however, is not a fixed structure that determines what is possible 
and not possible outside the existence of the beings engaging with it and with each 
other. Instead, the tradition itself is constantly reshaped through the intersubjective 
practices that instantiate it. As such it can be conceptualised as autopoietic in its nature. 
Again the tradition in general as is the individual human being and the meanings and 
practices she adheres to is more characterised by possibilities and actualities. It is not 
possible to enquire into this tradition from an abstract or theoretical point of view. 
Every attempt to grasp the tradition is first always already situated within the tradition 
itself and secondly changes the tradition through the act of enquiry. What is contributes, 
however, is an advanced understanding of the situatedness of complex systems of 
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linguistic and social practices in this autopoietic totality of past actualities and future 
possibilities. Only against this background is the fusion of horizons and the constant 
amendment and reinterpretation of human existence explicable.  
It is exactly because the tradition or form of life is not just a structural repository 
existing over and against the human being and conditions it but is instantiated 
repeatedly through practice that the ways in which it can be and is portrayed involves a 
constant interpretation of the environment in which rules as shaped and followed.  
Such a conceptualisation of an autopoietic totality that is instantiated in every instance 
of practice and that provides the framework for our pre-ontological understanding (our 
understanding that we always already are in a world in which we know our way around 
in a practical sense) also involves a move beyond the sole focus on language towards 
the being of language as such – linguisticality. As outlined above, due to the larger 
scope of the philosophical endeavours of phenomenological thought, linguisticality 
describes one of the existential features of human existence. In learning and 
participating in language-games we are not just internalising specific rules and practices 
but the practical capacity, the ontological structure of language as such. From then on 
we are able not only to participate in language-games we have been introduced to or 
learn the rules of new language-games; our participation which is characterised by the 
very nature of our existentiality and thereby by the thrown-projections we constantly 
engage in is translated through linguisticality in concrete aims, objectives and 
interpretation which we bring to the language-games we engage in. Here we find the 
hub of human creativity. This creativity is not only dependent on our intersubjective 
engagement with each other but also and maybe more primordially our engagement 
with ourselves and the tradition we are part of. Creativity and change maybe realised in 
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intersubjective practices where horizons of existentiality are constantly fused but the 
very conditions that make such a form of change possible and lie at the heart of the 
creativity we encounter can only be found by moving to the fundamental ontological 
level that grasps the specific of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In this respect this chapter 
closes by emphasising once more that the points raised here are not meant to replace 
Wittgenstein’s thought or even dismiss it. Rather, the complimentary appreciation of 
phenomenological insights on language relates to the larger picture of human 
existentiality that finds only rudimentary and peripheral consideration in Wittgenstein. 
We therefore want to argue for a wider scope and deeper situatedness of language in a 
form of life or tradition which is inseparably linked to particular instances of human 
interaction.  
Whereas links to the conception of agency have already been made in the above lines, it 
remains to show how language relates to the notions of freedom and truth. To these 
themes we will turn now. 
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V Truth – Deconcealment of Being in the disclosure of 
worlds 
 
We seek the essence of truth as the unhiddenness of 
beings in deconcealment, as a deconcealing occurrence  
upon whose ground man exists. 
Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 1929 
 
 
Once known, truths acquire a utilitarian crust; they no 
longer interest us as truths but as useful recipes. That 
pure, sudden illumination which characterises truth 
accompanies the latter only at the moment of discovery. 
Hence its Greek name aletheia, which originally meant 
 the same as the word apocalypsis later, that is, discovery, 
revelation or rather, unveiling, removing a veil or cover. 
Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote, 1914 
 
 
In this third of the thematic chapters the argument advances to probably the most 
contentious theme related to our enquiry – the notion of truth. Having outlined the 
complexity of the human involvement in a world in terms of agency and the central 
relation to this world through an expressivist understanding of language we now must 
consider the nature of the insights and knowledge that can are obtained through our 
involvement in the world. In other words we must proceed to the crucial question of 
how knowledge claims relate to the contextuality and historicality of our existence – the 
question of truth. 
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Throughout the modern period the quest for reliable truth in form of universally valid 
and necessary propositions proved to be a main element in philosophical enquiries. 
(Heidegger, 1996: 198; Shell, 1977: 549) As will be shown in the first section below, 
truth in most conceptualisations was either taken to mean correspondence or coherence. 
Something was seen as true either if correspondence between mind and an object of 
knowledge or coherence of a proposition to a network of propositions was achieved.  It 
proved, however, harder than expected at the outset to bridge the gap between mind and 
nature. Descartes may have initially be successful in securing a starting point by 
insisting on the indubitable existence of our mind that thinks but how such a mind is 
ever able to confirm extra-mental existence and therefore establish truth outside its own 
mental states remained a problem.  
Apart from this particular problem Descartes laid the foundations, as was shown above, 
for other commitments such as the view of disengaged agency and a designative 
conception of language. The notion of truth was practically guided by the huge 
successes of the natural sciences which proved vital in the ever expanding quest of 
modern humanity to conquer and control nature. (Bauman, 1978: 10-1) In many 
instances direct links and analogies were put into place to show the validity of scientific 
methods for delivering insights into the social and political world. The field of IR was 
not left out hereby but came under the spell of such scientific approaches early on. The 
challenge that we are concerned with in the current enquiry, however, drew from 
sources that denied the possibility to achieve truth about human relations and human 
existence in general by relying upon such a scientific notion of truth.  
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This short overview, however, paints a somewhat distorted or at least simplified picture 
of the matters and discussions about the notion of truth in IR and the wider field of 
philosophy. In fact, it seems somewhat hard to fathom the manifold nuances that guide 
the discussion regarding matters of truth. It seems therefore necessary to map out the 
differences somewhat more carefully and stress the more or less heuristic value of such 
an exercise. Pointing towards a ‘mere’ heuristic value, however, does not undermine the 
strength and depth of the discussion to follow since at the end we will show that a 
primordial notion of truth grounds or prefigures the different shades that cannot be 
elaborated upon here in all detail.  
The problem in dealing with matters of truth, however, remains to haunt even a 
heuristic map of differences unless we can find a way to depict the breadth of discussion 
without losing too much of its depth. The way that will be followed here takes its 
starting point from an influential and thoughtful discussion on matters of truth and 
concomitant problems sketched out by Bernard Williams. (1997) As Williams rightly 
observes the tension which will accompany most accounts of truth lies in the 
contradiction between truthfulness and truth. As he points out:  
“Two currents of ideas are very prominent in modern thought and culture. 
On the on hand, there is an intense commitment to truthfulness – or, at any 
rate, a pervasive suspiciousness, a readiness against being fooled, an 
eagerness to see through appearances to the real structures and motives that 
lie behind them. [...] Together with this demand for truthfulness, however, 
... there is an equally pervasive suspicion about truth: whether there is such 
a thing; if there is, whether it can be more than relative or subjective or 
something of that kind; altogether, whether we should bother about it, in 
carrying on our activities or in giving an account of them.” (Williams, 2004: 
1) 
 
Surely, these two tendencies in modern thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
In fact they can complement each other in cases where the denial of any meaningful 
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notion of truth is framed in the demand for truthfulness, i.e. to give up the notion of 
truth out of a desire to be ‘true’ to that fact that there is no truth. On other hand, the 
relation between truth and truthfulness in these cases gets complicated since any 
account on why it is meaningless to talk about ‘the truth’ or ‘Truth’ must rely upon a 
line of reasoning that itself implies a claim to truth. “The tension between truthfulness 
and the doubt that there is (really) any truth to be found comes out in a significant 
difficulty, that the attack on some specific form of truth ... itself depends on some 
claims or other which themselves have to be taken to be true.” (ibid.: 2) Besides the 
question arises that if we are truthful in a denial of Truth, i.e. “[i]f you do not really 
believe in the existence of truth, what is the passion for truthfulness a passion for? Or – 
as we might also put it – in pursuing truthfulness, what are you supposedly being true 
to?” (ibid.)  
It is one thing to claim that universal and necessary insights cannot be reached when 
looking at social and political dynamics but quite another to abandon the notion of truth 
altogether. If so-called post-positivist scholars rely in their research on specific 
philosophical insights or conceptualisations such as Wittgensteinian linguistics, the 
interesting question arises whether they hold what Wittgenstein says to be actually true. 
Or in more general terms, are the reasons given for an anti-foundationalist and ‘post-
positivist’ conceptualisation of the political and social world true; can they be true and 
what are they true to? If yes, then we would have to say a little bit more about the way 
in which they can be true and on which basis they can be seen as sincere examples of 
scholarship; what notion of truth do we actually encounter here? If not, then we 
certainly are in the odd situation to put forward reasons to proceed with our enquiries in 
a specific way but are unable to ‘authorise’ them in any meaningful sense. 
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The problem with the critique of any particular claim to truth in the interpretation of 
social circumstances lies simply with the fact that “it leaves the critics themselves with 
no authority, since they need to tell a tale (a lot of detailed tales, in fact) to justify that 
tale ... . They also need a tale to explain why they are in a position to tell it.” (ibid.: 8) 
Lastly, if a piece of research relies upon theoretical and methodological commitments 
that avoid the notion of truth, what does this piece of research represent? How are we 
supposed to deal with the claims, assumptions, reasons and insights provided in this 
example of scholarship? If we stringently deny the applicability of any notion of truth to 
this piece of work, are we supposed to see it merely as an opinion, almost a work of art? 
In such a conceptualisation we are not even able to determine the worth of different 
competing insights dealing with the same object; if there is no system of judgment in 
place every decision as to what piece of research represents a ‘clearer’ or ‘better’ 
account of the matter at hand is impossible or at least arbitrary (one could even go so far 
as to say that at the end of the day it is also impossible to determine what actually 
constitutes a piece of scholarship in general).  
 
We can already see here that the notion of truth is a problem not easily disposed of. In 
our pursuit of truthfulness – and arguably the academic endeavour is one in which 
truthful and sincere accounts should be reached – implies and relies on a notion of truth 
that cannot simply be shut out from our enquiries. As Williams rightly points out, for 
every position regarding the conception of the notion of truth “[w]e need to understand 
that there is indeed an essential role for the notion of truth in our understanding of 
language and of each other.” (ibid.: 6) In short, we can see that the mere abandonment 
of the notion of truth does not overcome problems we face in social research but rather 
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produces new problems on other levels. It is hereby important to note that although 
explicitly the notion of truth might not be discussed openly in a system of thought, we 
find assumptions that are taken to hold. To be sure, that does not automatically and 
necessarily include a commitment to a scientific notion of truth which would claim that 
what this kind of scholarship produces is in fact universally valid and necessarily the 
case. What it does entail, however, is the apparent conviction that these approaches are 
first of all valid ways to enquire into the matter at hand and secondly that they produce 
insights that can be framed as adding to our knowledge. The question then is what 
makes these insights ‘insightful’ if it is not the production of scientific truth. The 
argument followed in the subsequent chapters will be that the worth of this kind of 
scholarship lies with its production of a different and one might say more primordial 
form of ‘truth’ – truth that emerges out of the already described conceptualisation of 
human embeddedness in social and linguistic contexts. In line with the argument as it 
developed so far we will therefore immerse into another dimension of Dasein in order 
to discern the relation between being and truth. 
In light of this  the following sections aim to provide a new engagement with the notion 
of truth and a demonstration that first truth based on realist or idealist conceptions is a 
historically specific conceptualisation of truth and by no means timeless and binding. 
Secondly, by retrieving the plurality of meanings connected to the notion of truth the 
chapter progresses to a phenomenological enquiry into the notion of truth at the end of 
which a more primordial notion of truth as unhiddenness and appropriation will be 
presented. The answer that will be developed in the following sections as towards the 
meaning of truth is that truth describes the unhiddenness of beings in the deconcealment 
of being. Finally, the last section will show how such a notion of truth is compatible 
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with forms of historical and contextual knowledge and at the same time is also able to 
answer the paradoxical questions raised above. 
 
Truth as correctness and approximation – A derivative concept of truth  
 
The notion of truth as mentioned above is certainly one of the most central and most 
debated in past and present philosophical endeavours. We cannot aim at delivering a 
complete and exhaustive overview of all the different approaches to truth from the 
ancient world to the present nor is this necessary. For our purposes it seems sufficient to 
portray the main contemporary contenders and show their commonalities before moving 
on to a consideration of a different approach to tackle the question on the nature of truth 
which relies upon a strong notion of anti-foundationalism.  
In our depiction of the main approaches to truth that can be found in the modern period 
and that are linked back to earlier accounts in many ways we will draw attention to the 
correspondence theory of truth on the one hand and the coherence theory of truth on the 
other. The correspondence theory of truth can hereby be linked to a philosophical 
realism and the coherence theory of truth to philosophical idealism or at least to an anti-
realism. Or alternatively one could say that  
“[c]orrespondence and coherence, as theories of truth, both have their 
advantages. To the plain man and to the monistic philosopher each gives a 
comfort of peculiar warmth. To the one it is the comfortable assurance that 
as a man grows older he gets into his head the ‘hang’ of the real world; that 
as he becomes possessed of more and more truths inside him, as it were, so 
is he increasingly master of the things outside him. […] The monistic 
philosopher’s joy, some would say, is of a nobler sort, akin, perhaps, to the 
joy of the mystic. To him nothing is perfect save the All; not truth is true 
unless it becomes Truth; and this Truth again is something which is thought, 
somehow, to transcend the truth which we usually think of as realised in 
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knowledge, to become Being, a self-subsistent self-consistent Experience.”  
(Reid, 1922: 18) 
 
And although these two conceptualisations offer completely different readings of the 
notion of truth, they nevertheless share certain commitments which are rooted in a 
deeply modern sentiment deriving from the original formulation of truth or to be more 
precise of what is true emerging with Descartes.  
In the following lines we will look at the differences and similarities between these two 
approaches to the notion of truth. Since our focus is guided by the endeavour to develop 
a phenomenological notion of truth the depiction of the correspondence and coherence 
theories of truth will only be taken as far as suffices for the current purpose.  
 
The correspondence theory of truth 
 
The first notion and concept of truth that will be presented here is the most common 
approach in the modern period especially throughout the 20th century – the 
correspondence theory of truth. Generally, the correspondence theory of truth can be 
conceptualised along the lines of common sense. The theory in its most simple and 
almost naïve form stipulates that truth describes and is characterised by a 
correspondence between an idea or state of mind and an object in the world or a fact. 
“According to the theory, a true proposition corresponds and agrees with, and a false 
proposition fails to correspond or disagrees with, its fact.” (Ratner, 1935: 142)  
As such the correspondence theory relies upon a form of philosophical realism since the 
comparison must take place with an idea or judgement uttered from a human agent and 
a mind-independent world or reality to which this thought corresponds. “Anyone who 
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asserts that a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts commits himself 
to a form of realism, or at least to a denial of idealism. But this form of realism is 
minimal in the sense that it is merely a necessary condition of a statement’s 
correspondence to fact that there should be an independent world.” (Hamlyn, 1962: 
204) 
The correspondence theory of truth is accordingly in line with the continuing search for 
indubitable instances of knowledge and truth on which subsequent claims can be based. 
In this sense the correspondence theory presupposes two main points. “The first is, that 
in ‘truth’ there is always a duality involved; on the one hand ‘ideas,’ and on the other a 
reality which is existentially different from the ideas, and known only through them as 
medium. And in the second place, it holds that if we are to know the nature of this 
reality ‘truly,’ it must in so far correspond to our ideas of it.“ (Rogers, 1919: 67) 
Correspondence is established through a process of combination and separation at the 
end of which the status of the relation between idea and object is either confirmed or 
denied. “Because philosophers have often been interested in the search for certainty, the 
Correspondence Theory of Truth has often been fitted to the task of providing a means 
of finding out for certain whether a proposition is true – a test of truth. (Hamlyn, 1962: 
200) 
 
As such the origin of the correspondence theory of truth is by no means a modern 
development but can be traced back in its rudimentary form to Aristotle. In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle explains truth in the following way: “To say that what is the case 
is the case and what is not the case is not the case is truth, while to say that what is the 
case is not the case, or that what is not the case is the case, is falsehood.” (Aristotle, 
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1993: 123) In this simple form the correspondence theory of truth is understandably 
appealing. For simple statements, that is for statements that express a correspondence 
between a simple sense perception and an object perceived the theory seems undeniable.  
Throughout the history of philosophy this notion of truth as correspondence has been 
purported and defended by many seminal and influential thinkers. John Locke, for 
instance, in his Essay concerning Human Understanding follows a general trajectory of 
the correspondence theory. Truth and falsehood arise out of a specific process of 
understanding in which judgments are passed. These judgments refer either to 
corresponding notions in several minds if we talk about abstract concepts such as justice 
or to a corresponding notion between an idea and an object in the external world. It 
seems important to note that for Locke, ideas, complex or simple, can never be false. 
Ideas, in Locke’s sense, are only appearances and states of the mind which seen in 
themselves cannot be true or false. “For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances 
and perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be 
true or false, no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false.” 
(Locke, 1972: 326) Notions of truth and falsehood only arise for Locke at the moment 
the mind proceeds to pass judgments about the relation either between two ideas or an 
idea and an object. (ibid.) 
A similar attitude can be seen in certain quarters of early positivism and analytical 
philosophy. One of its leading thinkers, Bertrand Russell, also adhered to a 
correspondence notion of truth. In An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth Russell lists four 
different types of theory regarding the notion of truth the fourth one of which he 
identifies as correspondence. “IV. The correspondence theory of truth, according to 
which the truth of basic propositions depends upon their relation to some occurrence, 
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and the truth of other propositions depends upon their syntactical relations to basic 
propositions. For my part, I adhere firmly to this last theory.” (Russell, 1940: 289)  
 
There are, however, quite a few problems connected with these conceptualisations of 
what we take as being true. First comes obviously the problem of bridging the gap 
between a state of the mind and the external world. If we follow Descartes here for a 
moment, and a lot of connections have been made between Cartesian philosophy and 
the correspondence theory of truth, we encounter that Descartes had characterised two 
different types of ‘stuff’ (res). On the one hand we find the material world which 
Descartes described as res extensa on the other we have the mind which Descartes 
labelled res cogitans, the thinking thing. As we can already see these two types of 
things or ‘stuff’ are separated from one another in their elemental characteristics. “[I]f 
this is so then the two expressions of an Idea, the two wholes, the two systems, one 
‘mental’, one ‘real’, are, because different in ‘material’, incomparable to one another.” 
(Reid, 1922: 21)  
The question therefore remains how a correspondence between these completely 
different types of ‘stuff’ can successfully be established. And even if such a bridging is 
achieved in one way or another, the additional question on how to establish this 
connection as certain and indubitable, as required by the correspondence theory, is left 
open.  
 
Secondly, it has been pointed out that the correspondence theory in its traditional guise 
is open to charges of triviality and circularity. In respect to circularity the 
correspondence theory does not seem to get out of a mutual dependency in meaning of 
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facts and truth. If we, as the theory states, assume that truth is reached by comparing the 
facts we have with the reality, we face a conundrum. First we have to ask: “What 
function ... does the Correspondence Theory serve?” (Hamlyn, 1962: 198) So far we 
would say that the correspondence theory addresses the question ‘When is a proposition 
true?’ and the answer would be ‘If it correspondence to the facts’. But “[i]t is 
impossible, ..., to elucidate the nature of fact-stating discourse – what it is to state facts 
– without circularity. Facts are merely what true statements state and true statements 
state facts.” (ibid.) 
Out of this circularity which arises between the notion of true statements or propositions 
and facts or states of affairs arises the concomitant problem of triviality. If true 
statements state facts and facts are just what true statements state the correspondence 
theory turns out to be trivial in respect to the establishment of truth. “The dilemma we 
are involved in by the correspondence theory is inescapable. Before we have the fact, to 
compare the proposition with it is, of course, impossible. And to compare the 
proposition with the fact, after we have established the fact is trivial, as far as 
determining truth is concerned, because such comparison presupposes that we already 
possess the truth.” (Ratner, 1935: 145) 
 
There have been numerous responses and refinements to respond to these two general 
points and it is not necessary or fruitful to trace the different ways to respond to 
allegations of circularity or triviality at that point as it would lead us to far astray in our 
current endeavour. The one point of criticism, however, that is of interest to us is the as 
of yet unresolved challenge formulated by adherents of the coherence theory of truth.  
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As Harold Joachim, one of the foremost spokesmen of a coherence approach at the 
beginning of the 20th century pointed out, a correspondence exactly because it relies 
upon a notion of philosophical realism describes essentially a relation between an idea 
or proposition and an object. The comparison involved is therefore always directed 
towards something external. This relation, however, is never finally and satisfactorily 
developed and explicated. It rather seems that a correspondence theory of truth 
“involves external relations, both the relation of knowledge between mind and object, 
[...], and between terms in a judgment. The terms are simples, independent of their 
relations, the same before as after being related, and the relations are like links between 
carriages in a train” (Reid, 1922: 20)  Correspondence is thought in terms of indubitable 
certainty as it pertains to individual knowledge claims. What adherents to such an 
account overlook, however, is its embeddedness in a much larger context which 
provides the conditions that makes any notion of correspondence meaningful and 
comprehensible. The pre-eminence of affirming a certain, i.e. indubitable, knowledge 
and thereby building a secure base for relating to the world has led to an exclusive focus 
on the specificity of particular propositions and knowledge claims that either can be 
affirmed or denied. The wider context, however, on which the propositions qua 
propositions depend, remained outside the purview of correspondence accounts. It 
seems, however, that the mind that in Aristotle, Descartes and Locke “determines the 
relation constituting truth, is not simply an immediately focused discursive faculty that 
engages in processes of analysis and synthesis. Rather, the human mind brings to bear 
pregiven conceptual and perspectival configurations upon any apprehension of 
perceptual givens. These involve past experience and memory, including theoretical 
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training and methodological approaches derived from particular points of departure and 
intended goals or ends.” (DiCenso, 1990: 13) 
It seems therefore important to include the contextual conditions out of which the 
possibility for a correspondence theory arises in the very act of establishing any notion 
of truth. Reality and its interpretation is not just objectively given but always 
historically conditioned. Questions dealing with such fundamental notions as what 
counts as a judgment, what kind of knowledge is obtainable and worth pursuing and by 
what means necessarily penetrates the individual assessment of knowledge claims as 
towards their truth or falsity. A proposition alone can never be meaningfully understood 
or even labelled true or false without considering the historical conditionalities which 
determine the very notions of truth and falsity. “The nature of an experience of 
correspondence, therefore, will be determined by the context within which the elements 
of the correspondence are being approached and apprehended. [...] No correspondence 
can occur without the operation of some prior conceptual frame of reference that 
provides the standard of measure that makes specific judgments possible.” (ibid.: 14) 
Such a line of reasoning of course leads to a shift in focus when it comes to the 
determination of truth. Truth in a meaningful and encompassing sense can under these 
considerations not lie with individual propositions but must be allocated to the level of 
the system of thought which holds the framework of the conditionality of truth in place. 
“[T]ruth depends primarily on something other than correspondence – on something 
which itself conditions the being and the nature of correspondence.” (Joachim, 1906: 
17) 
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The coherence theory of truth   
 
The main rival to the just portrayed correspondence theory of truth has commonly 
become known as the coherence theory of truth. Generally put the coherence theory of 
truth “claims that the truth of a statement consists in its coherence with a system of 
statements.” (Dauer, 1974: 791) In the same way as the correspondence theory, the 
coherence theory is not a recent conceptualisation but developed over a much longer 
time span and is inspired by the thought of such eminent philosophers as Spinoza and 
Hegel.  
The point of departure in most accounts of the coherence theory is a critique of the 
correspondence notion of truth. The primary target is the above shown preoccupation of 
the correspondence theory with establishing truth in respect to specific knowledge 
claims and propositions. As was argued, correspondence approaches to truth commonly 
neglect to appreciate the wider context out of which the conditions for truth-judgments 
arise. Different systems of knowledge will lead to different propositions and different 
truth conditions. “A truth that is determined within a context of value-free scientific 
inquiry may appear quite different within the context of an ethical inquiry, and so on.” 
(DiCenso, 1990: 14) 
Followers of the coherence theory question the dualism inherent in correspondence 
account by stipulating that the independence of mind and nature cannot just be assumed. 
In this respect it is fair to say that followers of a coherence account, although they might 
not necessarily be idealist in outlook, are at least anti-realists. As Joachim put it: “But 
this severance of the experienced  Real from the experiencing of it, is the very mistake 
...; whilst, if truth be thus located in a sphere of being apart from mind, it is difficult to 
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see how science can in any sense be true. […] Science would be ‘true’, so far as its 
system of demonstrations reconstructs – i.e. repeats or corresponds to – the systematic 
coherence which is the truth as a character of the Real.” (Joachim, 1906: 69) 
Instead of a separation of mind and nature the coherence theory posits a systemic 
approach in which the notion of truth is defined by the degree to which a proposition 
fits with other propositions about nature in a given system. “Truth in its essential nature 
is that systemic coherence which is the character of a significant whole. A ‘significant 
whole’ is an organised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled.” (ibid.: 
76) 
Such an approach leads to different levels of truth. A single judgment or proposition is 
never true in itself but always embedded in a larger truth. The coherence theory is 
therefore characterised by “the dependency of all truth-statements upon a process of 
systematic universalization, which incorporates them into an overriding conceptual 
framework and which provides the basis for the determination of truth.” (DiCenso, 
1990: 22) Truth proper is only the whole of the system, that which in Spinoza is the one 
substance he calls God or Nature and becomes the Absolute in Hegel.  
 
Spinoza’ approach to truth must be seen in light of his thought developed in the Ethics 
(2000) Here he delivered the first account of a purely rationalistic and mechanistic 
conceptualisation of philosophy by overcoming the so far dominant relation between a 
transcendent God and an immanent creation. God in Spinoza is necessarily synonymous 
with Nature. (Spinoza, 2000: 226) God as the only substance cannot create anything that 
is outside himself, therefore the only logical conclusion for Spinoza would be that God 
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actually is Nature – the creator and the creation cannot be distinguished or exist distinct 
from one another.  
Within this all-encompassing system, however, we can conceive truth and knowledge 
only as always already embedded in the system as a whole. Single propositions derive 
their truth and meaning only from the overarching whole in which they are embedded as 
moments. As such a truth of a proposition depends on the mode of enquiry from which 
it is derived. Spinoza distinguishes three degrees of truth dependent on three different 
kinds of knowledge which he calls imagination, reason and intuition. (Spinoza, 2000: 
148-9; Parkinson, 2000: 32-37) 
Spinoza’s conceptualisation of knowledge and the connection between particular 
knowledge claims and the whole system exemplifies the main arguments of a coherence 
theory of truth. As Joachim notes, “[n]ow the monistic system of Spinoza stands out in 
the history of philosophy as representing the kind of position which we have been trying 
to develop and maintain. […] For we shall be studying a philosophy in which the notion 
of coherence obtains definite form and systematic development… .” (Joachim, 1906: 
148) 
A further even more refined account that is often taken to exhibit the main strands of a 
coherence theory of truth is the philosophy of Hegel. Hegel developed an account of 
truth that is thoroughly reliant upon contextuality and the historical situatedness of 
knowledge and human existence. “Even the ordinary, the ‘impartial’ historiographer, 
who believes and professes that he maintains a simply receptive attitude […] brings his 
categories with him, and sees the phenomena presented to hid mental vision, 
exclusively through these media.” (Hegel, 2004: 11) Hegel postulates that the 
knowledge obtained, although bound to the categories out of which it arose, will to a 
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certain degree represent the world as such. “We may come to the world predisposed by 
our reason to see it in a certain way, but the structure of our rational concepts and 
categories is identical with, and thus discloses, the structure of the world itself, because 
we ourselves are born into and so share the character of the world we encounter.” 
(Houlgate, 1991: 8) 
The compatibility between history and truth in Hegel relies upon his stipulation that the 
historical particularities at large represent the movement of humanity towards self-
conscious freedom. What Hegel calls the Absolute, the identity of identity and non-
identity, is the principle that through self-alienation gradually discovers itself and 
becomes conscious of itself. This dialectic movement as a whole is what Hegel sees as 
Truth. As he famously stated: “The truth is the whole.” (Hegel, 2003: 11)  
Hegel is therefore, in the same way as Spinoza, not interested in particular claims to 
truth or would even maintain that such claims could possibly be true in a certain and 
indubitable sense. Absolute truth can only be located at the highest level of generality 
and from there any other notion of truth must be seen as deriving its legitimacy. A 
single proposition can never be true as it is historically contingent. “All finite truths are 
incorporated into a unifying teleological process that has as its goal Absolute Knowing. 
It is this terminus ad quem that provides the coherent structure through which 
particulars take on their truth.” (DiCenso, 1990: 20) 
As one can see, the coherence theory of truth has as much philosophical pedigree as the 
correspondence theory. But it has, equally, as many flaws. The most important in our 
case is the reliance on a systematic whole that is seen as synonymous with truth. As 
Joachim already realised, it has to be “admitted that conceptions derived from partial 
wholes cannot adequately express the whole; and that what we experience is in a sense 
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always a partial whole, or the whole from a finite and partial point of view. We cannot 
experience the whole completely and adequately, just in so far as we are not ourselves 
complete.” (Joachim, 1906: 81) The problem of truth is therefore just re-allocated to a 
higher level. It might be correct to state that a single proposition in its truth value is 
always related to a larger whole but that in consequence only leads to an infinite regress 
since “[i]n this manner the final criterion of truth is transferred form the certainty of the 
subjective intellect as such to an encompassing system of thought within which the 
individual intellect is but a moment or aspect.” (DiCenso, 1990: 22)  
The problem that adherents of the coherence theory face is that on the one hand such a 
system in its reach and character is infinite but on the other is developed and described 
by a finite being. That is not a denial of the human capacity of transcendental thought 
but “that this transcendence cannot be such as to leave behind finitude altogether, which 
is precisely what speculation must accomplish if it is to develop a complete and 
coherent system.” (ibid.: 24) 
 
Both approaches to truth rely upon a foundationalism either in the form of mind-
independent facts and their simple accessibility or a natural or transcendental systemic 
whole. “Coherence theories fall into the same difficulties as correspondence theories in 
this respect. That is, they look toward some given basis for the determination of truth.” 
(ibid.: 25) A further difficulty we encounter in both accounts is their lack of 
accommodating active human developments. Exactly because they rely upon given 
foundations human existence is very much constrained either through a specific 
conception of the human mind or by an overarching metaphysical system according to 
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which everything unfolds. “In each case there remains little possibility of approaching 
truth in terms of the active and engaged processes of human existence.” (ibid.: 26) 
 
In the remainder of this chapter we will addressed whether it is possible to find a notion 
of truth that does not rely upon a strict and a priori given foundation and thereby avoids 
the pre-structuring of human experiences whether individually or for humankind as a 
whole. The notion of truth looked for here will be thoroughly anti-foundational without, 
however, lapsing into a thin and common sensical notion of truth. Instead, starting from 
the elaborations on agency and language established so far we will show that a 
primordial notion of truth as disclosure emerges out of the fundamental ontological 
encounter of human agents with their world, leaving any secure and certain foundation 
behind and emphasising the historicality of human existence in all its complexity. To 
this conceptualisation of truth we now turn. 
 
Truth as unhiddenness of beings in deconcealment – the primordial concept of truth 
 
After having outlined the basic interpretations of truth in modernity either following a 
form of philosophical realism or philosophical anti-realism we can now proceed to the 
endeavour to develop a conceptualisation of truth which can accompany and 
meaningfully enrich critical thought. As we can see from the section heading truth will 
be presented not as correspondence or coherence but as the ‘unhiddenness of being in 
deconcealment’ (die Unverborgenheit des Seinenden in der Entbergung des Seins). 
(Heiddegger, 2002: 57) In order to develop this notion further we will consecutively 
draw on the thought of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. The 
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central notion that will surface time and again in the next sections is the interpretation of 
truth as disclosure. This interpretation that relies upon the Heideggerian translation of 
the Greek term for truth – aletheia – presents truth as a process of unveiling a state of 
being.11 As will be substantiated in the next sections, truth in such an understanding 
must be seen as a process of appropriation rather than approximation in line with the 
literal meaning of the Greek notion of ‘a-letheia’ (un-covering or dis-closing). 
(Heidegger, 2002: 1-68) 
 
For Heidegger the question of truth arises at decisive points of rupture within the 
‘common sense’ framework of a system of thought. “Heidegger argues that we attain to 
truth after the possibilities of traditional thinking have been exhausted and we are 
brought to confront the source of our tradition in a dimension of human experience 
which precedes such thinking.” (Macomber, 1967: 9; see also Heidegger, 2007: 136-7) 
In our activities we are, as was pointed out in chapter III always already immersed in a 
world that we find structured in our original position of thrownness. (Heidegger, 1996: 
127; Schmitt, 2000: 216) The conceptualisation of thought is hereby mediated between 
past and future and represents a world which provides a framework that is beyond the 
individual human, a state of affairs that is captured in the notion of Dasein as being-
ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world. (Heidegger, 1996: 179) In order to 
conceptualise truth we therefore have to engage this moment of rupture and enquire into 
the conditions that made the traditional notion of truth possible. The point of departure 
                                                 
11 Heidegger develops this interpretation in a long and elaborate manner in his lecture course on the 
essence of truth by providing a new and insightful interpretation of the cave allegory in Plato. Again, we 
are not interested in the current study to what extent Heidegger’s take on Plato is philologically justified 
and sound. Instead the current chapter focuses on the paths towards a new conceptualisation of truth that 
have been opened by Heidegger and since then further developed in thinkers like Gadamer and Ricoeur. 
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has already been identified by saying that the manifestation of crisis takes place in the 
realm of human experience and the relation between Dasein and its world. In this sense 
the argument will proceed to show that truth is not primarily cognitive but has to be 
seen as an event out of which human agency arises and in which human existence 
consistently stands.  
 
 
Heidegger – Being and Truth  
 
In order to grasp this approach of truth and its concomitant problems in Western 
thought as Heidegger understands it, it is necessary to start the enquiry into the meaning 
of truth with quickly recapitulating Heidegger’s account of human Dasein and the way 
it relates to a world via experience. As has been argued above human agency is 
intrinsically engaged agency, agency that is situated in a context that is always already 
there. (Dallmayr, 1991: 27; Macomber, 1967: 58-9; Schmitt, 2000: 13-26) In any 
account of the notion of truth it is therefore necessary to enquire into the relation of 
Dasein to the world.  
Such an ontological approach to the meaning of truth must proceed by pointing to the 
uniqueness of human being (Dasein) and its relation to the world it finds itself in. As 
was argued above, theoretical and objective knowledge about the world, even if only the 
phenomenal world, was the aim and driving motivation in modern thought and as such 
in need of a foundation on which the epistemological quest could be rested. This kind of 
knowledge, however, already presupposes an encounter with the thing to be known in a 
given context. (Macomber, 1967: 93-4) If the thing we endeavour to know has not been 
encountered yet, we cannot attempt to know and understand it. This dimension is 
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certainly missing from recent conceptualisations of ontology as we could find them in 
the work of Wendt and Wight. Admittedly, they posit a relation towards ‘intransitive 
objects’ prior to any epistemological engagement but the way how human beings can 
relate to these objects prior to questions pertaining to knowledge remains obscure at 
best since their notion of knowledge is still very much in line with modern thought. 
What has to be accounted for, however, is the way human beings relate to objects and 
the way in which they encounter them.  Theoretical knowledge itself cannot be the 
original encounter exactly because it presupposes it. (Heidegger, 2002: 4; Schmitt, 
2000: 137-8; Macomber, 1967: 94-6; on the different meanings of the term knowledge 
see also Blattner, 2006: 84-5 and Dreyfus, 1991: 202-8) Heidegger describes the 
relation towards objects we encounter through the threefold structure of interpretation. 
We encounter an object never in a neutral, abstract of distanced way but relate to it 
intentionally and interpretively through Vorhabe (fore-having), Vorsicht (fore-sight), 
and Vorgriff (fore-conception).  (Heidegger, 1996: 140-1; Dreyfus, 1991: 198-9) Here 
we find again the crucial difference between a traditional conception of ontology and 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology (Fundamentalontologie). The argument here is not 
that the way we gain knowledge and approach the world in thought depends on the 
material circumstances we find ourselves in; it is not an argument that tries to establish 
the primacy of beings over thought as it is in Wendt and Wight.  Rather, the question 
here aims at delineating the mode of discovery, a primordial relation to the world that 
characterises human agency and constant involvement in the world; it is an argument 
that enquires into the nature of (human) being. 
Another problem with the relation between truth and knowledge that dominates the 
Western outlook relates to the fact that we have different kinds of knowledge. The 
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knowledge that we most cherish and that lay at the heart of epistemological endeavours 
in Western thought is closely tied to propositions and their structure. (Heidegger, 2002: 
2-3; Blattner, 2006: 84-5; Macomber, 1967: 28 and Dreyfus, 1991: 265) In this respect 
truth is established as soon as we present a proper proposition stating an objective fact. 
There are, however, forms of knowledge which cannot be put in propositional form. 
“The knowledge of the wise man is ineffable, and so is my knowledge of what a 
starched collar feels like on a hot summer day. […] There are various kinds of 
knowledge, of which only some – those roughly at the middle of a scale running from 
the lowliest to the most exalted – can adequately be expressed in propositions.” 
(Macomber, 1967: 27-8) The preoccupation with propositions in the quest for truth 
leaves us therefore in a position in which truth only represents a certain kind of human 
experience, namely experience or knowledge claims that can be put in propositional 
form and then verified. This, however, leaves out and completely ignores the realms of 
pre-propositional and post-propositional experience. Furthermore, it portrays a 
commitment to a designative conception of language in which a system of signs with 
fixed meanings must be presupposed to achieve the desired universal validity of the 
proposition under scrutiny.  
In respect to truth we find in our everyday life many instances in which the use is not 
propositional. Most often we encounter the argument that these notions and uses of the 
word ‘true’ have to be seen as derivative and metaphorical. (Heidegger, 2002: 3; 
Macomber, 1967:11) They reveal, however, yet again the problems with taking 
propositional truth as the original conception. 
“We call a man a ‘true friend’ or a ‘true leader’ because he measures up to 
our expectations of what a friend or leader ought to be. But the human 
mind in its judgment must also measure up to our expectations of it. We 
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may call a judgment true in the first instance because it reflects the facts 
accurately, but in the final analysis this is because, by doing so, it fulfils 
our notion of what a judgment ought to be. A judgment which is correct 
and accurate is the sort of judgment we value, and we value it because it is 
steadfast and dependable, like a true friend.” (ibid.: 12) 
 
Heidegger refuses the traditional split between propositional and metaphorical notions 
of truth and argues that both conceptions are valid in themselves (ibid.) Before truth can 
be obtained from and vested in knowledge propositions it seems necessary to enquire 
into the conditions out of which this conception of truth can arise. As we will see, truth 
in its ontological and primordial sense is not about approximation to certainty but 
appropriation to contextual situatedness. 
 
Having sketched out the problems and silent assumptions of traditional approaches to 
truth we can now move on to a phenomenological conception of truth that aims at 
showing the fundamental ontological premises that make modern notions of truth 
possible. As was outlined above the prime element in our enquiry into the meaning of 
truth lies with human experience and the way and mode things in the world are 
encountered before they can give rise to knowledge. The central element here is an 
appreciation of human being or Dasein since it occupies a unique position at the nexus 
of being in general and beings in particular. “However, only as long as Da-sein is, that 
is, as long as there is the ontic possibility of an understanding of being, ‘is there’ [gibt 
es] being. If Da-sein does not exist, then there ‘is’ not ‘independence’ either, nor ‘is’ 
there an ‘in itself’. Such matters are then neither comprehensible nor incomprehensible. 
Innerworldy beings can, too, neither be discovered , nor can they lie in concealment. 
Then it can neither be said that beings are, nor that they are not.” (Heidegger, 1996: 
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196) Dasein is the one form of being that is able to discover other beings in any 
meaningful sense. And as such Dasein must have an existential characteristic that 
enables it to be open for the discovery of other beings. This specific characteristic is 
captured in Heidegger’s notion of care or concern (Sorge) as a fundamental and 
existential relation of Dasein to its world. “As we have noted, being (not beings) is 
dependent upon care.” (ibid.; Demske, 1970: 21) In this way Dasein is the only form of 
being which is able to be concerned or care about other beings in a way animals or other 
things cannot. (Gadamer, 1979: 403) Other beings can certainly be related to one 
another in many ways but they can never encounter one another for two reasons. First, 
in order to discover beings and bring them into openness as Heidegger would phrase it, 
it is necessary that the discovering being is not just any being but that it is in its 
existential structure open towards other beings. (Macomber, 1976: 29; Heidegger, 1996: 
129) Secondly, and this is closely related to the first point, Dasein itself cannot be a 
determinate being, it cannot be described by the question of ‘what it is’. “What sort of 
being is this which essentially discovers, renders accessible, brings into immediate 
presence? It cannot have any determinate character of its own, because its being is to 
reveal other beings in their determinate character.” (Macomber, 1967: 18) The openness 
of Dasein consist therefore in its existential lack of an essential and definite what. (see 
also Dreyfus, 1991: 318 and Heidegger, 1996: 179) 
In an understanding in which the essential characteristic of Dasein lies in its capacity to 
open a clearing (Lichtung) in which it can discover and let beings be Dasein occupies a 
unique position. In this sense we encounter a claim that truth in its primordial and 
ontological understanding is not descriptive but revelatory as the process of discovery; 
the process of bringing beings into the openness and let them be what they are is the 
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necessary prerequisite of any correspondence notion of truth. “The being of the 
judgment is not essentially descriptive but revelatory. What verification proves is not 
the accuracy of description but the genuineness of revelation.” (Macomber, 1967: 17) 
We can see here an important consequence of the notion and conceptualisation of 
Dasein. As was already argued above, Dasein or human being is not a being, it is not 
synonymous with consciousness. “Discovery presupposes first a being which, itself 
essentially open, discovers other beings by drawing them into its openness. This being 
is Dasein. Heidegger does not equate the openness of Dasein, however, with 
consciousness, which he regards as a development within openness.” (ibid.: 29)  
The important insights for our quest for a meaning of the notion truth can be seen in the 
denial of a primacy of consciousness and the concomitant reliance upon theoretical 
knowledge as a way to truth. For Heidegger, as later for Gadamer, consciousness and 
knowledge can only be derivative, dependent on a more primordial conception of 
human existence in which Dasein encounters the object to be known prior to any 
conscious theoretical endeavour. The notion of encounter is central since the ability to 
encounter beings presupposes a specific form of being. As Heidegger explains: “A 
being can only touch an objectively present being within the world if it fundamentally 
has the kind of being of being-in – only if with its Da-sein something like world is 
already discovered in terms of which beings can reveal themselves through touch and 
thus become accessible in their objective presence. Two beings which are objectively 
present within the world and are, moreover, worldless in themselves, can never ‘touch’ 
each other, neither can ‘be’ ‘together with’ the other’.” (Heidegger, 1996: 52; 
Macomber, 1967: 29) 
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Before we can move on to an actual formulation of the primordial notion of truth it is 
necessary to develop the notion of care and the process of encountering objects in a 
world prior to consciousness a little bit further. First, it seems important to note that the 
notion ’object’ in this connection is somewhat misleading since the process of discovery 
does not yet lead to a subject-object divide, to a divide between mind and nature. 
“Being-in-the-world is not simply a relation of subject and object, but that which 
originally makes such a relation possible.” (Heidegger, 1997: 212) The main 
characteristic of care as an existential mode of encountering the world lies with the fact 
that this encounter is not driven by theoretical concerns but always already embedded in 
a specific project Dasein is involved in at the time. “We do not first encounter things 
and then see them in relation to some possible use. Usefulness is not a fortunate veneer 
of things which man is able to turn to his own purpose; it is only insofar as they are 
instrumental that things first manifest themselves at all.” (Macomber, 1967: 36) Beings 
never appear as a neutral ‘thing’ which we consciously and subsequently theoretically 
grasp but they serve in the instance of discovery as ends towards our projects. (Dreyfus, 
1991: 46-7; Macomber, 1967: 34) We can here see once more the clear distinction 
between an ontological approach pursued by scientific realists such as Wendt and Wight 
who try to grasp the entities in the international realm as objects manifested over and 
against a consciousness. This dichotomist view explicates the primacy of the theoretical 
over the practical which leads to the problems sketched out above. What we have to 
understand, with Heidegger, is that these objects are already encountered and assumed a 
meaning through this encounter. The encounter is hereby not one of theoretical grasp or 
conceptualisation – they only come second in the order of discovery. “Rather than first 
perceiving perspectives, then synthesising these perspectives into objects, and finally 
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assigning these objects a function of the basis of their physical properties, we ordinarily 
manipulate tools that already have a meaning in a world that is organized in terms of 
purposes. To see this, we must first overcome the traditional interpretation that theory is 
prior to practice.” (Dreyfus, 1991: 46-7; see also Heidegger, 1996: 62-3) Tools, and this 
encompasses observable as well as unobservable entities, are used and assume a role in 
relation to Dasein only through their function in the overall project we are involved in.  
“The phenomenological exhibition of the being of beings encountered 
nearest to us can be accomplished under the guidance of the everyday being-
in-the-world, which we also call association in the world with innerworldly 
beings. Associations are already dispersed in manifold ways of taking care 
of things. […] What shows itself in taking care of things in the surrounding 
world constitutes the pre-thematic being in the domain of our analysis. This 
being is not the object of a theoretical ‘world’-cognition; it is what is used, 
produced and so on.” (ibid.) 
 
This is why consciousness itself is only derivative. (Dreyfus, 1991: 71) At the moment 
of the primordial encounter there is not yet a clear distinction between subject and 
object but a fundamental ontological unity of Dasein and its world. (Heidegger, 1996: 
60) Heidegger clearly distinguishes between two relations of Dasein to objects – 
Zuhandensein (being at hand or readiness to hand) and Vorhandensein (being to hand or 
presence at hand). (Blattner, 2006: 52; Heidegger, 1996: 70-75)  “It is the peculiar 
characteristic of that which is immediately at hand to withdraw from its being at hand 
precisely in order to be properly at hand. It is for that reason that the being of the 
instrument is distorted if it is regarded as an object.” (Macomber, 1967: 39)  
Only in the latter sense, being to hand, is the instrument characterised as an object as we 
relate to it and deal with it as something that ruptures in one way or another the project 
we are involved in, it engages with us as distinct from Dasein. (Heidegger, 1996: 68) 
The rupture normally occurs if the instrument breaks down or does not fulfil the 
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function within the project we have expected it to fulfil. Heidegger identifies three 
different modes of breakdown or disturbance: conspicuousness, obstinacy and 
obtrusiveness. (Dreyfus, 1991: 70-1: Heidegger, 1996: 68-9) At that moment of rupture 
we are taken out of our primordial involvement and reflect upon the instrument as an 
object that in some way interferes with our present concerns. At that moment we start 
theoretical reflection, analysing what the instrument is supposed to do and finding out 
what is wrong with it and how to fix it. This is the starting point of consciousness and 
the ontic notion of the object of which we can acquire knowledge. As we can see this 
state is only derivative of the more primordial discovery and encounter with the 
instrument as instrument. “Dasein’s immediate concern is not with the instrument but 
with the work which it is meant to perform. It is the work and not the instrument which 
is immediately ‘at hand’.” (Macomber, 1967: 39) In a situation in which no rupture in 
the frame of reference occurs neither subjectivity nor objectivity would arise. 
The defining moment in Heidegger’s conception of truth is therefore the breakdown of 
the instrument out of which arises for the first time an awareness of the environment as 
consciously apart from Dasein. The instruments seem to ‘appear’ in front of the user 
because their breakdown interrupted the flow of Dasein’s project. This situation for 
Heidegger can be described as ‘disclosure’ since the instrument as long as it is drawn 
into a project vanishes as object from our awareness. Only the breakdown, the rupture 
of reference brings it again to our attention and discloses its being as object.  But the 
object in this rupture of reference is not the only thing that is disclosed. With it appears 
the whole world in which it is embedded and draws our attention to the wider 
environment in which we are embedded. “A broken instrument or deficient material not 
only reveals itself. For its instrumentality consist in its relation to other instruments, all 
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of which together go to make up the complex in which alone any instrument can 
function. The broken instrument thus reveals, in addition to itself, all the other 
instruments, which are now useless without it, and the structure of the complex of 
which they are part.” (ibid.: 44) Truth in its primordial sense consists for Heidegger in 
exactly this moment in which we are ripped out of our project and brought back into the 
present and the presence of objects. It becomes clear now, that any attempt to base truth 
exclusively on knowledge is misinformed since knowledge can only arise out of a more 
primordial state in which Dasein’s frame of reference is ruptured by a breakdown that 
brings its project to a hold. “Only when it thus confronts an impasse and is unable to 
proceed with its work is Dasein called back out of its preoccupations to an explicit 
awareness of the present. […] And now for the first time Dasein becomes explicitly 
aware of itself, being forced to confront itself in the question ‘What do I do know?’” 
(ibid.: 45) It is exactly this confrontation out of which the subject-object divide arises, 
disclosing the world as objective and external to the subject and therefore opening the 
possibility for (theoretical) knowledge. 
Dasein, however, never remains in the present in which it has been brought by the 
rupture of reference but almost immediately engages in other projects projected into the 
future. “Pure objective presence makes itself known in the useful thing only to 
withdraw again into the handiness of what is taken care of, that is, of what is being put 
back into repair.” (Heidegger, 1996: 68) The instruments and the structure in which they 
acquire meaning again vanishes from the consciousness of Dasein. Here we encounter 
Heidegger’s critique on the primacy of subjectivity and the misguided obsession of 
modern philosophy with the self. Descartes was wrong in first assuming the primacy of 
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consciousness and positing it as self-transparent, as objectifiable and standing over and 
against a world of constantly present things. (ibid.: 88-94)  
“The idea of constant objective presence not only motivates an extreme 
definition of the being of innerworldly beings and their identification with 
the world as such. At the same time it blocks the possibility of bringing to 
view attitudes of Da-sein in a way which is ontologically appropriate. But 
thus the road is completely blocked to seeing the founded character of all 
sensuous and intellective apprehension, and to understanding them as a 
possibility of being-in-the-world. But Descartes understands the being of 
‘Da-sein’, to whose basic constitution being-in-the –world belongs, in the 
same way as the being of res extensa, as substance.” (ibid.: 90-1) 
 
What we can see here are the deeper consequences of Heidegger’s claim that Dasein is 
characterised as being-in-the-world, i.e. a state of constant involvement. This 
involvement is embodied by the constant pursuit of projects or thrown-projections 
which equally constantly are ruptured due to the imperfections and limitations inherent 
in the instruments used. The impossibility of an objective and neutral stand towards the 
world arises out of the fact that such an endeavour is in itself a project guided by some 
motives and interests. In this sense everything Dasein engages in is a kaleidoscope of 
cascading projects each of which is connected to the others and engages in a constant 
oscillation between its pursuit and a breakdown of its instruments which again Dasein 
tries to understand and overcome through theoretical reflection, i.e. the establishment of 
knowledge. 
Instrumentality therefore posits one pole of human experience; it is the mode in which 
we primordially encounter the world. Only a breakdown in instrumentality can wield 
the emergence of truth in its ontological sense, a form of disclosure. There is, however, 
another pole which stands in opposite to instrumentality – art. Whereas instrumentality 
in its primordial form presents a complete concealment the work of art in its ideal form 
present the other extreme – a state of complete disclosure. For Heidegger, a work of art 
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succeeds in the same way in revealing truth as does a broken instrument. The work of 
art does not represent a tool or instrument, it is as such not drawn into any project but 
ruptures our existence by providing an unfamiliar context we have to deal with and 
therefore become fully conscious of this work. “For all their differences the broken 
instrument and the work of art both call us back from the future in to the present, 
manifest the material out of which they are made in a way that cannot be overlooked, 
and break through the familiar, self-evident context of our daily lives.” (Macomber, 
1967: 48) 
Subsequently, Heidegger opens a dialectic of Dasein between these two poles, pure 
instrumentality and pure beauty. (Heidegger, 2007f: 181) Whereas the one presents 
Dasein in the future, the other conceptualises it as resting completely in the present. 
Neither form can ever be reached in its ideal but human existence oscillates between 
instrumentality, i.e. our existential thrust of projecting ourselves into the future, and 
beauty, which makes us aware of the present and thereby discloses the world. In this 
way Heidegger develops an ontological notion of truth as disclosure through the 
rupture of time and the momentary return to the present which provides the primordial 
condition out which any subsequent epistemological notion of truth can arise. 
 
Heidegger, however, develops his notion not in contradistinction to a scientific 
rendering of truth but aims at explicating the derivative nature of any notion of truth that 
merely aims at certain knowledge. (Heidegger, 1996: 197) With the rise of subjectivity 
as the focus and origin of knowledge, the primordial notion of truth as a deconcealment 
of being becomes concealed. In the drive to ascertain the necessary and valid relation 
between mind and object or the coherence of different judgments within a metaphysical 
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or mechanistic frame of reference, “the epistemological impulse behind the traditional 
notion of truth is to take the object (thing or man) out of its existential/temporal context 
to render it a pure and shareable presence.” (Spanos, 1977: 428) Only by spatialising or 
detemporalising beings is it possible for a scientific conception of truth to arise. “In 
doing so Dasein as interpreter must transform his temporality into a series of ‘now 
points,’ … which suspends and thus ‘spatialises’ the temporal process. In this way, he 
achieves ‘objectivity’: a distance from the originally experienced object which allows 
him to become a privileged ‘observer’… .” (Spanos, 1977: 428) 
The drive towards such a concealment of the original notion of truth that reveals the 
characteristic notion of care as Dasein’s encounter with the world is by no means 
arbitrary but linked to three further central notions in Heidegger’s thought – Angst, 
nothingness and (in)authenticity. Dasein encounters the mood of Angst (anxiety) in the 
moment of truth, i.e. in the moment where its primordial involvement in a world is 
ruptured by a breakdown of an instrument central to its project. What Dasein encounters 
in this moment when a world is disclosed and Dasein reflects upon itself and on the 
objects around it is what Heidegger terms nothingness. (Heidegger, 2007a: 100-1) At 
the very moment when the instrument breaks down Dasein is not focussed on any 
object or project but experiences the finitude of its existence and its being-towards-
death. Angst is therefore not the same as fear since fear is always a fear of something 
whereas Angst describes an existential dread which reveals the finitude of human 
existence. (ibid.: 101; Polt, 1999: 76-7; Heidegger, 1996: 174) We have here therefore a 
multilayered account of the rupture of reference. On the one hand this rupture brings us 
into the presence of beings, opens up the space for a world in which subject and object 
arise. This is the initial and primordial notion of truth as disclosure. On the other hand 
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and on a different level, however, the moment of rupture is also the moment where 
Dasein, encountering its own primordial being, finds itself in the mood of Angst as it 
faces nothingness. (Macomber, 1967: 56) At this very moment we encounter the third 
Heideggerian term which will complete the account of truth we are looking for – 
authenticity. As was already discussed in chapter III, Dasein is not just a ‘being there‘ 
but also always a ‘being with’. We do not inhabit the world alone but are co-proprietors, 
our projects and those of other human beings intersect and as such our existence is one 
of communal experience (Mitda-sein). (Heidegger, 1996: 107, 112) 
This fact, however, gives necessarily rise to what Heidegger calls ‘das Man’ – the they. 
‘The they’ includes a levelling experience in which we enter into a mode of 
inauthenticity by following rules and norms that belong to everyone and no one in 
particular. “The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, not as a sum, 
prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.” (ibid.: 119) 
Inauthenticity becomes a mode of being in which we find ourselves most of the time. 
When, however, we encounter a breakdown of an instrument that ruptures our frame of 
reference we experience a true moment of authenticity. My instrument broke down 
hindering me from pursuing my project. What is experienced here is the moment in 
which the world is perceived from a thoroughly authentic perspective that is not tainted 
with what ‘they’ do or think. But this moment of authenticity comes for a price – the 
price of facing nothingness and Angst. (Macomber, 1967: 147) In this very moment my 
primordial condition as Dasein is exposed to me and by experiencing the finitude of my 
existence, I realise that the world is beyond my reach; it is infinitely bigger in scope 
than I am and any attempt to make it follow my commands and fit into my projects is 
doomed to failure. (ibid.: 46) Dasein, because it is always already placed in a world 
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which it finds and which transcends it, experiences the realisation of its finitude and 
being-lost on this world as Angst. “The ‘rupture of the referential totality’ discloses 
Dasein’s primordial situation … as one in which he finds himself in an alien and 
uncanny environment without reference points and boundaries. In this original realm, 
the fundamental mood of Dasein is dread, which, having temporality, has no thing or 
nothing as its object.” (Spanos, 1977: 424-5) 
As we can see now, this encounter with nothingness is a necessary condition for 
knowledge to arise but it is also a condition which Dasein tries to avoid and conceal. 
The modern quest for certainty in knowledge and subsequently for necessary and 
universally valid truth is exactly one strategy to avoid facing the temporality, historicity 
and finitude which primordially characterises Dasein. Dasein withdraws from the scene 
of rupture almost immediately and involves itself in another project. The return to this 
project is in most cases a return to inauthenticity. Angst vanishes and is replaced by its 
inauthentic counterpart – fear. Fear is inauthentic because it is not an existential mood 
in which we encounter nothingness but an ontic notion in which we transfer our 
primordial Angst in the face of nothingness to a fear of something. Fear is therefore 
always directed towards an object and the answer to an unbearable insight into human 
finitude. When encountering nothingness “men seek to ‘flee in the face of death’ and its 
ontological counterparts, time and nothingness, by ‘interpreting [these] publicly’: by 
transforming dread into fear or, since fear has its source not in no thing, but in some 
thing, by wilfully objectifying (finding objects for) dread.” (Spanos, 1977: 426) 
Having developed the argument thus far, we can finally summarise the main elements 
of Heidegger’s notion of truth. The enquiry into the meaning of truth started by looking 
at the two most prevalent notions of truth in past and contemporary scholarship namely 
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the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth. Both, as was 
shown, are preoccupied with truth as derived from knowledge either in the form of a 
correspondence between a mind and its object relying hereby on a notion of 
philosophical realism or on a general anti-realist outlook which sees truth arising out of 
a larger system of coherent propositions.  
The next step in the quest for the meaning of truth was an attempt to illuminate further 
whether these two notions of truth are primordial or derivative. Here, it was argued, we 
enter the realm of post-Husserlian phenomenology, especially through the work of 
Martin Heidegger. For any account of truth that relies upon the establishment of 
knowledge there must be a more primordial event which allows knowledge to arise. 
This is the case because knowledge about something already presupposes the presence 
of the object to be known. Knowledge, since it presupposes this presence cannot be the 
original encounter. Rather, as was argued above, the original encounter is to be 
understood in pre-theoretical terms allowing Dasein as being-in-the-world to draw in 
instruments in its pursuit of a project. This drawing in and using of instruments is not a 
reflective or even conscious endeavour but stems from Dasein’s existential 
characteristic of care. Dasein is always already involved in a world in which it lives and 
works. Dasein is furthermore also always beyond itself as it has the unique 
characteristic of projecting itself into the future and into possible modes of its being. 
Dasein is the being that allows other beings to show themselves as what they are. 
Therefore Dasein can itself not be a definite being characterised by a fixed essence but 
must provide what Heidegger calls a clearing or opening (Lichtung) in which it lets 
other beings be. In this vein, Dasein can only be described in respect to how it is but not 
as what it is. (Inwood, 1997: 23; Heidegger, 1996: 39-40) 
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This notion of care and Dasein’s constant involvement in projects which anticipate and 
constrain future modes of being makes possible the discovery of other beings as 
instruments. This discovery, however, is not a cognitive but a purely praxeological one 
in which the being encountered is manipulated into a specific usage that will further our 
project. Only when the instrument breaks down does any notion of subject and object 
arise. Only then does Dasein become aware of the world around it as different from it. 
The breakdown of the instrument is the defining moment for the primordial notion of 
truth since it discloses the primordial state of Dasein’s place in the world. Only out of 
this moment of reflection can any notion of subject and object arise which in turn 
provides the condition for epistemological and theoretical conceptualisations and 
derivative notions of truth. (Macomber, 1967: 44-46; Heidegger, 1996: 203) But this 
rupture has different layers of experience. We certainly find ourselves as grasping the 
totality of beings from a specific vantage point but we also find ourselves confronted 
with nothingness. Nothingness, the experience and confrontation of the radical limits 
and finitude of human existence, delivers us to the mood of Angst or anxiety. 
(Macomber, 1967: 108) This state, it is important to remember, cannot be reached or 
induced from inside Dasein’s own being but is an intrusion from the ‘outside’. We will 
have more to say about this ‘outside’ in the following chapter on freedom.  
Nevertheless, the truth event is characterised by the unhiddenness of objects or 
instruments and thereby opens a grasp of Dasein’s primordial relation to being. It is 
exactly this event which is described in Heidegger’s formula ‘Truth is the unhiddenness 
of beings in the deconcealment of being’. Truth is a disclosure that draws us near to the 
primordial state of being without ever being able to grasp it fully and exhaustively and it 
also deconceals other beings in the world as objects for the first time. This is the 
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phenomenological understanding of truth and the ontological precondition of any 
epistemologically grounded notion of truth. (Heidegger, 1996: 203; Polt, 1999: 83-4) 
 
Gadamer – History and Understanding 
 
Having outlined the general thrust of Heidegger’s argument regarding the notion and 
conceptualisation of truth in its ontological and primordial form we can now proceed to 
flesh out more clearly how this original quest for the meaning of truth has been received 
in the thought of other phenomenological scholars. Such a depiction will first broaden 
our understanding of the ontological notion of truth and also provide a different 
perspective which will help to assess the implications of such a conceptualisation of 
truth for the social sciences and IR in particular 
Although Gadamer relied heavily on the insights produced by Heidegger’s original 
enquiry (Grodin, 2003: 6-7; Dostal, 2002: 1-2)12, he was more concerned with the social 
dimension of human existence and its hermeneutical characteristics. (Scheibler, 2000: 
130) Concomitantly, Gadamer moved beyond a Heideggerian account and refocused the 
endeavour on the notions of history and understanding and their role in human existence 
and the attainability of truth in the social realm. Whereas Heidegger is originally 
occupied with a delineation of being-in-the-world and its relation to notions such as 
truth and freedom in abstract terms, Gadamer focuses his thought much more clearly on 
the historical and interpretive element of Dasein. (Grodin, 2003: 75-7; DiCenso, 1990: 
79-80; Warnke, 1987: 78) Therefore “the focus upon the terms Being and truth in 
Heidegger is shifted to history and understanding in Gadamer.” (DiCenso, 1990: 82) As 
                                                 
12 That is not to say that there are no differences between Heidegger and Gadamer. For a concise 
overview of the most important differences see for example Grondin, 2002: 49-50 and Lammi, 1991. 
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we will see in due course this shift is not as fundamental as it might seem at first glance. 
Principally Gadamer stays close to Heidegger but adds a new hermeneutical element to 
Heidegger’s thought.13
Understanding in Gadamer, and here he is clearly taking the cue from Heidegger, moves 
away from the narrow confines of epistemological certainty in search for validating 
truth claims. Understanding becomes rather a practically related activity that draws its 
insights from the Aristotelian conception of phronesis understood as practical wisdom. 
(Gadamer, 1979: 278-89; Weinsheimer, 1985: 73; Grodin, 2003: 7) Practical wisdom 
gives us the opportunity to apply knowledge of practical rather than theoretical value. It 
does not mean, however, in focussing on practical wisdom that Gadamer gives up truth. 
In the same way as he extends the notion of understanding beyond its scientific scope he 
also extends the notion of truth. As he explains in the opening chapter of Truth and 
Method, restricting truth to the results of scientific methodological research is a modern 
aberration that left the human sciences in general in a dilemma. (Risser, 1997: 151-7; 
Grodin, 2003: 22) Either they adopt the methodologically oriented research that proved 
so successful in the natural sciences to be able to claim truth for their findings or they 
abandon the notion of truth and aestheticise their work.  
If we now keep Gadamer’s claim in mind that truth does not have to be derived from 
scientific method that establishes ahistorical and decontextualised propositions which 
can be repeatedly tested and verified we can see the possibility to achieve and orient 
ourselves towards a more primordial kind of truth. This kind of truth is a truth about 
                                                 
13 This does not mean that Heidegger did not make use of the term ‘hermeneutics’ as is clear from his 
conceptualisation of the ‘hermeneutics of facticity’. What is does mean, however, is that Gadamer much 
more so than Heidegger emphasised and substantiated how such a hermeneutics is instantiated and has to 
be understood in the social context of human life. 
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human existence and interaction, it is necessarily situated within history and it assumes 
its importance through generating practical relevance for our current situation and in 
doing so reveals a facet of human life that provides insights into the contextuality of 
Dasein. 
 
To begin with, the title of Gadamer’s magnum opus Truth and Method seems to 
promise a straight forward conception of both. In fact, however, Gadamer neither 
develops a ‘theory of truth’ nor does he propose a specific method with which such 
truth could be obtained. (Gadamer 1979: xvi-i; Dostal, 2002: 2-3) In respect to truth, as 
we will see, he is and stays very close to the Heideggerian conception of disclosure and 
in respect to method he retains the general phenomenological characteristic of 
description.  
In developing his hermeneutical account Gadamer enters through the realm of art, a 
starting point that resulted from Heidegger’s characterisation of art as a truth event, as a 
disclosure of being through the rupture of reference achieved by our encounter with the 
work of art. (Macomber, 1967: 46-8) Such an encounter in respect to its effects is, as 
was indicated above, similar to the breakdown of an instrument and the subsequent 
rupture of reference. In this line Gadamer maintains that truth is in its primordial form 
not a cognitive process relying upon a scientific method but a disclosure of being 
exemplified by a fusion of horizons. (Di Censo, 1990: 101-2; Taylor, 2002: 134-5) The 
notion of horizon is central to Gadamer’s argument but not original to him. The term 
horizon surfaced in the wake of the historicist movement in Germany and was most 
important in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Horizon in Nietzsche was the given socio-cultural 
background that on the one hand allowed us to understand things and on the other 
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confronted us with the impossibility of obtaining objective knowledge as all knowledge 
arises out of a specific horizon of thought. (Weinsheimer, 1985: 39-40, 183; Gadamer, 
1979:  407) The horizon in Nietzsche, however, is something static that restricts our 
view of the world and can never be moved or shifted. In Gadamer, however, there is not 
only one horizon but a manifold of horizons. (Gadamer, 1979: 269, 272-3) These 
horizons, furthermore, are shifting and developing constantly. In Gadamer it is certainly 
the case that the horizons are an embodiment of tradition as their constitution is always 
historically situated. (Grondin, 2003b: 100-1) On the other hand the concept of 
understanding Gadamer is trying to bring in here relies upon the possibility to overcome 
and change a given horizon – not in the sense of leaving all horizons behind and 
achieving objective access to the things themselves; but in the sense that horizons can 
be fused. (Risser, 1997: 80-1; Gadamer, 1979: 273, 337; Grondin, 2003b: 96, 125) In 
this conceptualisation the event of truth is principally dialogical and consists in an 
encounter of horizons which in their fusion, i.e. in the process of understanding, reveal 
insights into human existence. (Weinsheimer, 1985: 183) These insights are identical in 
their character with the abovementioned disclosure as it does not provide a theoretical 
scientific grasp of a state of affairs about human existence but, as it ushers into the 
development of a new horizon discloses human situatedness and self-understanding 
contextually, i.e. praxeologically.  
 
Central to this notion of truth is of course Gadamer’s conception of experience. 
Experience as it is seen in the natural sciences points to something that is repeatable and 
can when rested upon correct empirical methods be confirmed independent of direct 
historical, political or social circumstances. Gadamer moves away from this notion of 
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experience and emphasises the difference developed by Husserl between scientific 
experience and historical experience. Again we find striking parallels to Heidegger’s 
thought. The conception of experience as arising out of a disposition of care which we 
found in Heidegger is taken up by Gadamer and situated within the historical horizon of 
understanding. Where Heidegger relies upon the tripartite fore-structure of 
understanding characterised by Vorgabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff, Gadamer posits the 
notion of pre-judice (Vorurteil –literally meaning pre-judgment). (Gadamer, 1979: 239-
40; Weinsheimer, 1985: 11, 167-8; Wachterhauser, 2002: 72) 
Similar to Heidegger, we find here a critique of the Enlightenment project and its 
reliance upon the power of reason to establish knowledge and certainty. The core 
conception of consciousness and its complete transparency allowed Descartes to state : I 
think therefore I am. Combined with his general task of establishing certain knowledge 
we witness here the modern intertwinement and primacy of subjectivity and 
epistemology. Against such a conception Gadamer reintroduces the notion of tradition 
whose abandonment in course of the Enlightenment he labels a “prejudice against 
prejudice.” (Gadamer, 1979: 240) Central is the insight, that consciousness, as was 
shown above, is merely derivative and not constitutive of human existence. Gadamer, in 
line with Heidegger, reversed the Cartesian dictum and maintains ‘I am therefore I 
think’.   
 
Because historical or social experience is primordially practical and can only be grasped 
theoretically in retrospect, Gadamer agrees with Heidegger that a scientific approach 
that aims at establishing certain knowledge about such experience always comes too 
late since what we try to grasp in knowledge has already been experienced and cannot 
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be re-enacted. (Palmer, 1969: 194-198; Risser, 1997: 83-5) Historical experience or 
learning experience both depict a negativity that is expressed in the overcoming of 
former views in light of new insights. This type of experience cannot be repeated and 
serves to negate our previous views. (Gadamer, 1979: 317; Grondin, 2002: 44) What is 
actually experienced is not something external to us but the contradiction between 
cognition and previous views on the matter at hand. (Taylor, 2002: 128) Experience 
proper therefore is the error or partiality of these previous views and we experience this 
in such a way that we are now too experienced or sophisticated to re-live the experience 
of believing in these errors. Gadamer calls this process a ‘reversal of consciousness’, 
thereby obviously borrowing a term that is central to Hegelian dialectics. (Gadamer, 
1979: 317) In the same way as Hegel stresses the abandonment of former truth when a 
new stage towards the Absolute is reached, Gadamer interprets dialectical experience as 
a way through which human agents correct their formerly held views on history. As 
Gadamer explains, “[u]nderstanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as 
participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present 
are constantly mediated.” (Gadamer, 1989: 290; see also Palmer, 1969:199-200) But 
there is more to this notion of understanding than mere practicality. Understanding for 
Gadamer always involves a dialogue between the respective parties. (Gadamer, 1979: 
330-3) It seems, however, important to point out that for Gadamer “[w]e can ... speak of 
a relative autonomy of dialogue with respect to its participants. If it is so, those who 
take part in a dialogue are not so much participants, as those in whom the dialogue 
participates.” (Grondin, 2003b: 127) This dialogue can either include two subjects or a 
text and a subject. Understanding therefore always means the attempt to reach an 
agreement through the medium of language. “Language is the middle ground in which 
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understanding and agreement concerning the object takes place between two people.” 
(Gadamer, 1979: 345-6) This emphasis on agreement is a clear critique of the classic 
positivist approach that locates the process of understanding in the consciousness of 
individuals. In much Enlightenment thought understanding does not refer to a dialogue 
but to an imposition of will onto the world. To understand is to dismantle and control, to 
master that which has to be understood in the vain attempt to gain absolute knowledge 
of and therefore absolute control over it. Gadamer, in order to defend the all-
encompassing historicality of all knowledge and the utterly dialogical nature of 
understanding criticised exactly the Cartesian notion of self-transparent consciousness 
by emphasising its impossibility. The sheer thought that consciousness could be purged 
from tradition and prejudice appears absurd to Gadamer since human existence, the 
Heideggerian being-in-the-world always already presupposes a situatedness we cannot 
leave. (Weinsheimer, 1985: 161-4; Gadamer, 1979: 405) The distinctive feature of 
Dasein, as developed above, is that in living human beings relate themselves 
interpretively to their lives, that they understand themselves in a continuous process of 
self-understanding, experience and re-interpretation. Here Gadamer maintains that we 
understand history not simply because we make it but also it has made us already.  
Gadamer, captures this particularity of human existence through the notion of 
‘historically effected consciousness’. (Weinsheimer, 1985: 205; Wachterhauser, 2002: 
65 Gadamer, 1979: 305-10) “The principle of effective history gives expression to the 
limiting forces that operate in any act of understanding. Gadamer historicizes the 
Heideggerian conception of foremeanings, arguing that such antecedent interpretive 
frameworks develop through historical existence. Effective history includes both the 
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creative production of cultural forms, such as texts, that shape the worlds we inhabit, 
and the history of the interpretation of these texts.” (DiCenso. 1990: 82-3) 
It describes the embeddedness of our understanding in a tradition that reaches infinitely 
into the past as well as the future and escapes our grasp in its entirety. As Gadamer 
observed:  
“In fact history does not belong to us; but we belong to it. Long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in 
which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-
awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of 
historical life. That is why the prejudices [pre-judgments (Vorurteil)] of the 
individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of 
his being.” (Gadamer, 1979: 245)  
 
In this sense that the experience of historical understanding cannot be reduced to a 
‘subject-object’ schema in which the knowing subject is seen to be standing and judging 
over against an ‘object,’ coldly and calculatingly distancing himself from the text under 
investigation.” (Chan, 1984: 423) 
The influence of the historically effected consciousness that expresses itself in tradition 
provides the link between Heidegger’s claim that being is essentially time and 
Gadamer’s focus on historicality and understanding. Tradition, i.e. the structure of pre-
judgments that inform our pre-theoretical relation to the world are not to be understood 
as ontological entities, i.e. beings. (Wachterhauser, 2002: 61-4; Palmer, 1969: 182-4) 
Rather tradition is pertaining to being itself. Tradition as well as the totality of 
historically effected consciousness can never be grasped or theorised like other 
ontological structures or beings. Tradition is but another term for the historicality of 
Dasein and therefore lacks necessarily any definite ‘what’. Tradition, or the historical 
existence of Dasein is itself a temporal phenomenon, instantiated in every act of 
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understanding in which Dasein relates to its world. Truth in such an understanding 
provides the Heideggerian Lichtung (clearing) through the dialectic of the fusion of 
horizions and the “art of saying”. (Thompson, 1981: 41; Risser, 1997: 156; Schweiker, 
1988: 26) Having outlined Gadamer’s position on truth arising out of a dialectic of 
thrown-projections we can move on to the third thinker that contributed to a 
phenomenological notion of truth – Paul Ricoeur. 
 
Ricoeur – Interpretation and Worlds of Meaning 
 
As was the case with Gadamer before we can not hope to explicate the whole scope of 
Ricoeur’s thought but will focus on two specific elements – his reconceptualisation of 
representation and reference – in order to show how his thought adds to the 
aforementioned efforts to conceptualise truth as a disclosure of worlds and thereby 
redirecting it towards and placing it in a new social ontology. Ricoeur was heavily 
influenced by the works of Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer and, especially in his later 
thought, reacted to and amended what he perceived to be shortcomings in their 
approach to hermeneutics. (Ihde, 1971: 6-7; Lowe, 1981: 384; Thompson, 1981: 36; for 
a concise overview on this see also Reagan and Stewart, 1978: 97-108) In respect to the 
role of texts and the hermeneutical nature of understanding Ricoeur was indeed very 
close to Gadamer’s conception but also moved beyond Gadamer in important aspects. 
The point of disagreement that seems most interesting to the project at hand is Ricoeur’s 
criticism of Gadamer’s dialogical model of hermeneutics. As was outlined above 
Gadamer saw the embeddedness of reader and text within a tradition as the central 
feature through which a hermeneutics of human understanding in history becomes 
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conceptualised. In this way Gadamer had already made a decisive step towards a 
historical appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy. (DiCenso, 1990: 121) The 
engagement with a text leads to a fusion of horizons in which a new understanding 
arises in which the contextuality of a wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (historically 
effected consciousness) assumes a central role. By accepting the ever-present force of 
history and the in inability of consciousness to leave its embeddedness in history, 
Gadamer adds a new and stronger hermeneutical dimension to Heidegger’s thought. 
(Grondin, 2003b: 75-7; Warnke, 1987: 78) 
The very situatedness of the interpreter within a web of normative and existential 
determinants allows only for an ontological relatedness between understanding and 
project/world. The main argument hereby was that truth for Gadamer is not missing 
from such a situated and ontological hermeneutics but rather embodied in the disclosure 
of a state of being that reveals, in light of the projects in which the understanding is 
achieved, central characteristics of the relatedness between Dasein and world. (Taylor, 
2002: 132-5; Grondin, 2003b: 147-8) Truth, and here Gadamer is clearly agreeing with 
Heidegger, is primordially ontologically disclosive and only derivatively 
epistemologically certain, even if Gadamer in response to Heidegger takes this notion 
further by arguing that “imaging of truth for Gadamer is not about how things come to 
show themselves as they do. It is not about the conditions for the rupturing of the folds 
of being (as Heidegger takes up this project). It is rather about the art of saying.” 
(Risser, 1997: 156) 
What Gadamer tries to overcome in his dialogical manner is exactly the alienation or 
distanciation between reader and text. The historical tradition framed in linguisticality 
always brings its immediate presence to the text through the interpretative engagement 
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of the reader. The text ceases thereby to be a historical remnant in which we have to 
recover the original intent and meaning and is transformed into an immediate medium 
in need of interpretation through the historically affected consciousness brought to bear 
upon it. “Ricoeur concurs with Gadamer’s arguments that interaction with textual 
embodiments of historically produced wisdom provides the dynamic basis for reflexive 
and disclosive forms of understanding. However, he argues that the functional mode of 
the process is ill-represented by a personification of the text as a conversation partner.” 
(ibid.: 114)  
In describing the process of interpretation as an immediate appropriation of a text 
through a subject embedded in and confined by a historically affected consciousness 
Gadamer opens the way towards the insight that such a notion of consciousness “no 
longer pertains to methodology, to historical inquiry, but rather to the reflective 
consciousness of this methodology. It is the consciousness of being exposed to history 
and to its action, in such a way that this action upon us cannot be objectified, because it 
is part of the historical phenomenon itself.” (Ricoeur, 1981: 61) 
The problem of such a conceptualisation of a hermeneutics of immediacy in which the 
text replaces an interlocutor became clear in the debate between Gadamer and 
Habermas in the early 1970s – the so called ideology-critique debate. (for a detailed and 
concise depiction of this debate see for instance Scheibler, 2000: 9-70 or Mendelson, 
1979: 44-73) The danger of Gadamerian hermeneutics and its conceptualisation around 
a dialogical model of interpretation could lead to the unquestioned acceptance of the 
authority of tradition. (Wachterhauser, 2002: 61; Weinsheimer, 1985: 170-1) Although 
certainly not intended by Gadamer such a conclusion becomes possible since both the 
text and the reader meet within the constraining framework of the historically effected 
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consciousness. Without tracing the debate about ideology critique it provides the 
starting point for Ricoeur’s attempt to widen Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutic 
disclosure and reintroduce the eliminated notion of distance.  
Ricoeur maintains that the presence of the text is only of a trivial kind. “While in a 
facile sense the text may be said to be present to the reader, the semantic disclosure of 
the text produces meaningful worlds that are not fully assimilable to existential and 
historical immediacy.” (DiCenso, 1990: 115) What has to be recognised beyond the 
constraints of the dialogical model provided by Gadamer is the all-pervasive presence 
of distanciation. Ricoeur points out that “in spite of the general opposition between 
belonging and alienating distanciation, the consciousness of effective history contains 
within itself an element of distance. The history of effects is precisely what occurs 
under the condition of historical distance. It is the nearness of the remote; or to say the 
same thing in other words, it is efficacy at a distance. There is thus a paradox of 
otherness, a tension between proximity and distance, which is essential to historical 
consciousness.” (Ricoeur, 1981: 61) 
Such an acceptance of the proximity of distance at the very heart of hermeneutics makes 
it possible to insist on the historically conditioned framework of interpretation and yet 
maintaining a critical edge to its practice.  It seems worth quoting Ricoeur here at length 
before moving to the ramifications of this reconceptualisation for the notion of truth. 
“The distanciation in which this hermeneutics tends to see a sort of 
ontological fall from grace appears as a positive component of being for the 
text; it characteristically belongs to interpretation, not as its contrary but as 
its condition. [...] Writing is not simply a matter of the material fixation of 
discourse; for fixation is the condition of a much more fundamental 
phenomenon, that of the autonomy of the text. [...] What the text signifies 
no longer coincides with what the author meant; verbal meaning and mental 
meaning have different destinies.” (ibid.: 91) 
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With this move away from the conceptualisation of the text as an immediate partner in 
conversation, as a ‘Thou’ so to say, Ricoeur leaves behind the last remnants of the 
notion of authorial intent, a conception of hermeneutics that Gadamer had already 
largely demolished in the wake of his universal hermeneutics of tradition. Accepting the 
inherent dialectic between the immediacy of the encounter and the historically implied 
occurrence of alienating distanciation mapped out by Ricoeur means that “the 
hermeneutical encounter with the text is not analogous with a personified  Thou but is 
rather a process in which the linguistic disclosure of the text opens worlds of meaning 
before the reader.” (DiCenso, 1990:115) Giving up on seeing the text as a ‘Thou’ with 
which to engage purely within the immediacy and contextuality of the encounter and 
making room once more for the distanciating element within any process of 
interpretation it becomes possible to shift the focus away from the reader who 
appropriates the text towards the world that is disclosed in front of the reader and 
thereby widening the scope of the hermeneutical encounter in transcending the 
immediate subjectivity of the reader. (on the centrality of such a distanciation see for 
instance Pellauer, 1979: 106-8; Ricoeur, 1974: 75, 80; Schwartz, 1983: 292) “The 
relation to the world of the text takes the place of the relation to the subjectivity of the 
author, and at the same time the problem of the subjectivity of the reader is displaced. 
To understand is not to project oneself into the text but to expose oneself to it; it is to 
receive a self enlarged by the appropriation of the proposed worlds which interpretation 
unfolds.” (Ricoeur, 1981: 94) In this sense then, “the text is not simply a medium of 
communication between two subjects or a substitute for the authorial partner in a 
conversation. Rather, the text is the source of a disclosive process that supersedes and 
transforms the subjectivity of both author and reader.” (DiCenso, 1990: 116) 
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In order to maintain such a focus on linguisticality as the disclosure of worlds Ricoeur 
develops a new conceptualisation of the core terms of representation and reference 
which leads to an understanding of truth that reiterates and at the same time widens the 
ontological notion of truth we have already found in Heidegger and Gadamer.  
 
In respect to the first term – representation or mimesis – Ricoeur is challenging the 
prevalent conception that restricts the notion of representation to a form of copying or 
mirroring an object or state of affairs. The framework in which such a function of 
representation becomes possible is still vested in the notion of Cartesian consciousness 
that tries to bridge the mental ‘inside’ with the worldly ‘outside’. As we have repeatedly 
shown, this dualism is endemic to the modern conception of subjectivity and still haunts 
many conceptualisations in IR and the social sciences in general. Predictably, 
representation in Ricoeur’s work does not rest upon the notion of a Cartesian cogito 
which assumes the passive characteristic of simply re-presenting what has been 
originally presented. (Schweiker, 1988: 27-8; Reagan, 1996: 75-6; Thompson, 1981: 
55) Rather, Ricoeur sees such a conception of representation as derivative of a much 
broader and more primordial relation between the cultural worlds out of which it arises 
and the reconfiguration of these worlds through processes of representation. In order to 
conceptualise this approach more clearly Ricoeur split the notion of representation into 
three different and yet interconnected spheres which he calls mimesis1, mimesis2 and 
mimesis3. (Ricoeur, 1984: 46; Schweiker, 1988: 28; Connerty, 1990: 392-3) 
Ricoeur’s aim is to determine the place of representation in the order of being. Whereas 
representation in its usual understanding is vested in the mind as a form of connecting to 
the outside world, it must in Ricoeur’s ontology be vested not in the mind, i.e. in 
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consciousness or in the world, i.e. nature but reside in the place that brings both of these 
into being. In other words for representation to assume a meaningful place in a 
fundamental ontology its relation to being-in-the-world must be illuminated and 
conceptualised. Ricoeur aims at exactly such a conceptualisation by widening the 
sphere of simple mirroring through the introduction of the determinants that guide and 
make such a mirroring possible in the way it occurs. The focus hereby lies with the 
notion of mimesis1 and mimesis3 which Ricoeur describes as “a reference back to the 
familiar pre-understanding we have of the order of action” (mimesis1) and “a new 
configuration  ... of the pre-understood order of action” (mimesis3). (Ricoeur, 1984: xi) 
Such a widening of scope provides the existential link between the process of 
representation and being-in-the-world by including “both the pregiven cultural worlds 
inhabited by human beings and activity transformative of these worlds.” (DiCenso, 
1990: 122) The link to the specific position of Dasein as the place where worlds are 
being disclosed is provided by the fact that “presentation per se refers to a being-in-the-
world that is culturally and linguistically formed and hence is itself mimetic.” (ibid.) 
With this conceptualisation Ricoeur is completely in agreement with Heidegger and 
Gadamer and their critique of the objectivising tendency of modern subjectivity and 
consciousness that underlines many enquiries into the social and political world. (ibid.: 
127; Ricoeur, 1971: xv; Klemm, 1983: 59-60; Thompson, 1981: 55; Reagan and 
Stewart, 1978: 104) Ricoeur shows that the “unreflective condition, the linguistic 
determinations of being-in-the-world, which are endemic to cultural worlds, are taken as 
value-neutral tools of operation, and their specific interpretive and mimetic nature is 
suppressed.” (DiCenso, 1990: 124)  
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This tripartite structure of representation is by no means a temporal or logical sequences 
leading from one stage to the other. In fact, the partition of representation into the three 
different spheres is more heuristic than anything else. “Behind Ricoeur’s formulations 
there lurks not teleology or chronology of beginning-middle-end that seeks to 
encapsulate the flux of experience into neat prefabricated structures.” (ibid.: 125) If one 
wants to conceptualise their relation it would be most appropriate to see them as 
involved in a ever-present circularity in which conditionality of experience flows in a 
multifaceted and self-referential, mimetic fashion.  
“Indeed the value of the differentiations involved in threefold mimesis is 
that it avoids the error of attributing the more deliberate, distilled, and 
highly-organized configurations of mimesis2 to the more contingent and 
open-ended narrativity of mimesis1. The inherent linguisticality and 
narrativity of temporal existence makes possible the emergence of narrative 
per se (mimesis2) [...] Moreover, it is the intrinsic narrativity of cultural 
existence that makes efficacious the critical reflection of forms of memesis2, 
back upon reality by means of mimesis3.” (ibid.) 
 
The second term which has to be reconceptualised in light of the insights produced in 
the thought of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur regards the notion of reference. In the 
light of the reconceptualised notion of representation “Ricoeur articulates the 
relationship between language and Being, and hence the critical and transformative 
dimensions of hermeneutics, by a reconstruction of the notion of reference.” (ibid.: 126) 
Reference is hereby not linked to a simple correspondence between mind and world but 
describes the mutually constitutive relationship between being and language. (Klemm, 
1983: 85-90) As for Heidegger and Gadamer being and language are deeply intertwined 
and any separation between the two is an abstraction that can only obscure the 
connection between them. Any designative system of language, as shown above, posits 
the relationship as between a linguistic and non-linguistic realm. In fact, however, 
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linguisticality permeates through being and is essential for our understanding of Dasein. 
“Being as such cannot be dirempted and isolated from the disclosive capacity of 
language. Yet neither does the nature of being allow a total absorption into language.” 
(DiCenso, 1990: 126-7) We find here a correspondence to Wittgenstein and his 
contention that human existence cannot be understood outside the confines of language, 
i.e. that forms of life a necessarily linguistically determined but at the same time they 
cannot simply be reduced to language. This point is important to stress since it is a clear 
position that prevents any profane synonymy between being and language and a 
subsequent reductionism. Human relationality towards the worlds we inhabit is always 
mediated by linguistic practices carried out publicly; or, in other words, the only way to 
access ‘reality’ is through language (ibid.: 127), not in a manner of approximation and 
correctness but in a manner of appropriation and disclosure. In this sense Ricoeur points 
out that the notion of reference is a sign of the “self-transcendence of language.” 
(Ricoeur, 1979: 74) The ‘pointing-beyond-itself’ of language which is characteristic of 
an expressivist notion of language is hereby the hallmark of the renewed interest in the 
notion of reference. “The disclosive and creative nature of language does not derive 
from, or result in, an abolishing of the functions of reference. Rather, with the 
reformulation of mimesis and all that this implies, we are led to a complexification of 
our understanding of reference.” (DiCenso, 1990:126) In this sense Ricoeur sees the 
referential function of language as pointing to the world that is disclosed in front of the 
interpreter in any event of interpretation. (Klemm, 1983: 85-90) This ‘world’ does not 
exist beyond language and yet it is not reducible to mere fiction in a profane sense – it is 
not just made up and can individually be changed at will. Rather the disclosure inherent 
in any hermeneutical process is necessarily expressed in language and framed according 
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to the tradition or cultural world out of which it arises. It is not dependent on a single 
consciousness of author of reader but transcends in its linguisticality the subjectivity of 
both and critically discloses a world in front of them. “The meaning disclosed by the 
text transcends the subjects and challenges the interpretive frameworks of 
understanding derived from the manner in which reality (or, in Heidegger’s language, 
Being) is disclosed to the subject.” (DiCenso, 1990: 116) The cultural worlds that are 
disclosed in this process transcend the individuality and subjectivity of the interpreter 
engaged in the process of disclosing; in fact, it is already a subjectification, in a 
Cartesian sense, to say that the interpreter through his interpretation is disclosing these 
worlds. Rather, it would be more precise to say that the reader assumes more the role of 
a midwife which is necessary to bring about a world and let it be; the interpreter is so to 
say characterised by the paradoxical state of self-transcendent consciousness rather than 
self-transparent consciousness. (Klemm, 1983: 87) The world disclosed would not be 
without him and yet it is not him in his individuality who lets them be. The worlds 
antecede the interpreter, not logical or spatially but temporally. They do not exist in an 
outside but are instantiated in time through exactly the dialectic between the immediacy 
of interpretation and the alienating distanciation of hermeneutical historicity. “Ricoeur 
describes the critical relation between linguistic disclosure (mimesis2) and cultural 
reality (mimesis1) as a referential operation. He maintains that it is the referential 
function that allows language in general and hermeneutics in particular to operate 
critically in relation to cultural worlds.” (DiCenso, 1990: 128) This becomes only 
possible through an understanding of language that links being and linguisticality on the 
most basic and existential level. Language becomes in fact inseparable from any 
instance of being. “Here it becomes clear that Ricoeur, in agreement with such diverse 
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figures as Wittgenstein and Foucault, understands the reality of language to be 
inseparable from its instances of use. Linguistic meaning cannot be determined in any 
full and final sense apart from its operations within specific contexts.” (ibid.: 129)  
It is more than evident from this formulation that language must not be seen as aloof 
from human existence but exhibits an existential category of it. Truth must therefore 
also be found within the historical conditions of human existence as the place in which 
meaning is publically mediated. Every human being is situated within a wider web of 
linguistic and social practices that transcend his horizon and make it impossible to 
inquire into these states of affairs in an objective and abstract manner. (Ricoeur, 2007: 
28-31) Or to put it in Ricoeur’s language: [T]he infinite or the transcendent does indeed 
contribute to the constitution … of our being-in-the-world. […] But the role of that 
infinite is properly exhausted in the task of constituting, and thus it is never possible for 
us to encounter the presence of the infinite directly.” (Lowe, 1981: 399)  
Through his extensive elaboration on the notions of mimesis and reference which here 
could only be presented in their main outlines, Ricoeur pushes Heidegger’s and 
Gadamer’s notion of truth as disclosure further. He picks up Heidegger’s notion of 
openness and at the same time moves beyond it. “[T]ruth is not merely a term or an 
horizon but a milieu such as the atmosphere or light, the latter being an expression 
common to Gabriel Marcel and Martin Heidegger. [...] The metaphor … of truth as 
milieu or light, leads us to theme which we earlier encountered: that of being as 
‘openness.’“ (Ricoeur, 2007: 54) It thereby reveals the underlying interconnectedness 
between objectified and spatialised notions of truth which can be found in coherence as 
well as correspondence theories of truth and the more primordial notion of truth as the 
linguistic disclosure of worlds which make them possible. “Truth verification simply 
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confirms ontic experiences within the frameworks governing the appearances of things. 
The dynamic and disclosive approach to truth developed by Heidegger, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur displaces the closure of interpretive frames and opens our understanding to 
repressed and unthought dimensions of existence.” (DiCenso, 1990: 143) 
The last step that is left in this enquiry into the notion of truth is the assessment of how 
far such a primordial, ontological notion of truth is compatible and illuminating for a 
reconceptualisation of social ontology in IR. 
 
Truth and Dasein – Towards a phenomenological understanding of truth 
 
In this chapter we tried to trace the conditions of the possibility of coherence and 
correspondence theories of truth and also a way to conceptualise truth within an anti-
foundationalist ontology. This path was constructed along the lines of Heidegger, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur who struggled with the notion of truth and tried to establish an 
ontological form of disclosure that is appropriate to the denial of the primacy of 
Cartesian consciousness and everything that follows from it.  
It seems first important to realise that an engagement with the notion of truth is possible 
beyond the smoke of the ‘foundationalist’ vs ‘relativist’ battlefield. If we return to the 
initial starting point of this thesis and the depiction of recent attempts to rephrase and 
revive the notion and importance of ontology for the study of the international realm we 
can see that there is more than a simple commitment to ‘epistemological relativism’ 
necessary to engage in a meaningful discussion about truth and ontological primacy. 
The role of language, much neglected in recent literature on ontology in IR, is crucial 
and provides the key that opens a field much more complex than imagined in these 
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publications. It seems also possible now to reflect more closely and in a substantial 
fashion on the conditions under which verification and validation is placed in a 
framework that commits itself to an anti-foundationalist stand. It is not necessary to 
embrace epistemological or ontological foundationalism in order to achieve ‘truth’ 
especially because the truth derived from such commitments turned out to be 
conditioned by and dependent upon a more primordial form of existence. Truth does 
primordially not reside in the fixed notions of either ‘how to establish certain 
knowledge’ or ‘concentrating upon the ontological realism of intransitive objects’. 
Rather, truth arises out of a notion of Dasein that in its existential categories provides an 
iconoclastic wave in the wake of which the old notion with its fixation on beings is 
swept away. Truth exactly because it arises out of the ontological dialectic between 
Dasein and its world mediated through language is not longer characterised by a vain 
quest for certainty through correctness and approximation but rather finds its innermost 
nature in the appropriation and disclosure of worlds of meaning.  
Secondly, based on the arguments unfolded above it seems now possible to establish a 
reconceptualised notion of truth that shares a commitment to the historically situated 
and contextually contingent position of human-being-in-the-world without giving in to 
relativist and ‘everything-goes’ musings. Likewise we have seen that such a 
commitment does by no means imply the abandonment of either a meaningful notion of 
reality or the central terms of representation and reference. 
In detail we have shown that from the very beginning, the notion of truth as disclosure 
does not set out to compete or replace the prominent notions of truth in the form of 
correspondence or coherence. Heidegger, for instance, claims as central for his 
endeavours that “[a] notion of truth as correspondence overlooks – and even tends to 
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obscure – the original way in which Dasein relates to things.” (Macomber, 1967: 35) 
Rather, an ontological approach to truth which emphasis the necessity to elaborate on 
the initial discovery of instruments that subsequently can serve as objects of knowledge 
shows that such a notion is more interested in a different and more primordial type of 
truth. This is captured in the Heideggerian notion of aletheia in its original meaning as 
‘unhiddenness’. The focus here lies with the question of what characterises human 
existence and how it is possible to appropriate a description of it. In other words, truth 
as disclosure is never concerned with correctness or approximation to certainty but it is 
intrinsically revelatory of different aspects of Dasein as it relates to and finds itself in a 
world in which it is thrown and in which it struggles, lives and works. 
Based on this initial quest for the meaning of being found in Heideggerian thought and 
the subsequent elaboration of the nature of Dasein as the field in which beings can be 
and are disclosed as what they are we moved to the historical appropriation of this 
though through the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer, although very much 
indebted to Heidegger, moves the focus of his work towards the notion of history and 
the nature of understanding. He argues, as has been shown above that human agents in 
their attempt to understand the world are always already constrained (as well as 
enabled) by a historically effected consciousness that provides them with a pre-
understanding that they bring to every act of interpretation. In Gadamerian 
hermeneutics we do not find an attempt, as in earlier conceptions, to devise a method of 
interpretation that will lead to correct and accurate representation of the meaning of 
texts. Rather, hermeneutics for Gadamer is characterised by a dialectic which draws the 
text and the reader into a conversation and fuses their respective horizons in the process 
of interpretation.  
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Gadamer’s work focuses hereby on the inevitability of historical conditionalities which 
befall and emanate through all instances of interpretation. “Gadamer contributes to an 
approach to truth as disclosure by developing the hermeneutical and historical 
dimensions of understanding that are constitutive of the human experience of truth.” 
(DiCenso, 1990:113) What Gadamer is developing is a more primordial notion of 
understanding and truth, one that takes into account the involvement and practically 
oriented existence of Dasein. In this way Gadamer as well as Heidegger pave the way 
for a radical reorientation towards ontology.  
“After Dilthey the decisive step was not to perfect the epistemology of the 
human sciences but to question its fundamental postulate, namely that these 
sciences can compete with the sciences of nature by means of a 
methodology which would be their own. […] The presupposition of 
hermeneutics constructed as epistemology is precisely what Heidegger and 
Gadamer place in question. Their contribution … must be seen as an attempt 
to dig beneath the epistemological enterprise itself, in order to uncover its 
properly ontological conditions” (Ricoeur, 1981: 53)  
 
To be very clear about it, this reorientation towards ontology and away from the 
primacy of epistemology is by no means compatible or synonymous with the claims 
recently made by critical or scientific realists in IR theory. It is of a completely different 
and much more substantial kind since it does not simply switch from ‘how can we know 
the world’ to ‘what entities are there’. Rather, the driving question as Ricoeur so pithily 
observes is “what is the mode of being of that being who exists only in understanding” 
(ibid.: 54) – we see here a completely different and more primordial conception of what 
ontology entails.  
In a last step we have shown how the work of Paul Ricoeur adds further to our 
ontological conception of truth by retaining and elaborating on the critical element of 
such a hermeneutics which is someone obscured in Gadamer’s work. Central in 
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Ricoeur’s elaboration of Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics is the retrieval of the 
element of distanciation which Gadamer had bracketed in light of his focus on the 
immediacy of text and interpreter as partners in a dialogue. Starting from Gadamer’s 
work Ricoeur maintained that “in spite of the general opposition between belonging and 
alienating distanciation, the consciousness of effective history contains within itself an 
element of distance. The history of effects is precisely what occurs under the condition 
of historical distance.” (ibid.: 61) Drawing on Gadamer’s central notion of the fusion of 
horizons Ricoeur found “another index of the dialectic between participation and 
distanciation… . For according to Gadamer, if the finite condition of historical 
knowledge excludes any overview, any final synthesis in a Hegelian manner, 
nevertheless this finitude does not enclose me in one point of view. Wherever there is a 
situation, there is an horizon which can be contracted or enlarged.” (ibid.: 61-2)  
In order to substantiate these claims Ricoeur set out to reconceptualise and broaden the 
concepts of mimesis or representation and reference. Through this he was able to shift 
the focus away from a Gadamerian dialogue towards an unfolding of worlds in front of 
the text through the mediation of immediacy and distance. “This concept signifies that 
we live neither within closed horizons, nor within one unique horizon. Insofar as the 
fusion of horizons excludes the idea of a total and unique knowledge, this concept 
implies a tension between what is one’s own and what is alien, between the near and the 
far; and hence the play of difference is included in the process of convergence.” (ibid.: 
62) 
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Out of the combination of the reflections found in Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur it 
becomes possible to elaborate a substantive reconceptualisation of truth which neither 
succumbs to a mundane foundationalism nor ignores the deeper questions related to the 
notion of truth. Truth in an ontological sense is presented by the process of disclosure. 
“Insofar as the meaning of a text is rendered autonomous with respect to the subjective 
intention of its author, the essential question is not to recover, behind the text, the lost 
intention, but to unfold, in front of the text, the ‘world’ which it opens and discloses.” 
(DiCenso, 1990: 115) 
This disclosure is dependent on forms of being and is therefore never complete. As 
Heidegger never became tired to point out, any process of disclosure is at the same time 
a process of concealment. The inherent critique upon a self-transparent consciousness 
that dominated much of modern thought entails a rejection of the objective attitude in 
any attempt to understand the social and political world. “The approach to truth that has 
been traced from Heidegger through Ricoeur is hermeneutical, critical and disclosive. It 
is not predicated upon the immediate apprehension of unanalyzed ‘ordinary’ reality. 
Hermeneutics moves from the unreflexive ontic and apophantic to the level of disclosed 
frameworks of interpretation that condition any experience of immediacy as this or 
that.” (DiCenso, 1990: 143) 
In this respect it seems more important than ever not to simply abandon the notion of 
truth in our enquiries into the social and political worlds we encounter and constitute. 
Rather, it is necessary to lay claim to the more basic and fundamental notion of truth as 
disclosure in order to account for a different ways to approach phenomena in the 
international realm. What critical scholarship provides is a disclosive endeavour in 
which worlds of meaning unfold in front of its audience. These insights and disclosures 
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are not neutral or objective, they are not aiming at establishing transferable and 
theoretical knowledge but they lead us deeper into the nature of the social which is 
existentially praxeological. Dasein is the plane on which the entities we encounter are 
disclosed as what they are in light of the dialectic between immediacy and distance 
brought upon them in the act of interpretation. We have now reached again the point in 
which early arguments such Winch’s demand to enquire into the relation between 
reality and thought and subsequently into the intelligibility of reality find their 
consummation in the linguistically constituted disclosure of worlds which transcend the 
individual and pertain to human being or Dasein as such. “The quest for truth, on this 
level, leads us to rethink the interpretive patterns that govern our existential activity. It 
carries us beyond the false immediacy of the subjective appropriation of objects to the 
processes that are constitutive of subjectivity.” (ibid.) 
 
The notion of truth as the unhiddenness of beings in the deconcealment of being unfolds 
its whole momentousness through the notion of disclosure. Truth assumes thereby a 
central part in any attempt to fundamentally reconsider the ontological premises out of 
which social research arises. The new social ontology which we set out the sketch in the 
present thesis has gained another element that neatly fits into the reconceptualisations of 
agency and language provided above. The one element left that seems necessary to 
explore for an initial sketch of this new social ontology concerns the central role of 
human freedom. Freedom in its nature is again a very much debated concept in 
philosophy and the social sciences. As will be shown in the next chapter it has to be 
appropriated and reconceptualised in light of the fundamental insights produced so far. 
To this task we will now turn. 
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VI Freedom – The Possibility that we are 
 
 
Freedom is not a particular thing among others, not  
lined up as a part of a row, but rather it prescribes and permeates 
the totality of beings as a whole. If we are to investigate freedom  
as the ground of possibility of human being then its  
essence is more primordial than man. Man is only a guardian of  
freedom, … human freedom signifies now no longer:  
freedom as a property of man, but the reverse: man as a  
possibility of freedom. Human freedom is the freedom 
which invades and sustains man, thereby rendering man possible. 
 
Martin Heidegger 
 
 
The last chapter which will complete the preliminary sketch of a new social ontology 
undertaken in this thesis is concerned with the character and role of freedom in human 
existence in general and in the political and social realm in particular. The role of 
freedom in human life and existence was and still is one of the most puzzling and 
widely debated issues in different fields in the humanities. At the heart of these 
controversies lies the paradoxical insight that freedom can neither be affirmed to exist in 
any absolute sense not can it be denied to exist in any absolute sense. Total human 
freedom is impossible since the limitations (both physically and mentally) which 
humans face in their mode of existence constrain their actions to a certain degree. On 
the other hand it seems equally obvious that human beings compared to most other 
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beings are not dependent on purely instinctual reactions or mechanical necessities in 
their environment. 
The question of freedom in our current endeavour seems necessary however in order to 
provide a space for praxeological concerns pertaining to the way human beings are 
enabled and constrained in respect to their actions. As we have seen with Wendt and 
Wight, both rely in their account of ontology on the famous dictum ‘ex nhilo nihil fit’ – 
nothing comes from nothing. It seems, however, that such a one-sided account which is 
left unsubstantiated in the work of both scholars, leaves us somewhat stranded in face of 
the antinomy of freedom so well described by Immanuel Kant. (Kant, 1998: 484-5) 
Although it is commonly accepted that ‘nothing comes from nothing’, i.e. every event is 
conditioned by a prior cause (and that is not necessarily restricted to efficient cause) the 
room for choice and freedom of action is severely jeopardised. Especially in respect to 
the normative dimension in which an account of freedom is relied upon in order to give 
a meaningful space to the notion of responsibility such a short-cut solution to the 
problem of freedom suffers not only from undetermination but also from 
underdetermination.  
The fact remains that aside from the commonly accepted sequential succession of 
events, human beings tend to subscribe to a notion of freedom that gives them breathing 
space in respect to their actions. How is this possible within or in relation to the notion 
that ‘nothing comes from nothing’? That is not to say that both positions are a priori 
irreconcilable but it demands at least a clarification of the extent to which human action 
is free and even more fundamental an exposition of what is meant by ‘freedom’.  
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In the history of philosophy we find numerous treatises dealing with the notion of 
freedom, much too numerous in fact to deal with all of them at this point. Important 
therefore will be the attempt to provide an answer to the dilemma of the coexistence of 
determinacy and indeterminacy of human action. In order to provide such an answer it 
seems first of all possible to restrict our inquiry to the way freedom manifests itself 
ontologically and phenomenologically. That means that the many different forms of 
freedom such as political freedom, moral freedom, metaphysical freedom will be 
illuminated only in so far as they presuppose the concept of freedom which they all 
embody. Secondly it seems necessary to proceed in three steps in order to elaborate on 
this concept of freedom as towards its scope and meaning. First we would have to gain 
more clarity about the notion of freedom we are dealing with. As will be demonstrated 
freedom can be conceptualized in many different ways – metaphysical, cosmological, 
practical, negative, positive and so on. Before we therefore can actually start with 
developing an account of freedom it is unavoidable to shed more light on the different 
angles used to engage with the question of freedom. Secondly, based on these different 
conceptualizations, we would have to sketch out the relation of freedom to human 
existence and conceptualise the dialectic in light of the themes of agency, language and 
truth we have already dealt with. Finally, we would have to provide a link to matters 
concerning research into the social and political processes to be found in the 
international scene. 
Approaches to the problem of freedom 
 
As was already indicated above, the entry points to discussions on the notion of freedom 
are numerous depending of the specific area of enquiry. One can debate about the nature 
F r e e d o m   P a g e  | 259 
 
and scope of political freedom in the form of self-legislation or self-determination, one 
can focus on matters of moral freedom and subsequent questions of responsibility or 
one can focus on metaphysical freedom and its relation to systems of realism or 
idealism. Equally, one can find innumerable philosophical accounts with which to start. 
In the modern period alone path-breaking accounts of freedom were delivered by 
thinkers as diverse as Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Schelling, 
Hegel, Kierkegaard, just to name the most prominent. So the first problem before one 
can actually immerse into any substantial discussion on freedom is the determination of 
the starting point in terms of the kind of freedom to be addressed and the philosophical 
perspective from which it should be addressed. 
In respect to the first point, the kind of freedom under consideration, it seems necessary 
to chose, if possible, the broadest or most basic conception of freedom. This is the case 
since we are concerned with a conception of freedom that pertains to the same level of 
generality as the other themes presented here. In pursuit of a new social ontology the 
focus can initially not lie with any specific notion of freedom in an already 
compartmentalised field of study but only with the conditions that make such a 
compartmentalisation and subsequent narrower foci on particular kinds of freedom 
possible. We can therefore, at this point of our enquiry, leave aside any notion of 
freedom that deals only with an aspect of what it is to be human, such as political or 
moral freedom. Instead we will focus on the conditionality out of which freedom, if it is 
to assume any positive meaning at all, must be grasped and subsequently makes 
derivative and compartmentalised notions of freedom possible. The focus in the 
remainder of this chapter therefore lies with ontological freedom as the ground for the 
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possibility for different manifestations of immanent freedom in the various disciplines 
concerned with human action. 
In respect to the second point, the selection of the philosophical starting point seems 
more difficult to determine especially since the different philosophers in question come 
to completely different solutions in respect to the problem of freedom. The range of 
approaches reaches from a Spinozist determinism to a Leibnizian compatibilism to the 
Kantian positing of transcendental freedom and the subsequent critique in Schelling and 
Kierkegaard. (Kosch, 2006) The starting point for our short depiction of the treatment of 
freedom in modern philosophy will be provided by Kant’s thought in this matter. The 
reason for choosing Kant as the point of departure is mainly twofold. First, in almost all 
systems of freedom devised before the critical philosophy the solution to freedom was 
presented as a certain and systemic one. In Spinoza, for instance, freedom in any 
meaningful sense was denied through the subjugation of individuals to nature of which 
they only constitute moments that are necessarily regulated by natural (efficiently 
causal) laws.  
In Leibniz’ system freedom is not denied but presented in a compatibilist mode. 
(Adams, 1998: 51) Freedom here simply means ‘independent from external causes’. In 
this way the general notion of causality as necessitating a temporal sequence of cause 
and effect is brought in agreement with the notion of freedom. Kant righteously denied 
such a conception of freedom any meaning as moral responsibility cannot be allocated 
to individual action on the basis of internal and external causes since even internal 
causes derived from sensibility could not have led to a different form of action. (Kosch, 
2006: 25-6; Honderich, 1996: 855) Kant from the first critique onwards struggled with 
the notion of freedom and its relation to the realm of natural causality. The most famous 
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statement of this dilemma can be found in the third antinomy of reason to which we will 
turn in due course. Therefore, Kant provides the widest and most open consideration of 
freedom in its transcendental sense both in respect to the possibility of such a freedom 
and its conditioning relations to subordinate notions of freedom. We therefore enter into 
our discussion on freedom from the struggle that plagued Kantian philosophy to the end 
in order to find a possible point of overcoming (not solving) the Kantian predicament.  
The second reason why Kant’s philosophy and his thought on freedom seems to be of 
central importance is taken from the influence it expounded in subsequent models of 
thought. Almost the whole development of what nowadays is, rightly or wrongly, 
subsumed under the label of Continental philosophy can be read and interpreted as a 
reaction to Kant’s philosophy and its inherent shortcomings of which his unfinished 
treatment of freedom remains one. In this line we find a direct relation between Kantian 
thought on the matter of freedom and the various attempts to engage with the subject in 
the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and the more anti-Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. There we can already see proto-
Heideggerian tendencies in the late philosophy of Schelling which will provide the link 
to the main movement under consideration here – post-Husserlian phenomenology. And 
indeed if we look at the lecture series given by Heidegger himself on the issue of human 
freedom throughout the 1930s we find the most extensive and intensive treatment of 
Kantian philosophy in all of Heidegger’s work. (Heidegger, 2005) Kant therefore seems 
very well suited to outline the central dilemmas connected to matters of freedom on the 
one hand and via Schelling to provide a link to post-Husserlian phenomenology on the 
other. 
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Kant and the third antinomy 
 
The problem of freedom arises in Kant in wake of the opposition of theoretical and 
practical reason. “The issue of compatibility of freedom and theoretical objectivity 
arises in the way that it does for Kant because his case for the objectivity of theoretical 
claims relies in part on his view of causality – in particular, on the claim that the 
(phenomenal) universality of deterministic causation is a condition of the possibility of 
experience.” (Kosch, 2006: 15) For Kant the limits of theoretical reason and 
subsequently of what can be known result from his ontological and epistemological split 
into the realm of phenomena and the realm of noumena. (Scruton, 1997: 48-52; Kant, 
1998: 338-365) Accessible through experience is only the world of appearances or 
phenomena, not, however, the things as they are in themselves, the realm of noumena. 
Kant therefore must run into a problem resulting from his commitment to deterministic 
causality in the natural realm. If human beings are simply part of this natural realm and 
exist only in its confines Kant would have had to admit that freedom is a mere myth; in 
other words he would have ended up in a very similar place as Spinoza did. Kant, 
however, insisted that human beings are not simply natural machines but that their 
intrinsic capacity to reason will put them in contact with the noumenal realm of 
freedom. (Bowie, 1996: 106) Such a dualistic ontology of human existence – as 
standing in the phenomenal realm but being connected to the noumenal – left Kant with 
a dilemma in respect to freedom which he sketched out in its scope in the third 
antinomy of reason. On the one side of the antinomy Kant stipulates that “[c]ausality in 
accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the 
world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom 
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in order to explain them.” (Kant, 1998: 484) This is the thesis in defence of a substantial 
notion of freedom. On the other hand, however, stands the antithesis which assumes that 
“[t]here is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with 
laws of nature.” (ibid.: 485) This position obviously follows a strict deterministic 
attitude.  
Before we look closer towards the way Kant tried to deal with this antinomy and to 
which conclusions he came, it seems necessary to clarify the meaning of the term 
‘freedom’ Kant is using here. Throughout his writings Kant uses freedom in quite a few 
different meanings. “Kant employed the terms ‘freedom’ in a number of senses. [Four 
of them are]: transcendental, practical; comparative; and the freedom of rational self-
determination.” (Kosch, 2006: 17) The concept of freedom that raises the conundrum 
sketched out in the third antinomy is transcendental freedom. It “is the one that raises 
the problem of compatibility with determinism; Kant calls it ‘transcendental freedom’ 
or ‘absolute spontaneity’.” (ibid.; Allison, 1997: 42; Benson, 1987: 571) This kind of 
freedom necessarily has to escape the confines of natural causality and posits an 
uncaused cause that is able to start a sequence of events without being the consequence 
of any prior event. It thereby describes “a causality … through which something 
happens without its cause being further determined by another previous cause, i.e., an 
absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself a series of appearances that runs 
according to natural laws… .” (Kant, 1998: 484) 
We can see here again the clear location of such a freedom as being outside the realm of 
appearances which follow one another in a deterministic causal sequence. As such Kant 
recognised that transcendental freedom must lie outside the scope of possible 
experience and subsequently he held the view that this kind of freedom cannot be 
F r e e d o m   P a g e  | 264 
 
grasped theoretically, i.e. it cannot be known to exist. We can find this instance in other 
writings by Kant as well, most clearly, for instance, in his short pamphlet on perpetual 
peace. Here he states: 
“The guarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less than that great artist, 
nature (natura daedala rerum). In her mechanical course we see that her 
aim is to produce a harmony among men, against their will and indeed 
through their discord. As a necessity working according to laws we do not 
know, we call it destiny. But, considering its design in world history, we call 
it "providence," inasmuch as we discern in it the profound wisdom of a 
higher cause which predetermines the course of nature and directs it to the 
objective final end of the human race We do not observe or infer this 
providence in the cunning contrivances of nature, but, as in questions of the 
relation of the form of things to ends in general, we can and must supply it 
from our own minds in order to conceive of its possibility by analogy to 
actions of human art. The idea of the relationship and harmony between 
these actions and the end which reason directly assigns to us is transcendent 
from a theoretical point of view; from a practical standpoint, with respect, 
for example, to the ideal of perpetual peace, the concept is dogmatic and its 
reality is well established, and thus the mechanism of nature may be 
employed to that end.” (Kant, 2002: 443, my emphasis) 
 
Kant sees the concept of transcendental freedom as being outside the confines of any 
theoretical grasp and yet states that it is not only necessary but also ‘dogmatic’ and 
‘well established’ in practical terms, i.e. in terms pertaining to moral conduct. In fact, 
Kant’s main concern with the notion of transcendental freedom does not aim at 
delivering a notion of freedom concerned with the whole of human existence but one 
that is specifically concerned with moral action. For Kant, transcendental freedom in the 
above understanding is seen as the indispensable prerequisite for any moral law which 
might bind human agents and prescribe a duty to follow it derived for the demands of 
practical reason.  
“[T]he abolition of transcendental freedom would also simultaneously 
eliminate all practical freedom. For the latter presupposes that although 
something has not happened, it nevertheless ought to have happened, and its 
cause in appearance was thus was not so determining that there is not a 
causality in our power of choice such that, independently of those natural 
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causes and even opposed to their power and influence, it might produce 
something determined in the temporal order in accord with empirical laws, 
and hence begin a series of occurrences entirely from itself.” (Kant, 1998: 
534) 
 
 
Practical freedom and transcendental freedom, however, are not synonymous, since 
Kant leaves the possibility open to think about practical reason in itself as not 
necessarily being in contradiction to natural determinism. “[I]n both the practical and 
transcendental conceptions, freedom requires that reason have causal force in the 
determination of the will; but the transcendental sense adds a further requirement: that 
reason be an uncaused cause.” (Kosch, 2006: 19) Two elements within this conception 
of freedom seems central to our current endeavour. Firstly, and we will come back to 
this point in the next sections, freedom for Kant is inextricably linked with reason and 
reason itself resides as a faculty in the human mind. Secondly, if Kant posits 
transcendental freedom in the noumenal realm and stipulates that for freedom to be 
effective in starting an ‘uncaused’ sequence of events in the phenomenal realm, it is 
necessary to introduce a new conception of causality which Kant indeed does. On the 
one hand he maintains that natural causality indisputably rules the phenomenal realm 
but on the other hand he affirms a specific causality of freedom which makes it possible 
for reason to be an uncaused cause in the noumenal realm. (Benson, 1987: 571) 
Following these two conceptions of cause, Kant in fact deepens the rift characterising 
human existence by stipulating that human beings are part of the phenomenal and 
noumenal realm. At first sight he opens a possibility to combine the two forms of 
causality be locating them into different moments within the human agents. “The union 
of causality as freedom with causality as the mechanism of nature, the first being given 
through the moral law and the latter through natural law, and both as related to the same 
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subject, man, is impossible unless man is conceived by pure consciousness as a being in 
itself in relation to the former, but by empirical reason as appearance in relation to the 
latter. Otherwise the self-contradiction of reason with itself is unavoidable.” (Kant, 
1956: 6) And although this bifurcation solves the compatibility problem between natural 
determinism and transcendental freedom, it leaves the concept of human agency 
somewhat obscure. It is one thing to say that the two kinds of causality are situated in 
different ontological realms but it is quite another to conceptualise the convergence of 
these two realms in the human subject which supposedly takes part in them. Kant’s 
dichotomy “does not offer much in the way of guidance on the questions of how the two 
sorts of causality (natural and spontaneous) are supposed to fit together (and to be 
predicated of the same entity: the human agent in its phenomenal and noumenal 
aspects).” (Kosch, 2006: 29)  
Kant himself was aware of the negative effects of this split. To be sure, it was not a split 
that claimed the existence of two completely distinct entities in a sort of causal relation. 
Rather the split is a split in the human agent herself. It presents the human agents as 
being looked at in two different ways and these two different ways are governed by 
completely different laws. In this way “the self has to be seen, on the one hand, as an 
absolutely spontaneous noumenal entity and, on the other, as a mechanistically 
determined object of experience. [...] How can these two descriptions be descriptions of 
one and the same moral agent?” (ibid.: 37) Kant himself found two possible ways to 
synthesise these two concepts of reason which subsequently informed the development 
of German idealism and later anti-Enlightenment thought to a large degree. We will 
depict these solutions only briefly and only in respect to those aspects that seem 
relevant for our current enquiry. Needless to say, any attempt to conceptualise either 
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solution in its entirety would require a plunge into Kantian philosophy that would 
neither be possible nor very helpful in our quest for a phenomenological concept of 
freedom. 
The first solution can be seen as a shift in priorities in terms of the relation between 
theoretical and practical reason. Whereas in the discussion so far the two realms of 
reason seem simply different in their subject-matter (theoretical reason as being 
concerned with judgments of truth and falsity and practical reason with decisions of 
right or wrong), Kant suggested in the second critique that theoretical reason has itself 
practical elements within it and should therefore be seen as subordinate to practical 
reason. “Thus in the combination of pure speculative with pure practical reason in one 
cognition, the latter has the primacy… .Without this subordination, a conflict of reason 
with itself would arise… .” (Kant, 1956: 126; Kosch, 2006: 38) 
The second solution was the introduction of a purposive element into the realm of 
mechanical nature which Kant called ‘technic of nature’. (Kant, 2005: 193; Guyer, 
1990: 38; Pluhar, 1986: 407-8) Based on the differentiation between determining 
judgment (a judgement that subsumes particulars under concepts) and reflexive 
judgement (which moves from the universal or whole as such towards the particular) 
Kant introduced the regulative idea of an absolute spontaneous understanding which 
imbues nature with a notion of purpose in its designs. “What Kant is asking us to 
imagine is an understanding for which the parts could be seen as dependent upon and 
determined by the whole, rather than (simply) the other way around. There would be no 
distinction between actual and possible for such an intellect...; not would there be a 
distinction between what should be and what is... .” (Kosch, 2006: 40) Such an 
understanding, however, can only be conceptualised as a subjective regulative idea that 
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frames the limited and contingent understanding of human beings; were it an objectified 
understanding it would equal an all-powerful, God-like being which again would not be 
within the purview of theoretical reason to grasp. (Kant, 2005: 198) Nevertheless the 
introduction of a purposeful notion into the so far mechanical realm of nature allows 
Kant to highlight a different form of causality to be working as a regulative idea. (ibid.) 
In addition to the simple efficient causality he identifies in the determined sequence of 
natural events he introduced through the technic of nature a notion of teleology or final 
causation. “This solution is intended to mediate the first two critiques by describing an 
understanding that can be viewed both as the substrate of the world of appearances of 
the first Critique and at the same time the moral author of the world of the second 
Critique. [...] The regulative principle requiring that we think about organisms in 
teleological terms while thinking that they are nonetheless mechanistically determined 
provides a concrete example of how such a reconciliation is possible – though the 
details of the reconciliation cannot be grasped by us, but only by the posited intuiting 
intellect.” (Kosch, 2006: 41) This solution, as ingenious as it might seem, however, 
comes for a price. The notion of transcendental freedom in terms of absolute 
spontaneity is necessarily threatened by the introduction of a teleological principle. 
Although the unity between theoretical and practical reason seem now at least possible, 
this approach “cannot do without the idea of a higher intellect that intuits the whole as a 
whole and for which each particular as well as the totality of particulars is necessary.” 
(ibid.: 42) Exactly because the proposed unity of theoretical and practical freedom rest 
on the (subjective and regulative) idea of a purposeful understanding behind the 
contingencies of our experience the contingent minds are no longer entirely 
independent. Kant will be able to maintain that practical freedom in such a system is 
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still possible but the notion of absolute spontaneity must necessarily finds it limits in the 
intuiting intellect which limits the range of individual free choice. 
Both solutions make a unity of the two kinds or reason possible but again produce 
difficulties of their own. We will leave Kant’s outline on the notion of freedom here and 
move to the ramifications of his thought. The leap towards a post-Husserlian conception 
of freedom as can for example be found in the work of Martin Heidegger is not as 
radical as it might appear at first sight for two reasons. First, because Heidegger himself 
as will be shown below takes his own starting point from Kant and works his notion of 
freedom out of the two solutions presented briefly above. For Heidegger, the problem of 
freedom as it was perceived in post-Kantian philosophy did not stem for a misguided 
conception of freedom but was grounded in the missing analysis of human existence. 
Heidegger will fill this gap and move to a conception of freedom that will broaden and 
deepen the Kantian one. Secondly, because the way towards Heidegger was already cast 
in a general fashion in the thought of Schelling who in his struggle with the Kantian 
legacy on freedom made the first important steps towards a radical reinterpretation of 
human being. It is this intermediate step which foreshadows important elements in 
Heidegger’s approach to which we will briefly turn now. 
 
Schelling on freedom – a proto-Heideggerian critique on Kant 
 
One of the main problem-complexes that was identified and seemingly shared by all of 
Kant’s critics was the inherent tendency of his thought to create dualisms such as 
phenomena-noumena, theoretical reason-practical reason, sensibility-understanding and 
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understanding-reason. It seemed the way to mend Kant’s shortcomings lay with the 
surmounting of exactly those dichotomist tendencies.  
Starting from these motivations Schelling in his early stages clearly followed Fichte 
who suggested the self-positing I as the unconditioned unity – a unity Fichte called the 
Absolute Ego. (Schaub, 1912: 568; Copleston, 1946: 46-7 and 49-50) On the other 
hand, however, Schelling agreed with a very powerful criticism on Fichte’s subjective 
idealism brought forward by Friedrich Hölderlin. As Hölderlin argued, Fichte’s abstract 
notion of the absolute I or absolute ego could not even be assumed viable in theory. 
Fichte readily acknowledged that it is indeed impossible to achieve the state of the 
absolute ego in which all dualistic notions would coincide but re-affirmed that man has 
a metaphysical as well as normative inclination to strive for its fulfilment. Hölderlin, 
however, righteously showed that Fichte’s absolute ego is in fact nothing. Fichte argued 
that the limited I by the act of self-positing in a form of Tathandlung becomes aware of 
itself by positing a non-I outside itself. Now, from this it follows logically that every I 
can only become aware, i.e. conscious of itself, by exactly this process of self-positing. 
The absolute ego, however, cannot possibly perform this act of self-positing since 
nothing can by definition lie outside it. In other words, the absolute ego would remain 
unconscious of itself and subsequently would mean nothing to itself. (Hölderlin, 1972: 
515-6) Whereas Schelling agreed with Fichte and of course with Kant that the subject is 
important in the establishment of the object, he went further and stressed the point, 
following Hölderlin’s critique, that the object is important for defining the subject. 
“Berkeley and Fichte had seen – the former that there is no object without a subject, the 
latter that, in this sense, the subject makes the object; but Schelling saw that neither can 
there be a subject without an object – that the objective world equally conditions the 
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existence of the ego.” (Lindsay, 1910: 265) The importance of the object in establishing 
the subject as conscious subject resembles of course Spinoza’s notion of God or Nature, 
a single substance of which all objects and subjects are only modes. Although Schelling 
in his early philosophy agreed with the monism of Spinoza which he obtained from a 
close familiarity with Jacobi’s reading of Spinoza (Snow, 1996: 21-8), he surely 
disagreed with the purely mechanistic and deterministic conclusions Spinoza drew from 
them. “Schelling derives largely from Spinoza, the net result not being Spinozan 
substance, with matter and mind as inseparable attributes of one being, but an 
inconceivable background named the Absolute.” (Lindsay, 1910: 260) Schelling 
recognised the importance of the two poles of existence, subject and object, and 
demanded they must be reconciled in a higher principle or unity as otherwise the 
problem of Kantian dualism between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom 
would re-emerge. In a general sense, it has therefore been said that Schelling found 
himself somewhere between Fichte’s subjectivism and Spinoza’s monism. “At one time 
this concept is represented by the Absolute Ego, another time by the Unconditioned, and 
again by the Absolute Reason, or simply the Absolute. In whatever form the conception 
appears, it assumes the role of an all-inclusive universal, conceived presumably by 
extending the concept of the subjective or consciousness so as to embrace the universe.” 
(Dewing, 1910: 158) This Absolute in Schelling’s thinking must, however, not just be 
thought as a negatively unconditioned unity, i.e. as a ground that is defined by an 
absence of subjectivity and objectivity. Rather, “it is necessary to demonstrate its 
sufficiency as a ground of experience”. (Groves, 1999: 30) From the beginning, 
however, Schelling faced major problems in establishing a conceptualisation of the 
Absolute that would fulfil the requirements he stated for it. The Absolute as a unity 
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beyond the empirical categories of subject and object “has to be thought of determining 
itself and thus grounding experience, without thinking this process in terms of the forms 
of ground-relation that we posit as determining the merely conditioned features of our 
experience.” (ibid.) In other words, the conceptualisation of the Absolute must not be 
conditioned by thought but must be grasped as truly unconditioned.  
 
Three different ‘projects’ can be identified in Schelling’s philosophical development 
that mirror his quest for an all-encompassing unity as the ground of human existence. 
The first can be found in his early Naturphilosophie (nature-philosophy) in which he 
starts form a more Spinozist account and posits nature as the condition for the 
development of self-conscious beings. In opposition to Spinoza, however, Schelling 
insisted that Nature, in order to provide the unconditioned ground, must be understood 
in dynamic terms, in terms of ‘productivity’ (Copleston, 1946: 50; Lindsay, 1910: 265); 
this approach is very much in line with Kant’s own thought of a teleological moment in 
nature as suggested in the third critique. (Snow, 1996: 82-6) 
This, however, did not prove to be sufficient for Schelling since the question how free 
agents evolve out of nature as productivity and are seen as transcendentally free and 
subject to mechanical laws remains somewhat shady. The role of the subject and its 
emergence was tackled by Schelling in a second project – his system of Transcendental 
Idealism. Again, the aim was to find an underlying unity of human existence that is able 
to provide the ground for the dualisms in everyday experience. (ibid.: 120-1) 
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The third and final stage in Schelling’s philosophical development began with the 
publication of the Freiheitsschrift (1992), in which he sought to uncover the possibility 
for a positive conception of evil which was missing in his idealist predecessors. From 
1809 onwards Schelling’s philosophy took a most radical break with his former 
attempts to systematise idealism, a task Hegel later would achieve. Instead, the new 
approach that gradually developed was characterised by three distinct features. “(1) a 
view of the nature of human freedom and the nature of agency arising from the 
Freiheitsschrift; (2) a radical theological voluntarism in ethical theory...; and (3) an anti-
idealist insistence on (to put it in terms common to Schelling and Kierkegaard) ‘the 
priority of being to thought’.” (Kosch, 2006: 88-89) As becomes almost immediately 
clear (3) is the most important step in our current endeavour and will be dealt with in 
the following lines to show its proto-Heideggerian character. The main concern for 
Schelling in this respect was the abovementioned problem with a teleological account of 
nature which threatened the validity of transcendental freedom. Schelling’s line of 
attack against the idealist conception that he had hitherto tried to amend lay with the 
stipulation that reason alone cannot be the only source for moral action as it was in 
Kant. (Snow, 1996: 31) “For however, highly we place reason, we still do not believe, 
for example, that anyone can through pure reason become virtuous or a hero or any kind 
of great man, nor even – in the well known phrase – that the human race can be 
propagated by it.” (Schelling, 1992: 95) The moral character of human beings can 
therefore not simply be derived from the capacity of reason but for Schelling it has to be 
situated again in the original concept of transcendental freedom as absolute spontaneity. 
So far Schelling simply retrieves Kant’s original concept of the first two critiques. But 
“Schelling goes further than Kant … in two ways. First, not only the agent’s actions, he 
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claims, but everything about the empirical agent … is determined by that agent viewed 
as intelligible object. What one’s transcendental spontaneity determines is not only 
one’s moral character, but everything about one. Second, this first aspect of 
transcendental freedom is attributed to all of nature. […] The nature of all being, not 
just human being, is determined conceptually rather than mechanically, and this 
determination is in some sense a self-determination.” (Kosch, 2006: 94; Snow, 1996: 
168-74) Freedom for Schelling is therefore something that pertains to the world in 
general and does neither simply reside in the mind nor can be merely attributed to the 
capacity to reason and subsequent moral action. Surely, Schelling did not equate the 
freedom of human beings with the freedom of plants or animals. He argued that both 
indeed shared a form of causal ultimacy which allowed them to be what they are, but 
only human being had the additional feature of alternate possibilities. (Kosch, 2006: 95) 
We see here already a proto-Heideggerian conception in that Schelling realised that 
human being is itself not caught in a predetermined nature but that different ways of 
being are open to it. (Snow, 1996: 142, 145-6) What Schelling did not yet grasp was 
that the being of innerworldly beings such as plants or animals would also depend upon 
the indeterminate being of Dasein. Nevertheless this account “captures a part of the 
phenomenology of agency as Kierkegaard and later figures of the so-called 
‘existentialist’ tradition experienced it and which distinguished them from Fichte and 
even Kant. Agency did not seem to them to be self-starting. Human beings are agents 
whether they choose to be or not. They receive their agency as a gift or have it imposed 
on them as a task; they do not self-constitute as agents.” (Kosch, 2006: 97) As we will 
see in the next section such a view of agency is firmly tied to the notion of freedom 
found in Heidegger. For the time being, however, Schelling remained stuck within a 
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substance ontology which did not allow him to move to a more radical interpretation of 
human existence and involved him in a manifold of new problems in connection with 
his notion of freedom. (ibid.: 96-8) 
This widening of the scope of freedom in Schelling, however, as we will also see in 
Heidegger, was the first careful step out of an idealist system which equated actuality 
with thought. In his later ‘positive’ philosophy in the 1830s and 1840s Schelling moved 
further away from idealist systematisation as can for example be seen in his critique of 
Hegel. One element that stands out in Schelling’s rather obscure philosophical work in 
the 1830s and 1840s is the relation between systematisations of thought and their 
relation to the actuality of life. Systems of thought, especially in idealist thinkers, 
always aim at conceptualising the world in a universal and all-encompassing fashion. 
The relation of thought to life is one of correspondence if not congruence. Schelling 
challenges this view, not to the extent that he denies any connection between thought 
and life or world, but to the extent that he maintains that such connections can never 
exhaust the contingencies and idiosyncrasies of actuality. Part of Schelling’s attempt to 
establish a ‘positive’ philosophy as opposed to the elaborate a priori systems of thought 
prevalent at his time was to introduce the possibility to move beyond the constrains and 
constructions of thought. “In later iterations of the positive philosophy on finds similar 
claims: negative philosophy is an abstract scaffold upon which a concrete description of 
the actual world must rest – but not itself a sufficiently concrete description.” (Kosch, 
2006: 109) We can see here already a move away from the exclusiveness of thought in 
grasping the complexities of life although Schelling still seems committed to a form of 
primacy of thought as it is seen as providing the ‘scaffold on which the actual world 
must rest’. Schelling does not go so far as to say that thought in fact is only derivative of 
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a deeper notion of being as Heidegger and other post-Husserlian phenomenologists will 
later do. However, “[t]he result of beginning not from the contents of thought but from 
the ‘being that precedes all thought’  (what Schelling calls das unvordenkliche Sein, 
which is meant to form the ontological foundation of the later system) is that the 
correspondence of being to thought cannot be grounded in thought.” (Kosch, 2006:111) 
And although Schelling never managed to think these approaches through to their 
logical end for various reasons, we can find in Schelling the first instances that aim at a 
much more fundamental and wide-ranging challenge to the trajectory of Western 
philosophy; a trajectory Schelling calls ‘negative philosophy’ and Heidegger will call 
the ‘tradition’. (Snow, 1996: 184; Marx, 1970) In these, as will be shown next, we can 
see proto-Heideggerian lines of thought that fundamentally will shake Western 
philosophy and contribute substantially to a notion of freedom as ‘the freedom that we 
are’ to which we now turn. 
 
Heidegger and freedom as the condition of Dasein 
 
Out of these reflections on freedom we can now move to Heidegger’s appropriation of 
the theme of freedom in light of his fundamental ontology. As we will see Heidegger 
engages with Kant’s thought on the matter but claims that the Kantian dilemma of the 
third antinomy and the remaining problems in its two solutions are due to the fact that 
Kant did not realise or penetrate into the complete depth of his questioning. (Heidegger, 
2005:119) For Heidegger, Kant never raised the central question of the meaning of 
being but always dealt with the notion of freedom in relation to an already existent field 
of beings and from this metaphysics of presence tried to justify transcendental freedom 
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as the ground for the specific form of freedom that will bind human beings morally 
manifesting it as the highest value. (Thiele, 1994: 283-4) 
What Heidegger tries to achieve as will be shown below is another approach to the 
transcendence of freedom as imagined in Kant without, however, necessitating a 
commitment to a form of Kantian idealism. This, for Heidegger, can only be achieved if 
we relate the question of freedom once more to the fundamental question of the 
meaning of being. (ibid.) In order to show how Heidegger undertook such an attempt at 
reconceptualising freedom from a fundamental ontological point of view it is necessary 
first to look at the specific place of human being at the nexus of what Heidegger called 
‘world’ and ‘earth’. From these preliminary reflections we can then proceed to show 
how Heidegger placed his account of freedom in relation to being and time and from 
there derived the fundamental nature of an ontological notion of freedom that at least in 
some respects supplements Kant’s prior deliberations. 
 
Dasein between world and earth 
 
As we have seen in the course of the preceding chapters the relation between human 
being or Dasein and the world it inhabits is of central importance for post-Husserlian 
thinkers and for the conceptualisation of a new social ontology as it is attempted here. 
Traditionally, this relation was seen as one of coexistence between different forms of 
entities or substances each definable according to a set of observable characteristics. 
(Odysseos, 2007: xii-xiii) Human existence stood out among those entities as it was 
imbued with reason which gave it the edge over other forms of being. The result was 
that with the advent of modern philosophy the relation between human beings and their 
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world was one of dominance and control. So far we have shown that such a conception 
is by no means as straight-forward and self-evident as its supporters would like to have 
it. Rather the relation between human being and its world is much more complex and 
subtle than often assumed. Heidegger and subsequent thinkers in the phenomenological 
tradition questioned the inherent metaphysics of presence that such a substance-
ontology entailed. Instead they tried to show the close involvement of human being in 
its world which does not allow for a neutral viewpoint from which objective observation 
will be possible; in other words they tried to overturn the elevation of human beings 
over their world and situate them right in the midst of other beings. (Dreyfus, 1991: 40-
3) Nevertheless, as was shown above such a situatedness was special in some respects 
that prove vital if we ask about the nature of human being. Human being is not just any 
being but is concerned with its own being. (Heidegger, 1996: 39) It stands out through 
the fact that it is not just an innerwordly being as plants and animals are but through its 
very being establishes a world which lets beings be what they are. Human being is 
thereby always involved in projects and hence projects itself constantly into the future – 
human being is its own possibility. (ibid.: 139) 
As such we can already see that human being must have a characteristic that allows it to 
project itself into the future in many different possibilities and subsequently encounter 
other beings and let them be. On the other hand we can also readily realise that these 
powers of projection are not unlimited. Human being cannot simply be whatever it 
wants to be. Heidegger catches one aspect of these limitations in the facts of birth and 
death. (Inwood, 1997: 24-5; Dreyfus, 1991: 305-13; Demske, 1970: 54-5) Human being 
is ‘thrown’ into the world and its existence is a constant being-towards death; no human 
device or project can ever move beyond those limitations. But there are smaller 
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limitations we encounter in our everyday lives as well and we will have to consider their 
nature and origin in order to gain a clearer conception of the nature of freedom. These 
further limitations must not only transcend human beings but also their world which 
only comes into being through human Dasein. The world as we have depicted it so far is 
therefore only one of two aspects human being is confronted with in its very being. The 
other element which as we will see provides a constant resistance and challenge to 
human projects Heidegger labelled ‘earth’. “Though dependent on Dasein for its unity 
and coherence, the world rests on a foundation of natural products and has its roots in 
the fecundity of ‘mother earth’.” (Macomber, 1967: 64) 
‘Earth’ in this sense roughly equals what is normally grasped under the term ‘nature’. It 
is the force behind and beyond human being and its world but not simply in the 
traditional materialist sense. It is not the realm of ‘intransitive objects’ that simply exist 
alongside human beings and can be grasped in a simple and scientific way. The earth in 
Heidegger is more closely related to the term mater in ‘materia’ – in the sense of mother 
earth. (ibid.: 65) This is not simply a mystic or poetic appeal to some elusive realm in 
which and out of which beings evolve. Rather, it has to be seen as the other side of the 
nexus at which human being stands. The projects we are involved in constantly can only 
be pursued by drawing materials into our awareness and use them. These materials are 
indeed existent as such beyond human existence but they are concealed from our view. 
The earth (note that Heidegger speaks of the earth and a world) is at the limits against 
which human being is struggling continuously. “The earth announces itself in every 
breakdown of the world. Such breakdowns bring Dasein to the recognition of the 
contingency of its designs, to an awareness that the rhythm of the earth is not its rhythm 
and that the manipulability of things is not unlimited; is often not even sufficient.” 
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(ibid.) As such the earth is in constant conflict with the world and both are inextricably 
interwoven in their struggle. As Heidegger once said, describing the relation between 
the two: “Die Welt gründet sich auf die Erde und die Erde durchragt die Welt.” (The 
world is founded on the earth and the earth emanates through the world) (Heidegger, 
2007f: 174) For Heidegger it is important to stress that the intrinsic concealment of the 
earth is the negative pole of human being that does simply not allow Dasein to control 
and manipulate everything in its reach. In this sense the anthropocentric view of 
modernity in which the natural world is seen as being imbued with reason – as is man – 
and subsequently can be an object to be controlled, manipulated and dominated is 
misguided and reveals itself as a vain undertaking in every breakdown of our 
instruments and projects. “Surrounding Dasein’s world of meaning – or rather 
penetrating it to the core – is the meaningless source of meaning and the marvelous or 
terrible ground of everything that is familiar. The familiar is not fundamentally familiar 
– it is not familiar in its ground or origin.” (Macomber, 1967: 65-6) The earth as 
important as it is for the very nature of our being is forever beyond our control because 
it is essentially out of tune with human existence.  
The conflict that defines human freedom is exactly situated at the nexus of the conflict 
between world and earth. Human being itself is not involved in this conflict but 
becomes its primary expression. Bound by the contingencies of the earth which are 
forever beyond its controll and opened towards the world which is of its own making, 
we find human being as the place that opens the possibilities for being.  
“Dasein’s activity throughout history takes permanent shape against the 
resistance of the earth in the way in which the activity of the sea leaves its 
mark in the contours of the coast against which it washes. If the world 
belongs to the being of Dasein, which is defined as a source of activity, it 
requires a counterelement as the source of its permanence and continuity. 
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This counterelement is the earth, which, in Heidegger’s thinking, plays the 
role traditionally ascribed by philosophers to material.  […] Heidegger 
speaks of it as an ‘opponent.’ The earth has a rhythm and dynamism of its 
own, on which Dasein is wholly dependent, which it must exploit, and to 
which, in the final analysis, it can only submit.” (ibid.: 66-7)  
 
“The negative character of the earth as the unfamiliar, like that of the instrument as the 
inconscpicuous, does not merely indicate what the earth is not. […] The earth is the 
sustaining-and-self-concealing, each in virtue of the other. Heidegger appeals to the 
twofold sense of the German verb bergen, which means both ‘to shelter or protect’ and 
‘to hide or conceal’.” (ibid.: 66; Heidegger, 2007f: 174) As such the earth provides the 
element of constancy that stands over and against the transient and fluctuating 
conception of the world. “The earth is the ground of the constancy of Dasein’s world: 
the resistance which it offers is essential to the abiding or enduring aspect of openness.” 
(Macomber, 1967: 66) 
Such a ground is indeed necessary if one wants to avoid a conception of a seemingly 
all-powerful Dasein which shapes and reshapes a world which is constantly in flux, 
waxing and waning under human existence without any constraining force to hold its 
defining characteristics in place. “The earth sustains Dasein’s life and conceals itself 
from Dasein’s scrutiny – and mastery – and is thus bergend in both senses of the term. 
[…] The essence of the earth is best expressed in the inner coherence of these two 
notions.” (ibid.; Polt, 1999: 137-8) The conception of the earth as the ever elusive and 
yet maintaining sphere also stands in clear opposition to any megalomanic attempts to 
subdue the environment we live in to human design and control. (Thiele, 1994: 284) 
Dasein only takes its place in the order of things as the place where the constant 
antagonism between transience and constancy is fought. “Man is not one of the 
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combatants; the combatants are the world and the earth – or the familiar and the terrible 
or marvelous – as these are the poles between which human existence is cast. But 
Dasein is the arena in which the combat takes place, and without it there would be 
neither combat not combatants.” (Macomber, 1967: 68) The constant confrontation with 
the fragility of human design and control reminds human existence of the constrains that 
are placed beyond any grasp in the concealed and mysterious realm of the earth. 
(Thiele, 1997: 501) On the other hand, however, it is exactly the earth that provides the 
enabling moment for Dasein to engage in its projects and create a world for itself. “The 
design which renders things accessible and intelligible requires resources on the one 
hand and resistance on the other […] By providing both the resources and the resistance 
of human design, the earth is the hidden source of the openness and order of the world.” 
(Macomber, 1967: 71; Heidegger, 2007f: 171) At this moment human Dasein returns to 
a central role within this antagonism that transcends its powers. “This conflict unfolds 
in human life; in Heidegger’s understanding it is human life. It is man who must wage 
the conflict – or at least provide the arena.” (Macomber, 1967: 67, Heidegger, 2007f: 
174; Polt, 1999: 138-9) The conflict described between world and earth takes place only 
in the presence of Dasein; Dasein provides the field in which the forces of its own 
design and the resistance of the earth meet. The awareness of these conflicts that 
regularly show themselves in the breakdown of human designs and projects cannot be 
grasped by purely theoretical reflection as is to be found in many philosophers of 
modernity. Important is the practical dimension of encountering this conflict. It is not 
the theoretical musings of attempts to systematize human life but the breakdown of the 
world, a rupture of reference which truly reveals the transient and imperfect state of 
human design. One area in which such breakdowns can most often be observed is 
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certainly the international political sphere where the life-projects of communities and 
individuals are enmeshed in a constant struggle and in need of constant adjustment in 
the face of one another.  
In this sense we can characterize human beings as situated between two poles of his 
existence the earth and the world which provide a constant flow of concealing and 
revealing without any chance of ever clearing the mystery of the earth in order to reach 
an objective account that allows mastery and control over nature. (ibid.: 138) Out of this 
constant antagonism must freedom arrive and only under these auspices can it be 
properly appropriated as it shapes human existence and the concomitant thrown-
projections through which human Dasein evolves into its own possibilities. Keeping 
this conflict between world and earth in our mind we can now move on to conceptualise 
more clearly where freedom can be found in relation to Dasein. 
 
Freedom and its relation to Dasein – Towards the freedom that we are 
 
So far, there might be a tendency detectable in the conceptualisations presented that 
seems to tilt the proposed new ontology towards a subjectivist and individualist 
primacy. We have said and shown how the notion of agency is characterised by the 
ability of human being and subsequently human beings to engage with the world and let 
other entities be what they are. It seems that here we reach yet again the threshold of a 
philosophical idealism that inscribes certain powers to the human agent that makes him 
or her stand aloof from the material circumstances he or she encounters. It seems 
likewise the case that through the medium of language it is now possible for this kind of 
human being not only to communicate through a set system of symbols but also to 
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create a ‘reality’ through the use of language in specific contexts and the subsequent 
establishment of rules of social and linguistic conduct that again can be ascribed to 
human influence.  
Such a reading, however, as tempting as it may seem is completely misguided for 
different reasons. First, we have already seen that the notion of consciousness is the one 
crucial element that distinguishes the thoughts presented here from a classic idealist 
enterprise. The claims we made are not rested in a conviction that the single human 
mind is the all-powerful place where agency, language and truth reside. It is not 
primordially the individual that assumes power to change the world around herself and 
it is not the monadic view that posits already constituted subjects in relations to one 
another. (Odysseos, 2007: xii-xiii) Rather it has been argued that human being is 
centrally concerned with its world and finds itself always already immersed in a context 
that is not of its own making alone. (Heidegger, 1996: 52; Deely, 1971: 30) The 
publicity of consciousness was the guiding argument in our deliberations so far which 
makes change a possibility not for the individual but for the publicly deliberated and 
negotiated existence of human being. Secondly, and this will be elaborated upon in the 
following lines, the power of human being so conceived as being able to shape the 
environment in accordance with the projects pursued regularly finds that the designs 
constructed in this pursuit are radically inadequate. As we have seen in the chapter on 
truth, the pursuit of projects as the constant involvement and care of human being in the 
world regularly encounters a breakdown of its instruments – the moment out of which 
truth arises. This second element which we have linked in the above section – the 
constant struggle between world and earth – poses other very ‘real’ limits to human 
endeavours and confronts us with our own finitude. Earth, however, as has been shown 
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is not simply the ‘nature’ of the natural sciences and general materialist musings. The 
earth as such is the ‘always beyond’, the Grund (ground) which is also always an 
Abgrund (Abyss). (Thiele, 1997: 502; Moi, 2006: 21-2; Wild, 1963: 677; Heidegger, 
1996: 142) 
To the same extent to which notions of agency, language and truth fundamentally and 
primordially transcend the consciousness of the individual, the notion of freedom must 
likely be sought in its primordial configuration outside of particular subjectivity. If this 
is not the case, the third antinomy presented above will remain obfuscated and reiterate 
the dilemma between noumenal freedom and phenomenal necessity. In respect to the 
centrality of freedom for our understanding of human existence Heidegger is not far 
away from Kant, as he realises that indeed the problem of freedom might well be the 
most fundamental in any account of Dasein. (Heidegger, 2005: 15-6; Dallmayr, 1984: 
207; Haar, 1989) We will also see that Heidegger agrees with Kant that freedom as such 
will never be revealed in its entirety but will always manifest itself in a blurred manner. 
“There are striking resemblances between this [Kant’s] conception of freedom and 
Heidegger’s. Heidegger too approaches freedom as a necessary presupposition, sees it 
as undissolubly bound up with obligation, makes it the background of a process of self-
realisation, and denies that it can ever be adequately explained.” (Macomber, 1967: 
100-1) And yet, Heidegger in his longest engagement with Kantian thought during his 
lecture series on the essence of human freedom sees Kant’s treatment of freedom as 
unfinished exactly because it remained on the level of consciousness alone. (Heidegger, 
2005: 119-20) Freedom for Kant must be presupposed transcendentally in order to take 
effect on human subjects. This effect, however, is one that addresses the moral duties 
prescribed by practical reason vested in individual consciousnesses. “For Kant it is the 
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highest element in man – reason – which obligates the whole man, and this is why 
freedom is seen primarily in conjunction with some actions but not all.” (Macomber, 
1967: 101) What remained problematic beyond Kant was the way the bifurcated nature 
of the individual human as free on the one hand and bound on the other can be grasped 
without ending up over and over again in the contradiction depicted in the third 
antinomy. We have seen that Schelling tried to escape this contradiction by following a 
path Kant had opened himself in the third critique by allowing an element of purpose 
into a hitherto purely mechanical concept of nature. (Kant, 2005: 193; Guyer, 1990: 38; 
Pluhar, 1986: 407-8) 
In his deliberations Heidegger, as did Schelling before him, pushed the notion of 
freedom beyond the confines of reason as a faculty of man and beyond the realm of 
moral action where freedom was exclusively located in Kant. “For Heidegger it is the 
being of man as an arena of openness which obligates man as a being within such an 
area. This is why his freedom is a presupposition of all our actions, not simply of those 
which we call moral, and why it imposes obligations beyond our understanding, which 
always occurs within openness.” (Macomber, 1967:101; Polt, 1999: 128) We can see 
that Heidegger links the concept of freedom in its primordial understanding to the 
notion of Dasein and thereby already transgresses the traditional boundaries of 
consciousness. At the end of his deliberation Heidegger will say that “freedom now no 
longer means freedom as a property of man, but man as a possibility of freedom.” 
(Heidegger, 2005: 94) How Heidegger reaches this insight we will show in the 
remainder of this section. 
Heidegger begins his reflections on freedom by delimiting the space of enquiry in very 
much the same fashion as Kant did by distinguishing the different notions of freedom 
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we encounter in everyday life. Among them are practical freedom, comparative 
freedom, political freedom understood as self-determination as well as positive and 
negative freedom. (Kosch, 2006: 17) The one type of freedom that is of the utmost 
interest to Heidegger, as it was to Kant, however, is the primordial one which provides 
the conditions under which the other types of freedom become possible. Kant labelled 
this freedom ‘transcendental’ and situated it in the noumenal realm beyond the confines 
of natural necessity which rules supreme in the realm of appearances or phenomena. 
Transcendental freedom was understood by Kant as ‘absolute spontaneity’, the capacity 
to start a series of events out of a spontaneous act which is uncaused itself. (ibid.; Kant, 
1998: 484) Heidegger takes the cue from Kant here and explores in more depth the 
connection of human being and freedom and its relation as it pertains to being and time 
as such. Heidegger argues that such an account is missing in Kant’s thought as it 
focuses only on a specific range of actions but not on the possibility for action in 
general. Heidegger sees freedom to be the defining moment of Dasein and as such as 
more fundamental than being itself. (Heidegger, 2005: 94) Contrary to Kant, however, 
Heidegger does not rely upon the central notion of reason but seeks freedom on the very 
bottom of human existence which, as we have seen, he describes as a mode of care or 
concern with innerworldly entities.  
“Even man’s original encounter with things, as we have seen, is a tenuous 
one; his being is immediately characterised not by openness to things but by 
distraction in his preoccupation with them. In his immediate manifestation 
the human condition, form this point of view, does not differ essentially 
from that of the beast. Only when human design breaks down do we attain 
to the area of openness in which things first manifest themselves explicitly. 
It is only from this moment on that we can regard the human situation as 
unique.” (Macomber, 1967: 94)  
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And further “[i]n the moment of withdrawal man stands in the presence of things – 
confronts things – for the first time, and only in virtue of this movement is he properly 
human.” (ibid.: 95) 
In this way, Heidegger links the question of freedom back to the notion of encounter 
and the subsequent characteristic of human Dasein to let beings be what they are. Such 
a conditionality that regards the being of innerworldly beings as brought into the open 
through the capacity of human beings to let things be as they are brings freedom in very 
close relation to the notion of truth as unhiddenness of beings in deconcealment as it 
was discussed in the preceding chapter. Human being as situated at the nexus of world 
and earth and as embodiment or space of their eternal contest provides the necessary 
opening to encounter and let beings be. The moment of truth in which the breakdown in 
reference reveals the contingency of human projects and their tools is not only a 
moment of truth as we have seen but more fundamentally even expresses the primordial 
freedom in which Dasein becomes its own possibility.  Central is hereby the insight that 
the beings we encounter are not simply present as finished and observable entities as the 
Western tradition since Aristotle defined them referring to the term ‘substance’. 
(Heidegger, 2005: 46)  
Such a substance-ontology runs into the problems sketched out in the introductory 
chapter and ends in a dead end in which either ideational or material factors have to be 
posited as foundational in order to create a structure in which experience is framed. 
Heidegger, however, refutes such a notion of substance ontology, or as he describes it a 
‘metaphysics of presence’. To support his claims he re-invokes the initial meaning of 
being in Greek thought – οΰσια. (ibid.: 43-5) Οΰσια is understood as constant presence 
but not in the sense of a monadic existence of different entities but rather as linked to 
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the concept of ενεργεία as constant activity and producedness. (ibid.: 50) Seen from this 
angle, Heidegger argues that beings in their innerworldliness are not simply there but 
they are brought towards their being through the self-showing of their appearance. What 
is meant by this is that “energeia stems from εργόν, work [Werk]. Έν εργόν, in work, 
means more precisely: self-holding (self-maintaining) in the activity of work. …, the 
understanding is directed towards the inner content of producedness, to being brought to 
stand forth from here to there, and, as such, to be now standing there. So producedness 
means there-standingness [Da-stehendheit], and ενεργεία means a self-holding in 
producedness and there-standingness.” (ibid.: 48) This rather cryptic passage hints again 
at the role of Dasein in the process of ‘being brought to stand forth from here to there’. 
The work which in its producedness pertains to human being stands forth as what it is, 
i.e. in its actuality, in the clearing provided by Dasein itself. This standing forth in the 
clearing of Dasein does neither allocate a primacy to Dasein in its subjectivity nor a 
primacy to the being in its actuality. The individual human being merely takes part in 
the process of letting-be but alone and as subject it cannot let things be. “Letting beings 
be in this sense does not entail a passive or disinterested attitude toward them; it is not 
synonymous with letting alone but with the letting-be of the fiat. It is by explicitly 
turning toward things, opening ourselves to them so as to permit them to have a decisive 
influence on our being, that we let beings be.”  (Macomber, 1967: 102; Thiele, 1994: 
283; Dallmayr, 1984: 215) But that Dasein is open towards things and let them be is by 
no means an arbitrary act of imposing meaning. Rather, “[b]eings are open to every 
form of human conduct – not only knowledge or even to consciousness – and to each in 
a different way. [We can for example see] the different aspects which a field represents 
to a farmer, a military tactician, and a town-planner and … the different way in which a 
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situation takes shape for a moralist, a judge, and a psychiatrist. Heidegger is convinced 
there is no point of view from which any being can be definitely (‘objectively’) 
represented.” (Macomber, 1967: 96) Therefore, the being in its producedness provides 
Dasein with a certain set of limits but these limits themselves can only be understood as 
limits within the space cleared by Dasein. The limits that we encounter are therefore 
neither material (i.e. substantially found in the object) nor ideational (i.e. derived from 
consciousness) in the traditional sense but express the existentiality and actuality of 
Dasein and innerworldly beings at the vortex of world and earth.  
“If Dasein can encounter things because its essence consists in being open 
to them, I can – and must – discover in things the criterion of its conduct for 
the same reason. Dasein must permit things to provide the binding direction 
of its conduct because its very being is such as to depend upon other beings, 
because it is essentially oriented toward the realisation of itself outside or 
beyond itself in the midst of the things it encounters within an area of 
openness which it itself constitutes. All human actions and attitudes involve 
an intrinsic reference to an ‘other.’” (ibid.: 99; Thiele, 1994: 288) 
 
Since the characteristic of letting beings stand forth as what they are in their presence 
Heidegger links freedom to the notion of truth which, as we have seen, arises out of a 
rupture of reference within the clearing provided by Dasein revealing its contingency 
and transience. As Heidegger proclaimed: “The essence of truth is freedom.” 
(Heidegger, 2007b: 123) In order to be able to let beings be what they are it is necessary 
that Dasein must always already have an understanding of what it means to be. The 
ground out of which this understanding of being arises is what Heidegger calls freedom. 
“Dasein provides the context in which these things can be what they are and the 
perspective to which they can manifest themselves as they are. This is what Heidegger 
means by the freedom of Dasein, essential to truth, of letting beings be, and of letting 
them be what and as they are.” (Macomber, 1967: 102) 
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Freedom is therefore not something that Dasein possess but it is more fundamentally the 
ground out of which the understanding of being which Dasein always already has arises. 
As such freedom is not what we have but it is what we are. 
“The freedom which Heidegger calls the essence of truth is not a faculty or 
property of man: it is not the faculty of free choice or the property of the 
will which allows us to select between two possible goods or to realise one 
of two possible modes of conduct. The freedom with which we are here 
concerned does not refer to exemption from physical or mechanical 
necessity or to the acceptance of such necessity in the light of reason. It is 
not the sort of freedom which we exercise now and then, as occasion 
demands. In short, Heidegger does not employ the word ‘freedom’ in many 
of the senses, common or technical, in which it is usually understood. Yet 
the sense in which he does use the word is meant to reveal the event, 
fundamental to human experience, from which all the usual senses derive.” 
(ibid.: 98)  
 
At this point we have reached the crucial difference between a Kantian and a 
Heideggerian notion of freedom. Kant tried to ground transcendental freedom in the 
noumenal realm in which practical reason takes part. The capacity to reason provides 
hereby the binding character to the moral law which human beings must follow – ought 
implies can for Kant. Freedom in this sense is posited as apart from nature and its 
intrinsic causal necessities. For Heidegger, however, freedom can only arise out of our 
place within being and it can therefore not stand apart from nature. “Against the 
background of freedom Kant portrays human being determining itself independently of 
the world and nature, while Heidegger regards such self-determination as possible only 
through the world and nature. Kant’s freedom binds man to actions imposing 
obligations which he can understand. Heidegger’s freedom binds man to beings, and the 
obligation which it imposes transcends human understanding.” (ibid.:101) We can see 
here already how Heidegger breaks with another piece reified by the tradition of 
Western metaphysics that saw freedom as situated in the human mind and therefore 
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empowered human action from within. For Heidegger, this seems to be a rather 
pretentious understanding that necessarily must run into the dilemma of positing the 
human mind as free and the human body constrained by natural necessity. Heidegger in 
his conception of freedom provides a solution to this antinomy through a more humble 
conception of human being and its powers. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that 
the way Heidegger conceptualises freedom does not undermine a notion of 
responsibility. It may be that Dasein in its very nature lets beings be but this process in 
not just one that simply ‘happens’ and in which Dasein only plays the role of a catalyst. 
The process of letting beings be is an active one in which innerworldy beings are drawn 
into our awareness and thereby come into being in a context of the aims and objectives 
set by Dasein’s projects. Dasein is not a simple bystander but actively and decisively 
engaged in the process of clearing a space for beings used in the pursuit of its own 
thrown-projections. In this sense one can say that “Heidegger does not predicate 
freedom exclusively or primarily of the human will, just as he does not predicate truth 
exclusively or primarily of human understanding. The term is rather a development of 
the notion of openness and can best be understood by analogy with the spatial sense of 
‘free’ as ‘clear of …’ or ‘open.’ Heidegger frequently speaks of a ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) 
in the density of beings – a clearing without which there could be no light (Licht) – and 
it is in this sense that the terms ‘free’ is employed in the present context. Such freedom 
is constitutive of Dasein as a being essentially open to things.” (ibid.: 98-9; Dreyfus, 
1991:163-7; Polt, 1999: 149; Heidegger, 1996: 125) 
The relation to freedom itself is thereby not one of freedom. Dasein cannot choose to be 
free since it is what it is only by dint of the freedom in which it takes part. “The 
freedom which Heidegger calls the essence of truth is the openness which constitutes 
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Dasein’s being. Such freedom does not belong to man as a property; on the contrary, 
man belongs to freedom as its creature. […] Man belongs to freedom as to the area of 
openness which he is, but which, for that very reason, does not stand at his disposal.” 
(Macomber, 1967:99) 
 
Ontological freedom and the possibility of choice in the social realm 
 
The focus of this chapter lay with the notion of freedom and its place in the new social 
ontology suggested in this thesis. Freedom in relation to human action and the nature of 
human existence starts from a dilemma which was conceptualised in many different 
ways throughout the history of Western thought. It seems that when it comes to the 
question of freedom in relation to human existence and action one necessarily 
encounters a conundrum since on the one hand the actions of human beings can 
seemingly not be reduced to a mere mechanical sequence that follows pre-given and 
necessary laws. But neither can freedom be seen as absolute in the sense that human 
agents face no constrains on their actions. In fact, both positions seem to be true to a 
certain extent. Humans are free to choose between different paths of action and yet are 
constrained by material and ideational factors that transcend the power of change an 
individual agent (sometimes even a community of agents) possesses. Freedom for 
Heidegger, as was shown above, provides the frame in which Dasein can assume its 
powers which show themselves in everyday conduct. The engagement with the world 
out of its own embeddedness within it allows humans to clear a space in which it can 
encounter other beings as ‘others’ in a parallel disclosure of truth and Angst. Freedom 
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for Heidegger describes this unique position and capability of human existence to let 
beings be which derives from its situatedness at the nexus of world and earth.  
The notions of world and earth occupy a central place in Heidegger’s thought because 
the dialectic between the two makes Dasein in itself possible. “Dasein is cast between 
openness and concealment, between meaning and the source of meaning which is not 
itself meaningful, or, as we can now put it, between the world and the earth.” (ibid.: 71) 
Freedom evolves directly out of this struggle that is only realised through Dasein and 
provides the conditions for Dasein’s possibilities.  “World and earth are always 
intrinsically and essentially in conflict, belligerent by nature. Only as such do they enter 
into the strife of clearing and concealing. Earth juts through the world and world 
grounds itself on the earth only so far as truth happens as the primal strife between 
clearing and concealing.” (Heidegger, 2007f: 180) The constant involvement in projects 
that are in need of tools and devices to deliver any sense of achievability creates the 
clearing in which Dasein and innerworldly beings meet. As we remember this 
dichotomy between the acting subject and the acted upon object is itself not the 
primordial condition of human existence. It results form the constant waxing and 
waning between the possibilities of Dasein and their ever looming breakdown. Central 
to our understanding of Dasein is “… the conflict which lies at the heart of human 
existence, the conflict between the intelligibility and control which he demands and the 
mystery and intransigence with which he is continually confronted – and the more 
forcefully confronted the more he demands.” (Macomber, 1967: 68) 
Freedom for Heidegger is therefore something that is not situated in human 
consciousness as a property or characteristic but is the very condition that makes us 
human and opens the possibility for the manifold endeavours we are engaged in 
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constantly. Freedom, itself is not something we can choose or reject; in its primordial 
form it is something that we are as humans.  
 
This concept of freedom as we presented it in the thought of Heidegger pertains directly 
to the social and political realm in general. At first sight, it seems rather aloof from any 
debates regarding the role of freedom in decision-making process or political action that 
can be found in social or political analysis. This is mainly due to the fact that here we 
encounter as fundamental the ability to make choices and decisions that is still vested in 
the individual although certainly we realise that the number of choices is limited to a 
certain degree. The question that arises, however, is how to understand the ability that 
human agents individually or collectively have to make decisions and how this ability 
relates to the constraining circumstances they face. In short we reach the somewhat 
worn-out debate of the agent-structure problematique. What is more important when it 
comes to decision-making processes? Are the agents always on top of the structural 
constrains or do the structural constrains overwhelmingly condition the agents in their 
actions? By now it should be clear that this ontological dichotomy between agency and 
structure is itself not as fundamental as the literature makes us believe. The agency-
structure debate itself is a manifestation of the subject-object divide which we have 
argued develops out of a much more fundamental conception of human being. Even 
accounts that maintain that the relation between agent and structure is one of mutual 
constitution cannot escape the negative ramifications of accepting the subject-object 
divide as primordial. By splitting the two kinds of entities into subjective and objective 
the dilemma is postponed but not overcome. In the wake of actual research the 
acceptance of a mutual constitution leads to an arbitrary break in dialectic of agency and 
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structure. The simple and yet decisive fact that ‘we have to start somewhere’ brings the 
theoretically promising solution of a mutual constitution to a sudden halt. We can 
emphasise time and again that although we might start with either structure or agency 
this be no means aims at establishing a primacy of one over the other. The deeper 
problem of having disrupted the dialectic which does not allow for a starting point, 
however, remains and posits the impossible question of justification for the proposed 
starting point in light of our assumption that this point itself was constituted and is 
therefore never original.  
Such a justification cannot lie with the primacy of the subject because “[f]or Heidegger 
it is the being of man as an arena of openness which obligates man as a being within 
such an area. This is why his freedom is a presupposition of all our actions, not simply 
of those which we call moral, and why it imposes obligations beyond our 
understanding, which always occurs within openness.” (ibid.: 101) Likewise, it does not 
make any sense to see the entities as dominant in constraining the actions and decision-
making processes of agents since these entities are what they are only due to the fact 
that Dasein lets them be what they are. They are not the monadic substances that Wendt 
and Wight rely on, pre-established objects with a clear set of characteristics that are 
what they are beyond human existence. The materials which we use as tools (both 
observables as well as unobservables) might transcend in their ‘reality’ the bounds of 
science and the bounds of individual notions of agency but they never transcend in their 
what-being the clearing provided by Dasein and subsequently can never be posited as 
what they are beyond human being as such.  
The agency-structure debate is a derivative non-problem simply for the reason that 
agency and structure are only ontically but not ontologically distinct. Agency and 
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structure are in this sense two different ways to illuminate and conceptualise Dasein as 
engaged in specific activities and projects: they describe different moments of Dasein’s 
involvement in the world. A distinct depiction of both can never be more than a 
heuristic device used to provide the different perspectives which embody our 
understanding of Dasein in its actuality. The views presented are never final but again 
publicly sanctioned either positively or negatively. Any account of agency implies a 
concomitant account of structure and vice versa exactly because the two are 
ontologically not distinct. Here we reach yet again the nexus of freedom and truth in an 
ontological sense. An enquiry into the political and social circumstances we are 
immersed in is only possible through the acceptance of a form of freedom as the essence 
of human being and any results of such an enquiry can be true only by dint of their 
disclosive power. Truth derives from freedom here as Heidegger argued and it 
maintains the truth as the disclosive power of human being before and beyond any 
claims to correspondence and coherence. 
In such a conception the notion of choice is still a real one since it is empowered by the 
underlying notion of freedom as the essence of human being. Choice happens in the 
assessment and judgement of our everyday situation in light of our preoccupations and 
projects we seek to pursue. This choice, however, is not primordial to human beings but 
only derivative of human being. The dialectic of world and earth provides the 
background against which the essence of human being as freedom emerges and makes 
possible the involvement in a world which is constantly made and remade in light of the 
projects Dasein pursues and their inevitable breakdown. In this sense agency and 
structure become derivative notions that in their ontic distinctness disclose modes of 
being and therefore pertain to truth and express the freedom of Dasein to let beings be. 
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We can see here that even the most entrenched approaches to international politics 
appear in new light. The determinism inherent in structural realist accounts, for 
instance, is itself only possible in light of the powers to let anarchy be what it is. This 
‘is’, as should be clear by now, does not refer to an unchangeable and fixed reality 
Dasein has to accept. It rather presents a way of interpreting the inherent clash and 
breakdown of human projects. Exactly the dialectic between the power of Dasein to let 
things be what they are and the obligations Dasein has to follow in this process of 
letting be account for the emergence of competing systems of order and the manifold of 
aims, objectives and solutions we face in light of the breakdowns of our projects. The 
space we clear is not a universal truth, it is never unconditioned or beyond the 
possibility of change. Change, however, can only come through the freedom that human 
being is and not through the freedom we wrongly think we possess. The possession of 
freedom as human property is an illusion, not in light of seemingly overwhelming 
material constrains we face but in light of our being as freedom – freedom possess us 
and can therefore never be possessed by us. 
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Conclusion 
 
After outlining the main pillars of the proposed new social ontology, we have to ask 
where we have arrived and to what extent our endeavour has successfully been 
completed. In order to draw a conclusion on these matters we will proceed in three 
steps. First, it seems necessary to summarise the main arguments which were 
expounded in the preceding 6 chapters and find a way to tie them together in respect to 
their importance for a reconceptualisation of ontology for the social sciences in general 
and IR in particular. Secondly, it seems necessary to say a word about the status of our 
enquiry in respect to its state and perspective. We will try to outline the achievements 
made by these reconceptualisations as well as the elements within such an ontology that 
have been left to future conceptualisation and research. And finally, we will outline in 
which ways the ontology sketched out above will be able to contribute to the field of IR; 
in other words we will have a look at the added value of our endeavour for the study of 
political and social processes in the international realm. 
 
The core arguments towards a ‘new social ontology’ 
 
Our study has come a long way. What started with a critique of recent publications on 
ontology took the shape of a wide and substantial re-evaluation of the notion of being 
and its relation to core terms such as agency, language, truth and freedom which are 
central for any attempt to conceptualise social and political dynamics. The reason for 
this far-reaching enquiry into different elements pertaining towards ontology was to be 
found in the argument that the tensions and problems arising out of recent publications 
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of ontology in IR cannot be dealt with from within the modern framework that 
naturalised ontology as substance-ontology. Substance-ontology describes the view that 
the entities we are as subjects and the entities we encounter as objects have pregiven 
observable characteristics and subsequently constraining and enabling effects. 
Furthermore, the objects we encounter, both as observables and unobservables, have a 
‘real’ existence outside and independent of the human mind that grasps them. The main 
task when starting from these premises was to give up the attempt to specify a certain 
way to know these items (i.e. a epistemological foundationalism) and instead go to these 
objects directly. As we have seen, Wendt and subsequently the group of critical realists 
accept the historically conditioned nature of knowledge but maintain, based on the 
stipulation of a mind-independent existence of ‘intrasitive objects’ that these objects 
should and can be grasped as what they are through their enabling and constraining 
effects on the subjects handling them. Only subsequently will they be tainted through 
different ways of apprehending them epistemologically. And indeed, when considering 
the different examples they refer to this stipulation seems intuitively right. Pigs indeed 
cannot fly, the war in Iraq is real and the hurricane Katrina that destroyed New Orleans 
really happened. As we have shown, however, in order for their ‘realism’ to work they 
would have to show that the intransitive, mind-independent objects exhibit the 
constraining and enabling effects on agency out of their own nature as objects and can 
be grasped as what they are without recourse to human values or interests. By focussing 
on the role of language in making statements about the world we have shown that such 
an access cannot be achieved and that intransitive objects in their conceptualisations by 
and for humans will always be tainted by specific understandings that we bring to our 
enquiries. The dilemma we were left with was the choice between a reification of 
C o n c l u s i o n   P a g e  | 301 
 
observable and unobservable entities as mind-independent and graspable in a neutral 
way and the powers of the human mind in creating realities according to its whim. The 
later option was exactly the one critical realists argued against by saying that objects in 
the world cannot simply by what we make of them – water cannot become oil just 
because we decide it and neither do unobservables such as the state simply vanish if we 
stop talking about them. The mind can neither simply change reality nor make it 
disappear.  
As we have said above, the core of this argument is correct. It is neither the case that the 
mind simply creates reality nor will it ever be possible to devise an epistemological 
toolset that will produce universally valid and necessary knowledge. But as we have 
shown, the way critical realists have chosen to respond to these problems cannot lie 
with a mere shift towards ontological foundationalism that posits the outer world as 
enabling and constraining and thereby provide a basis to start our enquiries from. This is 
simply another way to achieve the secure foundation where a world based on the 
subject-object dichotomy can be rested on.  
Rather, and this is what the remainder of the thesis argued it is necessary to dig deeper 
in order to uncover the root conditions that lead to dead ends in all cases of 
foundationalism. The question that was raised was whether the dichotomy between 
subject and object and the concomitant substance-ontology is in fact as intuitive and 
natural as modern thought had made them. It was argued that instead of simply buying 
into these assumptions and try to find a solution within this framework we have to 
question the framework and try to think anew through the notion of ontology. In this 
way we have outlined four core elements – agency, language, truth and freedom – that 
in modern philosophy were closely tied to the notion of the human subject and 
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consciousness. By showing how these terms can be unhinged from the tradition we have 
shown that the modern concept of subjectivity and consciousness is itself a peculiar 
construction that arose with the modern worldview in which God as the central being 
had been transplanted by the human subject as the shaper and master of nature. By 
drawing upon the insights of many thinkers within the phenomenological tradition of 
the 20th century, most notably, Martin Heidegger, we have shown how a 
reconceptualisation of ontology based on the quest for the meaning of being rather than 
on the nature of beings can pave the way to a new and innovative approach to matters 
pertaining to human existence in the social and political realm. We have shown that the 
crucial difference between human being and human beings provides a new way to grasp 
our relation to the world by overcoming the monadic conception of consciousness and 
conceptualising intentionality into the public sphere. By being always already immersed 
and involved in a world and by belonging to a language community which shapes and 
negotiates meaning publically, the individual human being does not exhibit a self-
transparent but rather a self-transcendent consciousness. Likewise, we have shown that 
the notion of truth can assume meaning outside the rigid corset of modern epistemology 
with its focus on certainty. Truth does not reside in correct representations of the world 
by individual consciousnesses but arises out of a rupture of reference when human 
beings are faced with their own finitude. Enquiries into the social and political realm do 
not lead to universal truths but to disclosive facets of Dasein and its relation to a world. 
This is why the modern stipulation of theoretical and objective knowledge has to be 
supplanted by a renewed emphasis on practices that reveal human projects and 
involvement in historically contextual situations. And finally, we have show how 
freedom is not to be seen as a property of man but rather how man takes part in freedom 
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as the place where innerworldly beings assume meaning in the clearing provided by 
Dasein. The freedom that we are lets beings be, neither in a way that beings determine 
human action nor in the way that human can decide arbitrarily what these beings are. 
Dasein in its capacity to let beings be takes part in freedom through the instantiation of 
possibilites that are its own. It is thereby temporally dynamic in that past projections of 
its possibilities provide the framework in which future projections will be cast. Again, 
this does not mean that human beings can be whatever they want but that human being 
achieves its own realisation in developing into its own possibilities. Agency and 
structure as has been argued above are already second-order abstractions that arise out 
of a theoretical attitude. Structure in its phenomenological state becomes spatialised 
agency, not dependent upon human beings but realised as what it is through Dasein. 
 
The question remains what status this new ontology can achieve in the scholarly debates 
in IR. In order to assess this question more clearly we will first turn to the inherent 
limits of the ontology presented here and then move on to more concrete examples 
within the scholarly debate that might profit from this new social ontology. 
 
The new social ontology – limits and perspectives 
 
As was shown above, what held the different elements of the new social ontology 
proposed here together was the critique of the modern notion of consciousness and its 
alleged powers. This focus on a critique of consciousness seemed warranted in light of 
the scholarly debates this ontology seeks to influence – debates evolving around the 
social and political aspects of human existence. And yet, it has to be clearly stated that 
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this depiction of ontology is itself necessarily written from a specific perspective and 
not to be understood as an objective account. The perspective in which the new social 
ontology was framed was guided by the critique of consciousness. The resulting 
conceptualisation is therefore itself only one of many possible Abschattungen in which 
this ontology can appear. In order to show elements that were only intrinsically dealt 
with or even sidelined in the current endeavour it is necessary to demonstrate how the 
proposed ontology, without substantially changing, can alternatively be portrayed. 
One element that comes through here and then in the above conceptualisation but is 
never fully discussed is the notion of time. Especially with focus on Heidegger’s work, 
the notion of time is nevertheless central and the ontology as it was presented here could 
have easily been written not as a critique of Cartesian consciousness but as a 
reconceptualisation of time as being. Time or temporality for Heidegger is central and 
closely tied to his concept of being in that human being in particular can only be 
individualised through time. The experiences individual beings make through their 
constant involvement in projects and the equally constant breakdown of their 
instruments in pursuit of these projects can assume meaning only in time. There is 
certainly research left to be done in the respect of this notion of time that is concomitant 
to the new ontology sketched here. 
Secondly, we also have to recognise that human being in all its temporality is 
nevertheless a spatial being. It has a corporeal existence as body which, again starting 
with Descartes has been naturalised as a res extensa. It seems, however, important to 
develop the notion of embodiment and the role of the body within the life and world of 
the individual human being as something closely connected to the realisation of its own 
possibilities of Dasein. Heidegger himself very much neglected the corporeal aspects of 
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human existence and was righteously criticised for this omission. A reconceptualisation 
of the body as central to human existence would hereby present another Abschattung of 
this new social ontology, a perspective that will postulate the same underlying claims 
but from a different angle. How central the body is for phenomenological thought can 
be seen most impressively in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, particularly in The 
Phenomenology of Perception. Again, in respect to the role of the body future research 
has to be conducted and the role of spatiality in human existence has to be linked to 
social questions. 
Finally, the conception of the new social ontology as it has been begun here does not 
explicitly deal with the ethical ramifications of this thought. When challenging the 
predominant conception of agency as mainly characterised by monadic subjectivity the 
subsequent corollaries for ethical thought and action have to be outlined. In the majority 
of modern thought, the conception of ethics, although presented in a myriad of different 
views, prescriptions and claims relied centrally on the monadic individual which was 
submitted to a Destruktion in the above chapters. Again, we find nothing in Heidegger 
directly concerning the role and conception of ethics in human existence. Other thinkers 
in the phenomenological tradition, most notably and further afield, Emmanuel Levinas, 
have pointed to the centrality of ethics in human life and conduct. This Abschattung has 
to be explored thoroughly since it pertains to human social and political life as one of its 
central pillars of concern.  
These three aspects that have not been discussed at length in the preceeding chapters 
leave ample room for future research and substantial additions to the ontology presented 
above. It has, however, to be pointed out at the same time that the lack of these three 
perspectives does by no means invalidate the findings and arguments presented above. 
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Again, in line with the position presented here, the current enquiry started with a 
specific problem in relation to the modern conception of ontology and the question 
therefore made it appropriate to answer this question form a specific angle. There are 
questions in relation to human being that have not been addressed or even raised here 
and these admittedly will prompt and demand the conceptualisation of this new 
ontology from different angles. This ontology will never be grasped as a whole and 
described from an imagined ‘outside’. It will always remain bound to a perspective that 
is equally guided by the questioner as it is guided by the problem raised. Any 
conception in this way will provide a new clearing opened by the enquirer who lets the 
problem unfold in front of herself, immersed and involved in a world and occupied with 
future projects and possibilities. 
 
The new social ontology – Paths for future research in International Relations 
 
The last section will now turn to the more concrete ‘added value’ of the above presented 
social ontology. As was repeatedly emphasised throughout the thesis, the 
conceptualisation of this new ontology was not concerned with a particular problem or 
event in the international scene but aimed at critiquing and overcoming one of the most 
naturalised positions exhibited in many instances of research in IR. As such it had to be 
conducted on a very abstract level which made it not immediately apparent how this 
critique can influence research projects in the field of IR specifically. Therefore, we will 
now proceed to outlining two exemplary fields of interest in which this new social 
ontology could open new perspectives and roads to research in IR. 
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Central terms in international politics 
 
The first area in which the ontology developed above could open new ways of 
understanding lies in the central notions that guide international relations discourse, 
such as trust, fear and uncertainty.  
In recent publications the notion of trust and its relation to uncertainty and fear has been 
scrutinised in order to illuminate ways in which trust can be created in the international 
system. (see for instance Booth and Wheeler, 2008) One of the main starting points for 
these studies was the contention of a certainty of uncertainty. It was argued that the 
initial feature of the international system consists in the all-encompassing lack of 
knowledge coupled with an equally important lack of a sovereign authority on the 
international stage. Out of this picture a constant state of uncertainty evolves which 
necessitates trust in order to enable a chance for peaceful coexistence or even 
cooperation in the international scene.  
Without having to immerse too deeply into the particulars of how trust can be achieved 
it seems generally that the actual starting point for this approach lies actually, and 
against the stipulation presented above, with certainty rather than uncertainty for mainly 
two reasons. First, the underlying assumption assumes the certainty of uncertainty in the 
international realm. But where and how do we achieve this certainty? The most obvious 
answer is that it can be observed when analyzing facts of international politics such as 
state behaviour (so for example the behaviour of the US towards Iran). As was argued 
above, however, it is impossible to state neutrally what this behaviour exhibits because 
there are always a number of incompatible interpretations for each fact leaving the 
desired outcome uncertain in itself. The positing of an ‘intransitive’ object or fact that 
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simply exists independent of the human mind begs the question of how we can come to 
know it in its independence if the only way we have to approach it lies with the capacity 
of our minds. This was, as we remember the starting point for this thesis.  
Secondly, the account of uncertainty relies upon certainty because uncertainty is 
understood as the mere absence of certainty. Here certainty and uncertainty are 
conceptually on a qualitatively different level. Absolute certainty can theoretically be 
grasped without the concept of uncertainty but uncertainty cannot be grasped without a 
prior conception of certainty. In other words, uncertainty is only defined in negative 
terms and lacks a ‘positive’ and substantial delineation of its conceptual characteristics. 
 
This now leaves one with two alternatives. Either one admits that the actual starting 
point lies with certainty (the certainty of uncertainty) but then it is necessary to account 
for this certainty, i.e. what makes one certain of uncertainty which will run into 
difficulties in its search for this certain point of departure. 
Or, and this is the second and much more promising alternative, one can actually try to 
flesh out what the notion on uncertainty entails substantially, i.e. how and when 
uncertainty emerges independent of the concept of certainty. In this way, certainty is 
still important but uncertainty is now elevated to a qualitatively equal level of 
conceptualization. If one substantiates the concept of uncertainty on its own terms, 
however, it seems that an epistemological approach alone does not get very far since 
uncertainty in epistemological terms always only describes a ‘lack of knowledge’ and 
therefore remains negatively conceptualized.  
A more promising way seems to lie with the ontological manifestation of uncertainty 
which usually is only treated as a consequence of epistemological uncertainty (so for 
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instance if I am uncertain of what I will be or what will happen to me after my death, 
the usual argument would be that this uncertainty derives simply from my lack of 
knowledge about death). In fact, however, this sequence is not as clear as it seems. The 
question can be raised whether it is not rather the case that I experience my inevitable 
death in everyday life and thereby my finitude as human being first through the pre-
theoretical understanding of being characteristic of Dasein. Out of this experience (my 
being-towards-death) I then raise the epistemological question regarding my death 
which remains inconclusive. My awareness of my own finitude as human being is not 
established through a theoretical reflection but is already derived from a pre-
epistemological understanding of what it is to be human. Knowledge and the different 
ways to obtain it derive from the attempt to grasp and manage this already perceived 
finitude more clearly and must be seen as derivative. In this sense one can argue that 
uncertainty does not derive from human thought or lack of knowledge but rather that 
human being takes part in uncertainty as the finitude and the being-towards-death which 
is the very being of human being. Uncertainty hereby becomes the conditionality of 
human being and the ground of the possibility of being human.  
In the same way one could ask how we should conceptualise the relation of trust and 
uncertainty. Is it really the case that uncertainty is the basis for the need for trust or is it 
rather that trust is an occurrence in our everyday lives that reveals the uncertainty we 
face. This is by no means a trivial question since it jeopardizes any epistemological 
primacy and would refocus the approach towards the ontological dimension of being 
human.  
If this, however, is the case, we can subsequently argue that our approach to uncertainty 
in its epistemological dimension is not the only and probably not even the fundamental 
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dimension we would have to consider when talking about trust. It certainly stays valid 
but will show itself as derivative from an ontological encounter with uncertainty. The 
question we would therefore have to ask is: Where and how do human beings encounter 
uncertainty in their being human? 
 
Considering this question, the answer we can find is that uncertainty is encountered in 
our everyday lives through the finitude of humans in its different shapes (only one of 
which is the finitude of our knowledge). Finitude is most worryingly encountered in the 
fact that we have to die. To be clear, this encounter is not an abstract one which simply 
consists in our knowledge that death is inevitable but in the ontological comportment 
towards death, i.e. in our being human. The knowledge of death is only derivative 
because we do not primordially stand back from ourselves and take ourselves as objects 
but relate to our being in a much more direct way. Uncertainty in this way is an 
encounter with ‘nothingness’ which is captured in the primordial mood of Angst 
(anxiety or dread). Anxiety is a non-directional mood that brings human beings into the 
presence of the totality of the world and reveals the finitude and powerlessness of 
human being in face of the vastness of the environment it is situated in.  
Human being always flees in the sight of anxiety and conceals it through a redirection 
towards different other moods. Two of the ways in which human being conceals anxiety 
is arguably fear and trust. Both redirect the direct experience of nothingness towards 
something. Fear is an inauthentic occurrence here because it merely serves to conceal 
the much deeper and frightful occurrence of anxiety. If we fear something we at least 
can focus on something rather than nothing and try to devise methods to protect 
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ourselves from it – we cannot protect ourselves from nothing exactly because it is 
nothing and not something.  
In this way it can be suggested that it might be worthwhile to consider trust as another 
inauthentic occurrence that conceals our primordial mood of Angst in the face of 
nothingness. This would exactly ground trust in an existential analytic of human 
Dasein. Such a conceptualization, however, would have far-reaching consequences for 
our conceptualisation of trust because trust is encountered not in thought or 
consciousness but is expressed in action. There is a clear difference between the 
utterance of trust and the action of trust. I can say to myself or to someone else that ‘I 
trust X’, but this declaration alone does not constitute trust, in fact it already exhibits a 
certain degree of mistrust since I obviously considered consciously whether to trust or 
not. By doing so, however, there already must have been reasons for this consideration, 
i.e. reasons to be mistrustful. Pure trust, therefore, one could argue, does by no means 
depend upon consciousness or thought but in fact shows itself in non-conscious 
behaviour. One can tell oneself a million times that one trusts X but there might still 
remain mistrust which cannot be overcome by conscious willing – trust is necessarily 
praxeological, emotive and intrinsically non-conscious.  
This conception of trust, however, causes huge problems in the light of recent 
arguments that aim at devising trust-building measures. If trust is not a conscious and 
wilfully producible outcome, the question of how trust can be ‘engineered’ becomes of 
primary importance. Trust is then not simply a calculated outcome of consciously 
devised action but always exhibits a strong ‘irrational’ component that is beyond the 
direct control of the human will. That is not to say that trust is not possible in the 
international sphere but it is to say that first the outcome will never be determinable in 
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respect to its causes because the ‘irrational’ component and its influence in trust-
building is not measurable and secondly that subsequently no ‘method’ can be devised 
that should facilitate trust-building in the international sphere. In other words the 
occurrence of trust cannot be subsumed under any form of technique but remains in its 
frequency and emergence intrinsically idiosyncratic and situational. 
Furthermore, the fact that trust cannot be controlled consciously by will and thought 
opens questions regarding the way ontology has been understood so far, namely as 
substance-ontology. Here we come full circle to the original problem in Wendt, Wight 
and other scientific realists. In his account Wight takes the subject-object divide as a 
primordial state of affairs and tries to solve the concomitant problems by shifting from a 
sure method of the attainment of knowledge (epistemological foundationalism) to the 
existence of ‘intransitive objects’ (ontological foundationalism). This move, however, is 
only possible, when remaining within the purview of a substance-ontology in which 
every object of study can be defined according to a neutral set of characteristics 
untainted by human values. Such a conception favours the theoretical attitude which, 
however, can actually be shown as derivative in comparison to the situatedness in an 
understanding of being which we always already share and which undermines any 
attempt to grasp entities in their ‘objective’ and ‘real’ occurrence of being.  
Even in these short remarks one can see how an ontological appropriation pertaining to 
matters of trust (and uncertainty) can help open new perspectives and generate new 
insights. 
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The politics of co-anairesis or dying-with – a phenomenological approach to genocide 
 
Another field that could profit from the perspective of the new social ontology is the 
study of politically motivated mass death. Although many scholars in various fields 
work on and contribute to the understanding of the emergence of mass death in the 20th 
century, we can hardly find a contribution that reflects on the meaning of the 
phenomenon as such – mass death. It seems that in most accounts we find the pursuit 
and development of means to reconcile, allocate responsibility, punish or proactively 
deal with matters of mass death within political contexts. (see for instance Staub, 2002; 
Baumann, 1989; Valentino, 2004) Death, however, the phenomenon around which all 
these efforts evolve, hardly ever features in these accounts. Important here seems to be 
the question: What characterises political mass death? By that we do not mean a 
scientific or essentialist enterprise that determines for instance how many deaths there 
have to be before one can speak of mass death? What it does mean is a central re-
evaluation of death as an event within the political sphere. Is it, for instance, appropriate 
to deal with (political mass) death always as individually experienced destruction of 
large numbers of human beings? Surely, the first reaction to this question would be that 
it is necessarily individual since individual humans meet death on their own even in a 
technologised event of mass annihilation. This initially obvious observation, however, 
already reveals a commitment to a specific view of the notion of the human agent and 
her relation to the environment she lives in. In this case it is the classic Cartesian notion 
of the subject, a monad that lives and dies individually as it was critiqued above. It is 
often just assumed that the individual is the organic unit of human existence and, as 
Louiza Odysseos has shown, that coexistence is merely understood as composition, the 
mere living side-by-side of already constituted individuals. Coexistence, however, 
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implies more than just this notion of composition. It is characterised by the ontological 
intersection of different life-projects based on their common characteristic of being 
placed in a world that is beyond the individual’s reach or control (Heidegger’s 
thrownness.) In very much the same way, death is, even when it occurs in the form of 
political mass death, always already framed within the modern notion of subjectivity 
and individuality. The event of mass death is a process of annihilating individuals in 
large numbers, a composite death of numerous monads. It can, however, be argued that 
when human co-existence is defined by thrownness, i.e. by the stipulation that the 
totality of human existence and experience is always already beyond the reach of the 
individual, the process of co-death or dying-with must also be understood as reaching 
beyond the physical destruction of individuals. This is meant by the term co-anairesis. 
 
It is therefore possible to re-thinking the phenomenon of mass death from a new angle 
that on the one hand challenges the existing notion of death as necessarily individual by 
enquiring into the phenomenon of the ‘death-event’ which can assume an individual as 
well as communal character. Secondly, it provides new inputs in the discussions 
evolving around the notions of suffering, responsibility, justice and reconciliation in 
cases of political mass death.  
The starting is provided by the notion of engaged agency as we can find in many 
instances of post-Husserlian phenomenology and related interpretive approaches as for 
instance in Charles Taylor’s work. This notion of engaged agency that embeds the 
human agent in a world which he can never fully master or control necessitates a re-
evaluation of death, especially mass death. First, we would have to show what it 
actually means to die for a human agent. As will be argued death does not necessarily 
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describe physical destruction but can also entail the de-humanisation of humans. With 
de-humanisation we do not mean a specific physical or psychological treatment but the 
denial of thrown-projections and concomitantly the essentialisation of the human agents 
in question. As has been pointed out by many thinkers in the phenomenological 
tradition, human existence is essentially an existence in time where the individual being 
projects herself permanently into the future. In this sense we can never speak of ‘what’ 
a human being is but only ‘how’ he or she is given the contextual circumstances and the 
projected possibilities. In this sense in many cases of mass deaths in the 20th century we 
can actually observe the destruction of the human agent before the physical killing of 
the human agent. This conceptualisation of death as a rupture of and in time is 
connected to the larger claim that in many instances in which events or processes are 
analysed, the existential characteristic of time and its relation to human being-in-the-
world is neglected in favour of the spatial element that often takes precedence in 
strategic or analytic assessments. 
Very closely related to any conceptualisation of the human agent is the use and role of 
language that in the cases of mass death necessarily changes its meaning. The projection 
of future possibilities is normally expressed through the medium of language which 
operates within the social realm of competing and complimentary life projects. With the 
advent of mass death, language ceases to express life projects and is transformed into 
either a designative tool of suffering for those affected or a medium of memory and 
grief for the survivors or friends and families. Language in both cases is transformed 
into a medium of remembrance - it is silenced towards the future. An appreciation of 
mass death therefore must also include a close and thorough reflection on the language 
of death.  
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Likewise, life within these zones of death changes its character, not just in a material 
sense of inflicting suffering on those targeted but in its existential structure of Dasein 
itself. It seems we have to differentiate very clearly between different spheres of human 
existence here. Primordially we encounter the ‘life-world’ which describes the pre-
theoretical and praxeological level in which human agents are embedded in their 
everydayness. This life world leaves open the possibility to project oneself qualitatively 
into the future. Secondly, and this is a modern phenomenon, we encounter the 
technological society which arose out of the ‘life-world’ and aims at quantifying the 
environment we live in in order to master and subdue nature. This drive of modern 
technological human beings has been described and critiqued by quite a few critics of 
the Enlightenment project. It has also been pointed out repeatedly that the 
intertwinement between this technologisation of society and the increased capacity to 
inflict mass death upon fellow humans is inextricable. What seems to be in need of 
further scrutinising is the occurrence and meaning of political mass-death as such which 
arises out of this technological society. 
The third level in this respect describes the specific situation of occurring mass deaths 
and can in a Heideggerian fashion be labelled the ‘death world’. The death world is not 
congruent to technological society but it arises out of it in the same fashion as 
technological society arose out of the ‘life-world’. It presents simply an actualised 
possibility of human development. The death-world in this sense tries to achieve two 
things: first, it strives at reinstating meaning into the meaningless void of quantified 
categorisation that arises out of technological society by means of destruction. 
Secondly, once the malign elements that are ‘worthy’ of destruction have been 
identified it aims at a suspension of time or the collapse of temporal existence. This 
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process is an extension of the first point. In the quest for meaning the death-world 
essentialises those in society that are perceived to hinder the projection of future 
possibilities, those that are seen as parasitic on the society and a drain on its resources 
for future development as projected by those dominant in the community. This whole 
process can again be linked to the notion of Angst which human beings are confronted 
with in any breakdown of their projects. The stigmatisation of a real or imagined group 
serves hereby as a tool to redirect the non-directional mood of Angst towards a 
directional and inauthentic mood of fear. The group of people declared unworthy to live 
are not only locked away and systematically killed (i.e. physically destroyed). As a first 
step they are de-humanised by a process of essentialising their existence.  
A person that was labelled a Jew under the Nazi regime, for instance, was by this 
essentialising act already robbed of her humanity by literally de-temporalising her 
existence. The past was forgotten and the future denied for those labelled superfluous 
and dispensable. Many German Jews fought in WWI but they were not spared as 
patriotic as they were. In the same vein, the future is taken away from them since their 
incarceration and destruction cuts them off from their own life-projects and their life 
ceases to be a possibility into which they developed and instead remains stagnant. They 
are existentially ripped out of the flow of time which characterises them as human 
beings. Instead they can now be defined, the meaning of their lives and their identities 
can be fixed exogenously as they find themselves bereft of power to project themselves 
into the future. The death-world signifies not only the physical destruction by 
technological means but the suspension of time and therefore the denial of humanity for 
those singled out. As it becomes clear from these short remarks the notion of death is 
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not confined to the physical destruction of individuals but assumes a new meaning in 
the vortex of ‘life-world’, technological society and ‘death-world’.  
Again, it is only possible to outline this approach towards the notion of dying-with or 
co-anairesis. Nevertheless, it shows clearly how the above developed conception of a 
new social ontology can be brought to bear upon themes within the political and social 
sphere, producing new and substantial insights into phenomena and opening new ways 
of research. 
 
 
The examples given here are only two of many more that become possible in light of 
the findings presented above. It is important to point out once more that the main aim of 
the thesis does not lie with closing spaces of research by introducing a new orthodoxy 
into the field of IR and demanding that every research project has to work within its 
confines. It was pointed out time and again throughout the thesis that the critique 
delivered here does not ‘rule out’ or ‘invalidate’ other approaches and methods but that 
it shows the underlying assumptions and convictions that 350 years of modern 
philosophy reified beyond questioning. It is intended to provide a contribution to the 
increasing philosophical and methodological sophistication in the academic field of 
International Relations that was identified at the beginning of the thesis. After the 
disillusion experienced in the breakdown of the Enlightenment’s quest for secure and 
indubitable foundations out of which certain and objective knowledge can arise new 
paths had to be explored and it is certainly fair to say that this process of exploration is 
far from over.  
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In light of these challenges the more and more diverse representation of International 
Relations as a strongly interdisciplinary field must unreservedly be welcomed. Rather 
than predicting chaos and a loss of parsimony and rigour as some of the old 
‘gatekeepers’ do in face of the waves of new and critical scholarship, there is 
undeniably a need to react to the historical and intellectual challenges in a vibrant 
academic environment. International Relations as a comparably young area of study 
opens in this respect the possibilities for unorthodox and undogmatic scholarship to 
explore the different facets of social and political life. One of these facets must concern 
our relation as scholars and human beings in general to the world we are trying to 
understand. Ontology and ontological assumptions, albeit abstract in their philosophical 
and methodological conceptualisations, are inherent in all accounts of engagements with 
the social and political world and therefore assume an immediate importance in 
everyday research. The foundations upon which this research rests belong to the 
academic endeavours in IR to the same extent as does empirical research and without 
continuously engaging with these foundations we will risk to loose the dynamic and 
critical edge which prevents the fall into a narrow dogmatism. 
In this sense the thesis is a beginning and not an end. and we again feel reminded of 
Heidegger’s dictum that served as a motto for chapter I. “The most thought-provoking 
thing in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.” In this sense, it 
remains to hope that the arguments presented in this thesis will spark new thinking.
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